Category:Deprivation of liberty
The old category structure used on this page is comprehensive as it contains every relevant case. The new database structure was introduced in 2019. It is more potentially useful than the old categorisation system: it includes all cases since January 2017, but only a minority of older cases: see Special:Drilldown/Cases. The pages below are initially ordered according to the dates on which they were added to the site (most recent first). The order can be changed by clicking on the symbol beside a column heading: click on the symbol beside "Page and summary" for alphabetical order; click beside "Categories" for the order in which the cases were reported. Click on the arrow symbol again to reverse the order. Click on a page name to view the relevant page. Asterisks mark those cases which have been added to the new database structure.
| Case and summary | Date added | Categories |
|---|---|---|
| * DOL in police cell Surrey Police v PC [2024] EWHC 1274 (Fam) — (1) The High Court authorised deprivation of liberty under its inherent jurisdiction in a police cell while a hospital bed was being found. (2) The judge endorsed guidance advocated by the Official Solicitor for future cases that involve an application to the court to authorise the deprivation of an individual's liberty in the police station either under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court or section 4A of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. (3) The local authority was ordered to pay the OS's costs. | 2024‑06‑13 13:56:02 | ICLR summary
|
| * Anticipatory declarations Somerset NHS Foundation Trust v Amira [2023] EWCOP 25 — The trust sought anticipatory declarations concerning what would be lawful and in Amira's best interests were she to lose capacity during childbirth: under s15 MCA 2005 about treatment under the care plan, and under the inherent jurisdiction about associated restraint or deprivation of liberty. The day before the hearing the trust assessed that she now lacked capacity. The court agreed and declared the care plan to be in her best interests, but made the following obiter comments: (1) The Court of Protection does not have any power to make anticipatory declarations under s15(1)(c) in relation to someone who currently has capacity, and earlier cases were wrongly decided. (2) A s48 interim order (which would have been relevant if the decision on capacity had been different) cannot authorise deprivation of liberty, but it is ECHR-compliant for temporary deprivation of liberty in emergency cases to be authorised under the inherent jurisdiction. (3) In a litigious world trusts want "the gold standard of immunity" (orders under ss16(2)(a) and 4A(3) and (4), or even a s48 interim order with inherent jurisdiction deprivation of liberty), but these could be difficult to obtain quickly enough and equivalent immunity could be obtained using ss4B, 5 and 6, which is the route that Parliament intended. | 2023‑06‑20 12:06:11 | 2023 cases
|
| * DOLS ineligibility under Case E Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust v JS [2023] EWCOP 12 — Jane, a 17-year-old patient, had been detained under s2 on an acute medical ward following a paracetamol overdose. When the s2 expired her detention continued as before, purportedly under common law but in fact unlawfully, and an application was made to the court. The plan was to discharge Jane to her mother's in a few days once a care package was arranged. (1) The court decided that she lacked capacity in relation to residence, care and treatment and that, inappropriate as it was (the ward being mixed-sex, all-ages, non-psychiatric and non-CAMHS), it was in her best interests to remain for the time being, and it therefore authorised the plan in the interim. (2) The court subsequently considered "ineligibility" under Case E for MCA detention, which arises when a patient is within the scope of the MHA (essentially, when an MHA application could be made and the patient could be detained) and the patient objects to at least some of the mental health treatment. The team responsible for conducting gatekeeping assessments for Tier 4 in-patient units had decided she did not meet the MHA criteria, but when the matter goes to court it is for the judge to decide. The patient clearly objected. She met the MHA criteria: she needed to be nursed safely and medicated to address the effects of her mental disorder, and no alternative was yet available. The decision on using the MHA cannot be viewed in isolation from what is (or is not) available elsewhere at the time. The jurisdictional label (MHA, MCA, inherent jurisdiction, or common law) is irrelevant when the care plan and length of detention would be the same in practice. (3) To use the inherent jurisdiction would be inappropriate because there is no statutory gap to patch (Jane could and should have been treated under the MHA) and because to do so would provide an incentive to avoid using the MHA. | 2023‑06‑14 13:38:08 | 2023 cases
|
| * Paedophilia and DOLS DY v A City Council [2022] EWCOP 51 — DY was a man in his 20s with autistic spectrum disorder, generalised anxiety disorder and paedophilia. He was subject to a SHPO, due to expire in three months, having been convicted of two sexual assaults of a girl aged under 13, with a residence requirement and curfew, and was managed by MAPPA (category 1, level 2). He was also detained under DOLS, always being accompanied by male staff when going into the community, and appealed under s21A. (1) He argued that the primary purpose of the care plan was the protection of the public rather than to prevent harm to himself, but the judge disagreed: it would be harmful to DY were he to commit further offences (reoffending would cause stress and risk of self harm, and risk of retribution) or place himself at risk of further criminal sanctions. (2) The judge decided that he had capacity to consent to his care and support arrangements, so should be discharged from DOLS. There was a high risk of impulsive reoffending if given the opportunity but that was a matter for the criminal justice system; she hoped that he would agree to be accompanied by at least one care worker whenever he goes out. | 2022‑12‑18 22:02:33 | 2022 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2022 cases
|
| * COP proceedings during s3 dismissed PH v A Clinical Commissioning Group [2022] EWCOP 12 — Proceedings were brought under s16 MCA 2005 in respect of LH, a patient detained under s3 MHA 1983, by his mother as litigation friend, seeking orders authoring his future deprivation of liberty in the community and other related declarations. There was no jurisdictional bar to the court making such orders, but LH's discharge from the MHA was not imminent and court oversight of the process would be costly and inefficient for the parties and the court. The application was therefore dismissed. | 2022‑07‑24 22:00:16 | 2022 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment missing from Bailii, 2022 cases
|
| * Contact MB v PB [2022] EWCOP 14 — "P is subject to a standard authorisation at the care home. Pursuant to the order of Francis J made on 21 April 2021, P’s husband MB has had his access to the care home and contact with P very substantially restricted. By these proceedings, MB challenges the standard authorisation and the contact restrictions. Although the proceedings have been brought as a challenge pursuant to section 21A of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the court has the power pursuant to section 16 Mental Capacity Act to make decisions on behalf of P as an incapacitated adult applying a best interests test as set out in section 4 of the Act." | 2022‑07‑23 21:43:57 | 2022 cases, Best interests, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2022 cases
|
| * Deprivation of liberty in hospital M v Ukraine 2452/04 [2012] ECHR 732 — M was too late to complain about her first hospitalisation. Her second, third and fourth hospitalisations violated Article 5(1) for procedural reasons. The fourth hospitalisation involved deprivation of liberty, despite the government's position that it had been voluntary. She was awarded €12,000 non-pecuniary damages. | 2021‑11‑23 11:44:12 | 2012 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ECHR deprivation of liberty cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2012 cases
|
| * Deprivation of liberty in own home London Borough of Havering v AEL [2021] EWCOP 9 — The father of AEL, a 31-year-old woman with trisomy 4p syndrome, objected to the description of his care for his daughter as a deprivation of liberty, his approach to care being founded on the principle that "AEL decides what she wants to do and when she wants to do it excepting if her safety could be compromised". The judge applied the Cheshire West "acid test", and decided that the objective element of deprivation of liberty was met (the subjective element and imputability to the state were not discussed) and therefore that AEL was being deprived of her liberty. | 2021‑10‑10 20:33:33 | 2021 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2021 cases
|
| * DOLS scrutiny Re YC [2021] EWCOP 34 — "This appeal raises an important question about how supervisory bodies should evidence their scrutiny of requests for authorisation of deprivation of liberty. ... There appears to be broad agreement that the following procedure is both workable and appropriate: (a) Firstly, the person granting the authorisation should carefully check that all details on Form 5 accurately reflect the other DOLS forms and relate to the particular P; (b) The Form 5 should be checked for accuracy by another member of the DOLS authorisation team of the supervisory body; (c) Form 5 should be provided to the RPR [Relevant Person's Representative] with a covering letter requesting that the RPR carefully checks that the forms, and all the information in them accurately relates to the relevant person; (d) An express requirement for the RPR to confirm accuracy to the supervisory body would be disproportionate but the RPR could do so." | 2021‑06‑10 13:03:03 | 2021 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2021 cases
|
| * Removal of family member from home A Local Authority v TA [2021] EWCOP 22 — GA was an 87-year-old woman who lacked capacity to make decisions about her residence, health, or care needs owing to severe and deteriorating dementia. Living with her was her son TA (a controlling presence), daughter XA (visiting to assist TA), and son HA (believed to have schizophrenia). The court ordered TA and XA to leave the home, so that GA could receive social and medical care at home and have contact with other members of the family, and authorised GA's deprivation of liberty there. The court also prevented TA from returning within 100 yds, ordered him not to use GA's Motability car and not to publish information on the internet, limited his correspondence with the local authority and Official Solicitor, and made a civil restraint order for a period of two years. Committal proceedings brought by the local authority were to be considered at a future hearing. | 2021‑05‑16 08:31:29 | 2021 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Other capacity cases, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2021 cases
|
| * Unlawful DOL damages London Borough of Haringey v Emile [2020] MHLO 70 (CC) — The local authority commenced proceedings seeking payment of £80,913.38 outstanding care fees, and were successful, but ended up also being ordered to pay damages of £130,000 (uplifted to £143,000) for 7 years and 10 months of unlawful deprivation of liberty, and costs following their refusal of an offer to settle. It appealed from the District Judge to a Circuit Judge, unsuccessfully. | 2021‑02‑11 23:06:24 | 2020 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, Neutral citation unknown or not applicable, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Unlawful detention cases, 2020 cases
|
| * Deprivation of liberty during conditional discharge Birmingham City Council v SR [2019] EWCOP 28 — (1) Both patients supported but lacked capacity in relation to the proposed care plans, which involved deprivation of liberty concurrently with a conditional discharge, and those plans were in their best interests. (2) Obiter, the division in the MOJ's post-MM guidance (MCA DOL for incapacitous patients whose risk is to themselves, but MHA s17 leave for incapacitous patients whose risk is to others and for capacitous patients) did not withstand scrutiny as it is in patients' best interests to be kept "out of mischief" and therefore out of psychiatric hospital. | 2020‑10‑17 09:00:36 | 2019 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Discharge conditions cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2019 cases
|
| * Conditional discharge and DOL MC v Cygnet Behavioural Health Ltd [2020] UKUT 230 (AAC) — (1) Although, following MM, the First-tier Tribunal has no power to impose conditions which would amount to a deprivation of liberty, it does have the power to coordinate its decision with the provision of an authorisation under the MCA, either by "the different hats approach" (the same judge sitting in the COP and the FTT) or "the ducks in a row approach" (adjournment or deferred conditional discharge). (2) This involves no Article 14 discrimination in favour of incapacitous restricted patients as, under SSJ guidance, the equivalent outcome can be reached for capacitous patients by using s17 leave. (3) The FTT had misunderstood the MM decision and had been wrong to refuse to defer conditional discharge for a standard authorisation to be put in place. (4) The UT discharged the patient subject to conditions of residence, supervision and compliance with "all aspects of the care package" (surprisingly, as the care package would amount to a deprivation of liberty), to take effect on a specified future date (which s73 does not permit), and with permission to apply to the FTT for variation on a material change in circumstances (presumably only before conditional discharge). | 2020‑07‑24 21:31:01 | 2020 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Discharge conditions cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Judgment available on MHLO, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions, Judgment available on Bailii, 2020 cases
|
| * Sexual relations and contact with husband Re SF [2020] EWCOP 15 — (1) SF lacked capacity in relation to some areas (litigation, care, residence, finances, tenancy, contact with strangers and people who are unfamiliar) but did have capacity to consent to sexual relations and to decide on contact with her husband. The psychiatric evidence was that SF would only have episodic memory ("memory for the personally experienced events of a person’s life, with retention of the details of time and situation in which they were acquired") in relation to contact with strangers, but would have semantic memory ("knowledge which is retained irrespective of the circumstances in which it was acquired [deriving] from the 'feeling' around the memory rather than the 'facts' surrounding the memory") in relation to her husband. (2) The court authorised the deprivation of liberty which existed both when living at her home and (on an interim basis until authorised by the placement) when receiving respite care at a residential supported care provision. | 2020‑07‑18 20:31:17 | 2020 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Sex and marriage cases, Judgment available on Bailii, 2020 cases
|
| * Capacity - DOL Sunderland City Council v AS [2020] EWCOP 13 — (1) The court decided that a CTO patient lacked capacity in all relevant areas (litigation, residence, care and contact). When giving oral evidence the jointly-instructed psychologist changed her mind on: litigation capacity (initially she thought AS had litigation capacity while not having subject matter capacity), residence (she placed insufficient weight on 'structure and routine', which is an integral part of the information relevant to a decision on residence in supported as opposed to independent living), and fluctuating capacity. The judge noted with approval the approach in NICE guidance on "Decision-making and mental capacity" to people with executive dysfunction. (2) The court authorised the deprivation of liberty (there was a high level of supervision throughout the day and night, in the accommodation and community). | 2020‑07‑07 16:47:31 | 2020 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Litigation capacity cases, Other capacity cases, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2020 cases
|
| * Residence and care capacity London Borough of Tower Hamlets v A [2020] EWCOP 21 — (1) Residence and care decisions are usually considered as individual domains of capacity, in keeping with the MCA's "issue-specific" approach; residence and care decisions involve overlapping information and are not made in separate "silos"; overlap does not mean that a residence decision incorporates a care decision: it is not necessary to make a capacitous decision about care in order to make a capacitous decision about residence. What was required for A to make a capacitous decision about where she lives is a broad understanding of the sort of care which would be provided in each of the two places of residence potentially available to her. Although it was agreed that A lacked capacity to decide how she was cared for, it was decided that she had capacity to decide whether to continue to live in residential care or return to live in her own flat with a care package. (2) Legal Aid would have ended had the DOLS standard authorisation ended: in a postscript the judge decided that, as A had no choice until the home care package was available, "the determination that A lacks capacity to determine the care that she should receive necessarily means that she lacks capacity within the meaning of paragraph 15 of Schedule A1 (that "[t]he relevant person meets the mental capacity requirement if he lacks capacity in relation to the question whether or not he should be accommodated in the relevant hospital or care home for the purpose of being given the relevant care or treatment"). | 2020‑04‑26 09:02:36 | 2020 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Other capacity cases, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2020 cases
|
| * Inherent jurisdiction and DOL Hertfordshire CC v K [2020] EWHC 139 (Fam) — "In this matter, the question before the court is whether it should grant a deprivation of liberty order (hereafter a DOL order) under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of AK, born in 2003 and now aged 16." | 2020‑04‑02 15:27:37 | 2020 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2020 cases
|
| * DOL and common law R (Jalloh) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 4 — "The right to physical liberty was highly prized and protected by the common law long before the United Kingdom became party to the European Convention on Human Rights. A person who was unlawfully imprisoned could, and can, secure his release through the writ of habeas corpus. He could, and can, also secure damages for the tort of false imprisonment. This case is about the meaning of imprisonment at common law and whether it should, or should not, now be aligned with the concept of deprivation of liberty in article 5 of the ECHR." | 2020‑02‑19 23:01:08 | 2020 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2020 cases
|
| * Contingent/anticipatory declarations - MCA/inherent jurisdiction - Caesarean section Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust v R [2020] EWCOP 4 — R had capacity to make decisions as to her ante-natal and obstetric care but there was a risk that she would lose capacity during labour and refuse a Caesarean section. (1) MCA 2005 s16 (Powers to make decisions and appoint deputies: general) applies only to those who currently lack capacity. (2) MCA 2005 s15 (Power to make declarations) is not so limited and so can authorise contingent declarations. (3) Deprivation of liberty cannot be authorised by s15 but the inherent jurisdiction may be utilised to fill that lacuna which would otherwise render the s15 power nugatory. | 2020‑01‑30 18:54:37 | 2020 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Medical treatment cases, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2020 cases
|
| * Failure to carry out DOLS assessments Staffordshire County Council (18 004 809) [2019] MHLO 41 (LGSCO) — LGSCO decision: "The Council has acted with fault in deciding not to assess low and medium priority Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards applications. The Council is also taking too long to deal with urgent applications. This is causing a potential injustice to the thousands of people in its area who are being deprived of their liberty without the proper checks that the restrictions they are subject to are in their best interests." The final sentence of the conclusion states: "[I]t is not acceptable that the only way low and medium priority applications are resolved is because the people involved move away or die." | 2019‑08‑10 22:11:49 | 2019 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, LGO decisions, Neutral citation unknown or not applicable, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, 2019 cases
|
| * MHT/Parole Board delay LV v UK 50718/16 [2019] MHLO 32 (ECHR) — LV, a s47/49 patient, had argued that there had been a delay, in breach of Article 5(4), in securing her release, in particular because of the two-stage process involving both the Mental Health Tribunal and Parole Board. She accepted the government's offer of £2,500 in settlement of her claim. | 2019‑06‑17 13:00:24 | 2019 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available offline, Neutral citation unknown or not applicable, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, 2019 cases
|
| * Medical treatment case King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v FG [2019] EWCOP 7 — "[T]he King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust seeks an order in the following terms in relation to FG: (a) a declaration that FG lacks capacity to make decisions regarding the medical treatment for his physical health conditions; (b) that it is lawful and in FG's best interests for him to undergo an operation to repair his right shoulder fracture/dislocation; and (c) that it is in his best interests to receive any sedation and anaesthesia his clinicians think necessary to allow the operation to be done. The matter has come in front of me today as urgent applications judge." | 2019‑03‑15 21:01:36 | 2019 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Medical treatment cases, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2019 cases
|
| * Unfair summary disposal of DOL/residence case CB v Medway Council [2019] EWCOP 5 — "The simple issue is whether the Judge had sufficient information before her to discount, at this stage, any real possibility of CB returning to her home, supported by the extensive and expensive care package that is being mooted. The language of the Judgment itself, to my mind, answers this question in phrases such as “I very much doubt…. I am very sceptical…. The practicalities are…. likely to be extremely difficult….” I share the Judge’s scepticism and I also very much doubt that even with an extensive package of support a return home will be in CB’s best interest. I note too that Dr Ajiteru expressed himself in cautious terms (see para 10 above). However, scepticism and “doubt” is not sufficient to discount a proper enquiry in to such a fundamental issue of individual liberty. ... It is easy to see why the Judge took the course she did and I have a good deal of sympathy with her. She will have recognised, as do I, that the effluxion of time has had its own impact on the viability of the options in this case. However, what is involved here is nothing less than CB’s liberty. Curtailing, restricting or depriving any adult of such a fundamental freedom will always require cogent evidence and proper enquiry. I cannot envisage any circumstances where it would be right to determine such issues on the basis of speculation and general experience in other cases." | 2019‑03‑15 20:56:19 | 2019 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2019 cases
|
| * Inherent jurisdiction authorises DOL during conditional discharge Re AB (Inherent Jurisdiction: Deprivation of Liberty) [2018] EWHC 3103 (Fam) — AB had capacity to consent to the care, support and accommodation arrangements which were provided as part of his conditional discharge but, following the MM case, there was an unlawful deprivation of liberty. The High Court extended the inherent jurisdiction to regularise the position of a capacitous detained mental health patient subject to restrictions as part of his conditional discharge which satisfied the objective elements of a deprivation of liberty (firstly, it was clear that there was no legislative provision governing this situation in that the Mental Health Act provided no remedy; secondly, it was in the interests of justice; and, thirdly, there were sound and strong public policy justifications). The court order: authorised the deprivation of liberty for 12 months; required the applicant to apply to court if the restrictions increase, and no less than one month before the expiry of the authorisation; and provided for a review on the papers unless a party requests or the court requires an oral hearing. | 2018‑12‑19 01:55:42 | 2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, 2018 cases, Judgment missing from Bailii
|
| * CTO and DOL Welsh Ministers v PJ [2018] UKSC 66 — (1) There is no power to impose conditions in a CTO which have the effect of depriving a patient of his liberty. (2) The patient's situation may be relevant to the tribunal's discharge criteria, and the tribunal may explain the true legal effect of a CTO (for the RC to act on that information), but if a patient is being unlawfully detained then the remedy is either habeas corpus or judicial review. | 2018‑12‑17 14:40:29 | 2018 cases, Brief summary, CTO cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii, 2018 cases
|
| * Re RD (Deprivation or Restriction of Liberty) [2018] EWFC 47 — "The court is concerned in this application with the circumstances of RD. She is 14½ years old. She is currently the subject of an application for a care order under Part IV Children Act 1989, and is in the interim care of Northumberland County Council. ... RD has been placed by the Local Authority at a residential placement in Scotland, which I shall call Lennox House. ... The issue for my determination is whether the regime which applies to RD at Lennox House deprives her of her liberty in such a way as to engage her Article 5 ECHR rights. ... The implications of my determination are not insignificant. If I were to find as a fact that RD is deprived of her liberty in Article 5 terms, I would feel obliged to adjourn the Part IV proceedings, and would propose that the Local Authority present a petition to the nobile officium of the Court of Session seeking authorisation of that Court for RD's deprivation of liberty ... If I find that she is not deprived of her liberty, then there would be little impediment to my concluding the Part IV proceedings in this jurisdiction." | 2018‑11‑29 21:13:11 | 2018 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii, 2018 cases
|
| * SSJ v MM [2018] UKSC 60 — The patient had capacity to and was prepared to consent to a conditional discharge requiring that he live at a particular place, which he would not be free to leave, and from which he would not be allowed out without an escort. (1) The Supreme Court decided 4-1 that the MHA 1983 does not permit either the First-tier Tribunal or the Secretary of State to impose conditions amounting to detention or a deprivation of liberty upon a conditionally discharged restricted patient. (2) The dissenting decision was that the tribunal has the power to impose such conditions so long as the loss of liberty is not greater than that already authorised by the hospital and restriction orders, and that this power does not depend on the consent of the (capacitous) patient. | 2018‑11‑28 13:49:47 | 2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Powers, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii
|
| * DOL of child Re HC (A Minor: Deprivation of Liberty) [2018] EWHC 2961 (Fam) — "HC has just turned 13 years of age. I shall refer to his parents in this judgment as, respectively, M and F, and to his brother as B. HC currently lives in a residential unit in Yorkshire ("the unit"). By application dated 18th July 2018, the local authority responsible for HC's placement asks that the court determine whether HC's placement constitutes a deprivation of his liberty and, if this question is answered in the affirmative, for authorisation, by way of declaratory relief pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction. ... Although the LA brings the application, it does not assert a position one way or the other in relation to whether HC's placement at the unit constitutes a deprivation of his liberty. Exploring this rather unusual position with Ms Shaikh, I was told that the LA sought only to present the facts to the court and to leave it to me to adjudge whether the particular regime and its inherent restrictions constitutes a deprivation of liberty. In the event that I do so find, the LA seeks authorisation of the deprivation as being necessary and proportionate." | 2018‑11‑08 02:48:41 | 2018 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, 2018 cases
|
| * DOL damages Atudorei v Romania 50131/08 [2014] ECHR 947 — Breach of Articles 5 and 8, but not Article 8, relating to hospital admission. | 2018‑11‑03 23:16:39 | 2014 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, MHLR summary, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2014 cases
|
| * Fluctuating capacity Royal Borough of Greenwich v CDM [2018] EWCOP 15 — "In this case the patient is CDM, a lady aged 63 years. ... My Conclusions: (i) I conclude that CDM lacks capacity to conduct proceedings, as is agreed on behalf of CDM. (ii) I conclude that she does not have capacity to make decisions about her residence. ... (iii) By the end of the case the parties agreed that I should consider care and treatment separately. CDM carries out her own self-care, with encouragement, in the care home. I am not satisfied that she does not have the capacity so to do. There will be some occasions when she makes appropriate decisions, for example accepting insulin from the nurse, but there are many other occasions when she makes manifestly unwise decisions as a result of her personality disorder which impairs her ability to follow professional advice, whether in respect of her residence or treatment. I therefore accept Dr Series' evidence that when making appropriate decisions she has capacity but when making manifestly inappropriate decisions she lacks capacity. (iv) Property and affairs: I am troubled by the lack of evidence on this issue. ... I do not think I have any satisfactory evidence on which I can conclude that she lacks capacity in this area. (v) I conclude that she lacks capacity to surrender the tenancy of her property. This decision is intimately bound up with her ability to make decisions about residence. ... It follows and I so find that CDM lacks capacity in relation to the question whether or not she should be accommodated in CC (being the relevant hospital or care home) for the purpose of being given the relevant care or treatment. I therefore authorise her continued detention and deprivation of liberty in CC. ... This means that a further hearing will be required both to establish a mechanism under which the local authority can operate when capacity fluctuates and also to consider best interests." | 2018‑07‑03 20:15:50 | 2018 cases, 39 Essex Chambers summary, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Other capacity cases, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2018 cases
|
| * Role of COP Visitor in DOL cases Re KT [2018] EWCOP 1 — "These are four test cases that were stayed in accordance with my decision in Re JM [2016] EWCOP 15. ... There are now over 300 such cases in which the MoJ and DoH (alone or together with the relevant applicant local authority or other public body) have not been able to identify a professional who the COP could appoint to act as P's Rule 3A representative. ... The first issue raised in these test cases is whether a welfare order approving a care plan advanced as being uncontroversial and which authorises any DOL caused by its implementation will have been made by a procedure that satisfies the minimum procedural requirements of Article 5 and common law fairness if P's participation in the proceedings is through the appointment of a general visitor to prepare a report under s. 49 of the MCA and that report supports the making of that welfare order. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, the following issues arise, namely: (i) What approach should be taken by the COP to choosing this option or other options and in particular the appointment of a professional Rule 3A representative? (ii) What directions should be given to a visitor on what he should do and report on? (iii) Should the Crown be or remain as a Respondent? ... I have therefore concluded ... that periodic reviews by the COP with the benefit of information provided by a visitor meets the procedural requirements." | 2018‑02‑05 23:03:08 | 2018 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2018 cases
|
| * DOLS funding case R (Liverpool City Council) v SSH [2017] EWHC 986 (Admin) — "By these proceedings, four English councils seek to challenge what they describe as the government's 'ongoing failure to provide full, or even adequate, funding for local authorities in England to implement the deprivation of liberty regime'. They suggest that the financial shortfall suffered by councils across the country generally is somewhere between one third of a billion pounds and two thirds of a billion pounds each year and claim that the Government must meet that shortfall. They seek a declaration that, by his failure to meet those costs, the Secretary of State for Health has created an unacceptable risk of illegality and is in breach of a policy known as the 'New Burdens Doctrine'. They seek a mandatory order requiring the Secretary of State of Health to remove the 'unacceptable risk of illegality' and to comply with that doctrine." | 2017‑05‑06 23:09:09 | 2017 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2017 cases
|
| * DOL in NI Belfast Health and Social Care Trust v PT [2017] NIFam 1 — "The court considers that four questions need to be addressed in this [Northern Irish] case: (a) Does PT lack capacity? (b) Is there a gap in the existing legislation, thereby permitting the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction? (c) Is the care plan in PT’s ‘best interests’? (d) Is the care plan compliant with the ECHR? ... There is therefore no difference between the statutory test and the existing common law tests. Hence, in determining the capacity of PT in respect of welfare matters, the court can apply the test set out in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, even though that legislation does not apply in Northern Ireland, as it is in line with the existing common law tests. ... I find that PT lacks capacity to litigate, to make decisions about his care and residence and about whether to leave the home unescorted. ... Therefore, it is clear there is a lacuna or ‘gap’ in the 1986 Mental Health (NI) Order and as a result, a care plan which involves a deprivation of the liberty of a person subject to guardianship, cannot be sanctioned under the Mental Health (NI) Order 1986. Such deprivation of liberty can only be sanctioned by the High Court acting under its inherent jurisdiction. ... I find that continuous supervision by his foster mother JB and the locking of the external doors of the home and car doors whilst it is in motion are in his best interests as they protect his health and physical safety. The provisions also ensure he can continue to live with JB, with whom he has a special bond. For this reason I find that it is in his emotional best interests to remain in this placement. This can only happen if the proposed deprivation of liberty is permitted. ... Therefore, before the court exercises its inherent jurisdiction it must fully address the following questions, in order to be satisfied that any order it makes complies with the ECHR. (a) Is Article 5 is engaged? Does the care plan contain provisions which amount to a deprivation of liberty? (b) If so, are the provisions of Article 5 (1) (e) met? (c) If so, is the detention in accordance with the objective of Article 5 and is it in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law? (d) Is the proposed Order compliant with the provisions of Article 5 (4)? ... I also find that although this is a benign regime, in accordance with the definition set out in Cheshire West, PT’s care plan involves a deprivation of liberty because there is constant supervision and he is not free to leave the home as the external doors are locked and car doors are locked whilst he is present. ... I find that the provisions of Article 5 (1) (e) are met. There is objective medical evidence before the court indicating that PT is of unsound mind, this condition is persisting and is of a kind to warrant his compulsory confinement as PT needs supervision to prevent him causing harm to himself. ... I find that the care plan represents the minimum deprivation necessary to achieve the aim of Article 5, namely to ensure that PT does not cause harm to himself. ... In accordance with the requirements of Article 5 (4) the Court order must provide for adequate review at reasonable intervals. The Trust seeks an order of 12 months duration. I find that this is a reasonable interval to review the order as the Care Plan and Guardianship are reviewed annually. To accord with the requirements of Article 5(4) the Order should also a include liberty to apply at short notice provision. The review provisions must also ensure that there is sufficient medical evidence before the court to enable it to review whether there still persists an unsoundness of mind of a degree or kind to warrant PT’s compulsory confinement. In addition it is necessary to build other safeguards into the Order including PT’s right to legal representation." | 2017‑02‑23 21:22:02 | 2017 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Northern Irish cases, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2017 cases
|
| * HRA time limit AP v Tameside MBC [2017] EWHC 65 (QB) — "The essence of the claim under Article 5 is that the Claimant was unlawfully deprived of his liberty between the 1st of February 2011 and the 12th of August 2013, a period of some two and a half years. ... In the present case the extension period sought (18 months) represents an extension equal to the whole of the primary limitation period (12 months) and half as much again. ... For all these reasons I decline to grant the Claimant an extension of time under section 7 to bring his human rights claim against the Defendant." | 2017‑02‑02 19:55:25 | 2017 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Miscellaneous cases, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Unlawful detention cases, Judgment available on Bailii, 2017 cases
|
| * Inquests and state detention R (Ferreira) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South London [2017] EWCA Civ 31 — "On 7 December 2013, Maria Ferreira, whom I shall call Maria and who had a severe mental impairment, died in an intensive care unit of King's College Hospital, London. The Senior Coroner for London Inner South, Mr Andrew Harris, is satisfied that there has to be an inquest into her death. By a written decision dated 23 January 2015, which is the subject of these judicial review proceedings, the coroner also decided that he did not need not to hold the inquest with a jury. ... A coroner is obliged to hold an inquest with a jury if a person dies in 'state detention' for the purposes of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The appellant is Maria's sister, Luisa Ferreira, whom I will call Luisa. She contends that, as a result of her hospital treatment, Maria had at the date of her death been deprived of her liberty for the purposes of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and that accordingly Maria was in 'state detention' when she died. ... In my judgment, the coroner's decision was correct in law. Applying Strasbourg case law, Maria was not deprived of her liberty at the date of her death because she was being treated for a physical illness and her treatment was that which it appeared to all intents would have been administered to a person who did not have her mental impairment. She was physically restricted in her movements by her physical infirmities and by the treatment she received (which for example included sedation) but the root cause of any loss of liberty was her physical condition, not any restrictions imposed by the hospital. The relevant Strasbourg case law applying in this case is limited to that explaining the exception in Article 5(1)(e), on which the Supreme Court relied in Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19, and accordingly this Court is not bound by that decision to apply the meaning of deprivation of liberty for which that decision is authority. If I am wrong on this point, I conclude that the second part of the 'acid test', namely that Maria was not free to leave, would not have been satisfied. Even if I am wrong on all these points, I would hold that as this is not a case in which Parliament requires the courts to apply the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights when interpreting the words 'state detention' in the CJA 2009, and that a death in intensive care is not, in the absence of some special circumstance, a death in 'state detention' for the purposes of the CJA 2009. There is no Convention right to have an inquest held with a jury. There is no jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court which concludes that medical treatment can constitute the deprivation of a person's liberty for Article 5 purposes. The view that it is a deprivation of liberty would appear to be unrealistic. We have moreover not been given any adequate policy reason why Parliament would have provided that the death of a person in intensive care of itself should result in an inquest with a jury. That result would be costly in terms of human and financial resources." | 2017‑01‑26 15:20:11 | 2017 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Inquest cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment missing from Bailii, 2017 cases
|
| * Privately arranged DOL SSJ v Staffordshire County Council and SRK [2016] EWCA Civ 1317 — "The issue in this case is whether, in order for the United Kingdom to avoid being in breach of Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is necessary for a welfare order to be made by the Court of Protection pursuant to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in a case where an individual, who lacks the capacity to make decisions about where to live and the regime of care, treatment and support that he should receive, is to be given such care, treatment and support entirely by private sector providers in private accommodation in circumstances which, objectively, are a deprivation of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Convention." | 2016‑12‑27 20:47:27 | Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Cases, Judgment available on Bailii, 2016 cases
|
| JMCA v The Belfast Health and Social Care Trust [2014] NICA 37, [2014] MHLO 147 — "Treacy J held that the supervision of this appellant was with legal authority and lawful and that the 1986 Order did authorise the guardian to take the impugned measures in the circumstances of this case. Subsequent to his decision the Supreme Court examined the concepts of deprivation of liberty and restriction of liberty in the case of patients suffering from mental health difficulties in Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19. It is unnecessary for us to set out the facts or reasoning in that decision. It is, however, now accepted by the Trust that the guardianship order did not provide any mechanism for the imposition of any restriction on the entitlement of the appellant to leave the home at which he was residing for incidental social or other purposes. ... Mr Potter on behalf of the appellant in this case recognised that this left a lacuna in the law. That gap had been filled by Schedule 7 of the Mental Health Act 2007 in England and Wales which introduced deprivation of liberty legislation into the Mental Capacity Act 2005 providing a mechanism for the lawful restriction on or deprivation of liberty of a person such as the appellant. It is clear that urgent consideration should now be given to the implementation of similar legislation in this jurisdiction." | 2016‑11‑29 21:00:14 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Northern Irish cases, Transcript
|
| * Discharge from DOLS P v A Local Authority [2015] EWCOP 89 — "This is an application by P (the Applicant) acting through his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor, for an order under section 21A of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) discharging the standard authorisation made on 24 June 2015 which authorises a deprivation of liberty in his current accommodation (the placement)." | 2016‑11‑24 23:48:11 | 2015 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Judgment available on MHLO, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii, 2015 cases
|
| * Guardianship GW v Gloucestershire County Council [2016] UKUT 499 (AAC) — "This appeal is brought with the permission of the First-tier Tribunal against the decision of that tribunal refusing to discharge the patient from guardianship. She was first received into guardianship on 8 January 2013 and the Court of Protection first made a Standard Authorisation on 14 February 2015. The essence of the case before both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal is that the former was no longer necessary in view of the latter." | 2016‑11‑12 00:00:27 | 2016 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Upper Tribunal decisions, Judgment available on Bailii, 2016 cases
|
| * Privately arranged DOL Staffordshire County Council v SRK [2016] EWCOP 27 — "This case concerns an individual SRK who was severely injured in a road traffic accident. The effects of those injuries are that (a) he lacks capacity to make decisions on the regime of care, treatment and support that he should receive (SRK's care regime), and (b) applying the approach in Cheshire West (see Surrey County Council v P and others; Cheshire West and Chester Council v P and another [2014] UKSC 19M, [2014] AC 896B), SRK's care regime creates, on an objective assessment, a deprivation of liberty. SRK was awarded substantial damages that were paid to his property and affairs deputy (the third Respondent IMTC). He lives at a property that has been bought and adapted for him. His regime of care and support there is provided by private sector providers. The damages funded that purchase and adaptation and fund that regime of care. The issue is whether this situation on the ground is a deprivation of liberty that has to be authorised by the Court of Protection (the COP) by it making a welfare order. The test that the COP would apply in making such an order is whether SRK's care regime is the least restrictive available option to best promote his best interests. The same test applies to the decision makers on the ground. It is common ground that at present SRK's care regime satisfies that test." | 2016‑09‑25 21:18:42 | Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Cases, Judgment available on Bailii, 2016 cases
|
| * DOL and representation Re JM [2016] EWCOP 15 — "These five cases are examples of cases in which the procedure to be adopted by the Court of Protection (COP) was left open in my judgment in Re NRA [2015] EWCOP 59, [2015] MHLO 66. That judgment contains the references to the decision of the Supreme Court in Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19 and of the President and the Court of Appeal in Re X (Court of Protection Practice) [2015] EWCA Civ 599, [2015] MHLO 44, which are the essential background to NRA. In short, the five cases were chosen as cases in which it was thought that there was no family member or friend who could be appointed as a Rule 3A representative. That is no longer the position in VE and my reference to the test cases in this judgment are to the remaining four." | 2016‑08‑31 20:40:27 | 2016 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment missing from Bailii, 2016 cases
|
| North Yorkshire County Council v MAG [2016] EWCOP 5, [2016] MHLO 26 — "I have had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the applications for permission should be granted and the appeals allowed. ... This appears to be a case in which DJ Glentworth uncharacteristically appears to have allowed her understandable concern about MAG's living circumstances, and her palpable frustration at what she saw as NYCC's tardiness in resolving his accommodation issues, to distract her from following a clear path to outcome. The result is one which I consider is unsupportable, and wrong. Picking six key themes from the arguments, I divide my discussion of the judgment into the following sub-headings: (i) Did the judge ask herself the correct question(s)? (ii) The effect of Re MN on these facts; (iii) Has there has been a breach of Article 5? (iv) Taking a decision which MAG could not take for himself; (v) No alternative option; impermissible pressure; (vi) The factual findings." | 2016‑08‑29 19:29:12 | 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function
|
| A Local Authority v M [2015] EWCOP 69, [2015] MHLO 135 — This judgment dealt with various issues including deputyship, deprivation of liberty, and disclosure. | 2016‑02‑08 20:08:33 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Deputyship cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function
|
| Somerset v MK [2014] EWCOP B25, [2014] MHLO 146 — "What I intend to do in it is to set out the history of the case and then of the litigation. Then I will deal with the factual issues upon which I have been asked by the local authority to make findings. I will then deal with the central issue in the case, that of where in her best interests should (P), the subject of this application, live. Next I will consider the conduct of the local authority and make findings on the issues as to whether P had been wrongly deprived of her liberty and, if she had, how long did that go on for; and finally what, if any, lessons can be learned from this case. ... These findings illustrate a blatant disregard of the process of the MCA and a failure to respect the rights of both P and her family under the ECHR. In fact it seems to me that it is worse than that, because here the workers on the ground did not just disregard the process of the MCA they did not know what the process was and no one higher up the structure seems to have advised them correctly about it." | 2015‑12‑22 22:22:55 | 2014 cases, Best interests, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Health Service Executive of Ireland v CNWL [2015] EWCOP 48, [2015] MHLO 119 — "Must an adult who is the subject of an application under Schedule 3 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to recognise and enforce an order of a foreign court that deprives the adult of his or her liberty be joined as a party to the application?" | 2015‑12‑21 23:58:58 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript
|
| Bournemouth Borough Council v PS [2015] EWCOP 39, [2015] MHLO 112 — "In this case I have to decide (i) whether the package of care provided to BS ('Ben') is in his best interests; (ii) whether that package amounts to a deprivation of liberty within the terms of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950; and (iii) what contact Ben should have to his mother, the first respondent. ... In the circumstances, in what I suppose will be one of the last orders of its kind to be made, I directed that Ben be discharged as a party. I was wholly satisfied that his voice has been fully heard through the IMCA Katie Turner. Further, in relation to the question of deprivation of liberty, all relevant submissions have been fully put on both sides of the argument by counsel for the applicant and the first respondent. There was no dispute between the applicant and the first respondent concerning issues (i) and (iii). The argument was centrally about the question of deprivation of liberty. ... I cannot say that I know that Ben is being detained by the state when I look at his position. Far from it. I agree with Mr Mullins that he is not. First, he is not under continuous supervision. He is afforded appreciable privacy. Second, he is free to leave. Were he to do so his carers would seek to persuade him to return but such persuasion would not cross the line into coercion. The deprivation of liberty line would only be crossed if and when the police exercised powers under the Mental Health Act. Were that to happen then a range of reviews and safeguards would become operative. But up to that point Ben is a free man. In my judgment, on the specific facts in play here, the acid test is not met. Ben is not living in a cage, gilded or otherwise. ... I do not criticise this local authority in the slightest for bringing this case. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court local authorities have to err on the side of caution and bring every case, however borderline, before the court. For if they do not, and a case is later found to be one of deprivation of liberty, there may be heavy damages claims (and lawyers' costs) to pay. I remain of the view that the matter needs to be urgently reconsidered by the Supreme Court." | 2015‑12‑21 23:10:54 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| * Conditional discharge and DOL MM v WL Clinic [2015] UKUT 644 (AAC) — (1) For the purposes of Article 5, a restricted patient with the capacity to do so can give a valid and effective consent to conditions of a conditional discharge that when implemented will, on an objective assessment, create a deprivation of liberty. (2) In determining whether to discharge conditionally, the tribunal has to consider whether the consent is freely given and (as raised in KC at [134-139]) consider any practical problems arising from the ability to withdraw consent. (3) MM's case was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with a direction that it apply the decisions in KC and this case. (Caution: see Court of Appeal decision.) | 2015‑11‑26 20:58:29 | 2015 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, MHLR summary, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Powers, Upper Tribunal decisions, Judgment available on Bailii, 2015 cases
|
| A Local Health Board v AB [2015] EWCOP 31, [2015] MHLO 95 — "I conclude that: (a) AB lacks capacity to conduct these proceedings herself. (b) AB lacks capacity to make her own decisions about whether to consent to medical treatment for her cardiac condition including dental surgery. (c) Insofar as the jurisdiction of the court is excluded because of the operation of the MHA and MCA, the inherent jurisdiction should be exercised to grant a declaration that it is lawful and in AB's interests to have the proposed medical treatment administered by the Applicant to her. (d) The inherent jurisdiction should be exercised to grant a declaration that it is lawful and in her best interests for AB to be deprived of her liberty to travel to and to remain at the hospital for the proposed medical treatment but that such physical and/or chemical restraint as may be required to deliver the treatment shall bear in mind the need to maintain her dignity to the maximum extent reasonably possible." (Caution: in relation to paragraph [54], on the MCA eligibility test, see An NHS Trust v A [2015] EWCOP 71, [2015] MHLO 91.) | 2015‑11‑13 23:00:17 | 2015 cases, Best interests, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| A Hospital NHS Trust v CD [2015] EWCOP 74, [2015] MHLO 94 — CD was willing to have the total abdominal hysterectomy, in order to remove two very large ovarian growths, which the medical experts recommended. (1) Mostyn J held that she lacked capacity in relation to this but that it was in her best interests to have the surgery. (2) The correct way to interpret the MCA ineligibity rules is as follows: "if the MHA regime whereby CD is compulsorily detained in a mental hospital imposes a specific requirement for dealing with the problem of the ovarian masses then CD is ineligible to be deprived of her liberty under the 2005 Act for the purposes of dealing with the problem by a different procedure under that Act. It doesn't (obviously) so she isn't ineligible." (3) In relation to deprivation of liberty the judge noted: "In KW & Ors v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2015] EWCA Civ 1054M at para 32 the Court of Appeal stated 'even if Cheshire West is wrong, there is nothing confusing about it'. It may seem that way from the lofty heights of the Court of Appeal; and of course the literal words of the Supreme Court's test are perfectly easy to understand. But for we hoplites who have to administer it at first instance the scope and ramifications of the test are, with respect, extremely confusing. As Mr Matthewson, instructed by the Official Solicitor for CD, rightly stated 'anyone who deals with this day by day knows this is confusing'. What of the situation where, as here, the protected person actively and fervently expresses the wish to undergo the procedure that is said to amount to a deprivation of liberty? What of the situation, as was the case in Bournemouth Borough Council v PS [2015] EWCOP 39, [2015] MHLO 112, where the protected person shows no inclination whatsoever to leave the home where he is cared for round the clock? What of the situation where the protected person is seriously disabled, perhaps bedridden, perhaps in a coma, and is thus physically incapable of exercising the freedom to leave? The answers I received from the Bar when discussing these scenarios belie the blithe suggestion that 'there is nothing confusing' about the test. I do not accept the criticism that my approach to these cases is 'distorted' by my 'passionate' and 'tenacious' belief that Cheshire West is wrong. Rather, it is a loyal approach which tries to apply literally and purposively the Supreme Court's test while at the same time pointing out how confusing and curious it is, to say nothing of the cost it causes to the public purse. The confusion surrounding the main test is mirrored by the confusion that the interface with the MHA gives rise to." | 2015‑11‑13 22:53:01 | 2015 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| An NHS Trust v A [2015] EWCOP 71, [2015] MHLO 91 — A patient detained under MHA 1983 s3 was not ineligible to be deprived of his liberty in a general hospital under the MCA 2005 for the purpose of physical treatment (and the previous case on this point, A Local Health Board v AB [2015] EWCOP 31, [2015] MHLO 95, should be read as if the judge accidentally omitted a negative and inadvertently and mistakenly stated the law wrongly). | 2015‑11‑12 18:42:52 | 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Re KW [2015] EWCOP 53, [2015] MHLO 88 — "DW objects to the deprivation of liberty and made the application to the Court of Protection on 5th December 2014 pursuant to Section 21A of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to challenge the purpose of the standard authorisation. The application was made on the following grounds: (a) LCC failed to make an application to the Court of Protection (despite the recommendations of the Ombudsman). (b) LCC failed to take reasonable steps to plan a move for KW to a more suitable placement, closer to her family and KW has suffered distress as a result. (c) It is not in KW's best interests to be deprived of her liberty at R H therefore one of the qualifying requirements of Schedule 1A is not satisfied." | 2015‑10‑31 21:03:27 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| P v Surrey County Council [2015] EWCOP 54, [2015] MHLO 87 — "The issues for me to determine are these: (i) Was P's detention at the care home between 5 September 2014 and 23 December 2014 lawful or was it in breach of Article 5 and/or Article 8? (ii) If P's detention during that period was unlawful or in breach of Article 5, does a right to compensation or damages arise and, if so, how much? No claim for compensation or damages is in fact pursued. (iii) Was P's detention at the care home between 23 December 2014 and the date of cessation of detention lawful pursuant to a properly-made standard authorisation? If not, was it in breach of his Article 5 and/or Article 8 rights? (iv) Does a right to compensation or damages arise and, if so, how much? No claim for compensation or damages is in fact pursued." | 2015‑10‑31 20:54:14 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Re P (Application for Secure Accommodation Order) [2015] EWHC 2971 (Fam), [2015] MHLO 77 — "In my judgment it is clear that the restrictions imposed by reg. 5(2) on making a secure accommodation order under s.25 in respect of a child over the age of 16 are limited to children who are accommodated as a matter of discretion under s.20(5) and do not extend to children who are accommodated as a matter of duty under s.20(3). Where a looked-after child aged between 16 and 18 is accommodated under s.20(3) of the Children Act 1989 the court has the power to make her the subject of a secure accommodation order under s.25. It follows, therefore, that in this circumstances of this case it is appropriate that the local authority's application for a secure accommodation order be adjourned generally with liberty to restore should circumstances arise in which it considers it appropriate to do so." | 2015‑10‑30 22:58:10 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Re AB (A child: deprivation of liberty) [2015] EWHC 3125 (Fam), [2015] MHLO 74 — "There is a large measure of agreement between the parties on the relevant factual matrix and the legal principles applicable to the issues I am asked to determine, namely: (1) Whether AB is deprived of his liberty at X. (2) If so, are the parents and/or the local authority entitled to consent to the same? (3) If not, whether the court will sanction the deprivation of liberty and, if so, under what provision, power or jurisdiction? (4) Whether it would be appropriate to give guidance on the approach to, and conduct of, similar cases." | 2015‑10‑30 22:39:14 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Rochdale MBC v KW [2015] EWCA Civ 1054, [2015] MHLO 71 — (1) The judge (in his second decision) had misinterpreted the consent order (on appeal from his first decision) when he said that the Court of Appeal had not decided that KW was being deprived of her liberty. Therefore, this second appeal would be allowed. (2) The judge was also wrong to say that the Court of Appeal had taken "a procedurally impermissible route" so that its decision was "ultra vires". An order of any court is binding until it is set aside or varied: it is futile and inappropriate for a judge to seek to undermine a binding order by complaining that it was ultra vires or wrong for any other reason. In any event, the consent order was made by a procedurally permissible route: the appeal court has a discretion to allow an appeal by consent on the papers without determining the merits at a hearing if it is satisfied that there are good and sufficient reasons for doing so. If the appeal court is satisfied that (i) the parties' consent to the allowing of the appeal is based on apparently competent legal advice, and (ii) the parties advance plausible reasons to show that the decision of the lower court was wrong, it is likely to make an order allowing the appeal on the papers and without determining the merits. (3) The Court of Appeal stated that the judge's disagreement with the Cheshire West decision was in danger of distorting his approach to these cases and, in light of the two successful appeals, the review should be conducted by a different judge. | 2015‑10‑23 22:29:42 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function
|
| North Yorkshire County Council v MAG [2015] EWCOP 64, [2015] MHLO 69 — The Council sought a declaration that it was in MAG's best interests (a) to be deprived of his liberty and reside in his current placement, and (b) for the Corporate Director of Health and Adult services to enter into a tenancy agreement on MAG's behalf in relation to the current placement. (1) The reference in Re MN (An Adult) [2015] EWCA Civ 411 to the ability of the Court of Protection to explore the care plan put forward by a public authority and the inability of the Court to compel a public authority to agree to a care plan which it is not willing to implement does not apply when the issue is the right to liberty under Article 5. (2) The placement at which MAG had been deprived of his liberty for 9 years did not meet his needs (for instance, there was insufficient room to manoeuvre a wheelchair indoors, so he had to mobilise on his hands and knees causing physical problems including bursitis and a recurring fungal infection in his thigh) and the council had not taken the steps necessary to ensure that there was no breach of its obligations. The court therefore refused to continue an interim deprivation of liberty authorisation. [Caution: see subsequent Court of Appeal decision.] | 2015‑10‑07 22:50:30 | 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Re NRA [2015] EWCOP 59, [2015] MHLO 66 — "I have ten cases before me seeking welfare orders under s. 16(2)(a) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (the MCA). The welfare orders are sought to authorise the deprivation of liberty that, it is common ground, is being, or will be, created by the implementation of the regime of care, supervision, control and support (the care package) upon which the welfare orders are based. If it had been thought that the care packages did not result in a deprivation of liberty it is highly likely that the relevant public authorities would have relied on s. 5 of the MCA and no application to the Court of Protection would have been made. When the cases were transferred to me they were regarded as test cases on the directions that should be given for their determination and in particular on whether the subject of the proceedings (P) should be a party." | 2015‑09‑30 20:53:15 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| * Conditional discharge and DOL SSJ v KC [2015] UKUT 376 (AAC) — (1) A conditional discharge may include conditions which will, on an objective assessment, give rise to a deprivation of liberty, if that deprivation of liberty is authorised under the MCA. (2) (Obiter) The same conditions would be lawful for a patient with capacity who gives real consent since this would mean there is no Article 5 deprivation of liberty. | 2015‑07‑15 22:54:29 | 2015 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Discharge conditions cases cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Judgment available on MHLO, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions, Judgment available on Bailii, 2015 cases
|
| Re MOD (Deprivation of Liberty) [2015] EWCOP 47, [2015] MHLO 48 — Nine cases which had been issued under the Re X streamlined procedure were listed for directions before DJ Marin. (1) One case (ML) would require a best interests hearing so never really belonged in the Re X procedure, but orders under the Re X procedure would or would potentially have been made in the other cases. (2) The Court of Appeal in Re X had (obiter, and without referring to new rule 3A) decided that P should be a party in every deprivation of liberty case. (3) Party status would entail the need for a litigation friend but, except for an IMCA in one case (MOD), no-one suitable had been identified: (a) in most of these cases, the family may be said to have an adverse interest to the person concerned; (b) there must be a question in every case as to whether family members have the required expertise; (c) the Official Solicitor refused to act as his COP Health & Welfare team was already "fire-fighting" at an unsustainable level owing to budgetary constraints; (d) IMCAs in one borough refused to act without indemnity insurance, which it was hoped would be in place by the end of 2016. (4) The result was that none of these cases could proceed, and neither could hundreds and potentially thousands of others: the judge said he "cannot think of a more serious situation to have faced a court in recent legal history". (5) These cases were transferred to the Vice President of the COP (Charles J) to decide on the following issues: (a) whether P must be joined as a party in a case involving deprivation of liberty; (b) whether the appointment of a rule 3A representative is sufficient in a case involving deprivation of liberty; (c) if P must be joined as a party, in the absence of any suitable person to act as litigation friend, what should be done in circumstances where the Official Solicitor cannot accept an invitation to act; (d) whether a family member can act as litigation friend in circumstances where that family member has an interest in the outcome of the proceedings; (e) whether other deprivation of liberty cases not before the court on this occasion but which raise similar issues to this case should be stayed pending a determination of the issues recorded at paragraphs (a) to (d). (6) The Official Solicitor was ordered to file and serve a statement which would: (a) provide a full and evidence-based explanation of why he cannot cope with the number of deprivation of liberty applications in which he is invited to act as litigation friend; (b) explain in full detail providing evidence where appropriate as to which areas or processes cause him difficulty and why; (c) inform the court when he expects to be able to cope with deprivation of liberty cases and the likely time scale in which he can start work on a case; (d) provide any other information to the court what will assist the court to make decisions in this case regarding the position of the Official Solicitor. (7) The court refused to approve deprivations of liberty on an interim basis ..→ | 2015‑07‑12 21:32:07 | 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Judgment available on MHLO, Transcript
|
| Re X (Court of Protection Practice) [2015] EWCA Civ 599, [2015] MHLO 44 — This case concerned the hearings arranged by Munby LJ, the President of the Court of Protection, in relation to devising a streamlined and minimally Article 5 compliant process for the anticipated higher numbers of court applications following Cheshire West. (1) Whether the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Court of Protection depends on whether there was a "decision" (MCA 2005 s53), which must mean a decision determining an issue arising between parties (involving or about the person concerned) rather than decision made on a hypothetical basis. (2) The President's judgments contained no appealable "decision" as the relevant issues had not arisen in the appellants' cases. (2) (Obiter) In theory the person concerned need not always be a party to deprivation of liberty proceedings if his participation can reliably be secured by other means, but given the tools presently available in our domestic procedural law, the person concerned must always be a party, so the streamlined "Re X" procedure was not compliant with Article 5. (Detailed summary on case page.) | 2015‑06‑17 19:08:12 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function
|
| KD v A Borough Council [2015] UKUT 251 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 42 — "Permission to bring this appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal (the FTT) because in the view of the judge it raises points upon which guidance is needed. Those points concern the relationship between the functions and powers of the FTT under the Mental Health Act 1983 (the MHA) and those of the Court of Protection, managing authorities and supervisory bodies under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (the MCA) and its Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS). The most relevant provisions of the MHA in this case are those relating to guardianship." This judgment includes guidance under the headings "The approach to be taken by the parties and the FTT on an application to discharge a guardianship under s. 72 of the MHA on the basis that an alternative has the consequence that the guardianship is no longer necessary as it is not the least restrictive way of achieving what is in the patient’s best interests" and "A check list for FTT’s when an issue involving an argument that an alternative involving the application of the MCA is said to be the basis for a discharge of guardianship". | 2015‑06‑08 21:43:37 | 2015 cases, 39 Essex Chambers summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Judgment available on MHLO, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions, Judgment available on Bailii
|
| W City Council v Mrs L [2015] EWCOP 20, [2015] MHLO 35 — "This hearing concerns a 93-year old lady with a diagnosis of severe dementia, Alzheimer's disease. She lives in her own home, with care and safety arrangements set up for her between her adult daughters and the Local Authority. This simple scenario raises the following issues: (a) whether the care arrangements for the lady (Mrs L) constitute a deprivation of her liberty; (b) if so, then whether the State is responsible for such deprivation of liberty; and (c) if so, then whether such deprivation of liberty should be authorised by the court and what the arrangements for continuing authorisation should be." | 2015‑04‑16 10:57:25 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| NM v Kent County Council [2015] UKUT 125 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 34 — NM was subject to both guardianship and a DOLS authorisation. His residence at a particular home was enforced and he was escorted while on leave. The First-tier tribunal decided that he "had the capacity to decide where to live but not the capacity to decide on the supervision that was required to keep him and any child he came into contact with safe", and that he would not remain in the home without being subject to the guardianship; it refused to discharge him. (1) An ideal set of reasons would identify the relevant legal differences between guardianship and DOLS and include findings of fact sufficient to show their significance to the legal criteria set out in s72(4). (2) Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs accepted the council's position that the differences include: DOLS assumes that the person lacks capacity to make the relevant decisions in their best interests; DOLS cannot impose a requirement that the person reside at a particular address, whereas a guardian can; and DOLS cannot authorise anyone to give, or consent to, treatment for someone with a mental disorder. He also said that a limitation inherent in the DOLS regime was that, while it could prevent NM from leaving, it could not deal with the possibility that he may abscond. (3) In some (other) cases guardianship may not be necessary for the purposes of s72(4)(b) as DOLS may provide sufficiently for the person’s welfare and the protection of others. (4) The First-tier Tribunal's reasons on the statutory criteria (the key being that NM would not remain at the home without guardianship) and the relationship with DOLS (concerning return following absconsion) were in substance adequate to explain and justify its decision. | 2015‑04‑10 20:09:05 | 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii
|
| Rochdale MBC v KW [2015] EWCOP 13, [2015] MHLO 24 — (1) The Court of Appeal's decision to allow an appeal against the judge's earlier decision (that KW was not being deprived of her liberty at home) by consent, and without an oral hearing or judgment, was procedurally impermissible. (2) Although the Court of Appeal had set aside the decision, it had not actually declared that KW was deprived of her liberty: therefore, her status will be in limbo until the judge decides the matter at an oral 12-month review hearing. (3) The provisions for a review on the care plan becoming more restrictive would only be triggered if the changes amount to bodily restraint comparable to that which obtained in Cheshire West, as any restrictions short of that would amount to no more than arrangements for her care in her own home and would not amount to state detention. (4) The judge concluded that: "In this difficult and sensitive area, where people are being looked after in their own homes at the state's expense, the law is now in a state of serious confusion." | 2015‑03‑24 20:09:36 | 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function
|
| * Sentencing guidance; MHT/PB delay R v LV; R (LV) v SSJ [2015] EWCA Crim 45, [2015] EWCA Civ 56 — "There are before the court: (1) Sitting as the Court of Appeal Criminal Division six cases where indeterminate sentences (either imprisonment for public protection (IPP) or a life sentence) had been passed between 1997 and 2008. Each specified a minimum term. In each case there was psychiatric evidence before the court with a view to a judge considering making a hospital order under MHA 1983 s37 as amended with a restriction under s41 of the same Act. The sentencing judge did not make such an order, but each was subsequently transferred to hospital under a transfer direction made by the Secretary of State under s47. (2) Sitting as the Court of Appeal Civil Division, a civil appeal in relation to a judicial review brought by the first of the appellants in the criminal appeals of the actions of the Secretary of State for Justice and the Parole Board relating to delay in the determination of her application for release from custody." In relation to the criminal aspect: in cases where medical evidence suggests mental disorder, the offending is partly or wholly attributable to that disorder, treatment is available and a hospital order may be appropriate, the court should consider (and, if appropriate, make) a s45A order before considering making a hospital order. | 2015‑02‑12 23:21:36 | 2015 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, MHLR summary, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Prison law cases, Sentence appeal cases, Judgment available on Bailii, 2015 cases
|
| Re AJ (DOLS) [2015] EWCOP 5, [2015] MHLO 11 — "This case raises a number of issues about the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and in particular the amendments that were introduced into that Act by the Mental Health Act 2007 concerning the procedures to be followed in cases of deprivation of liberty. The provisions under consideration include the selection and appointment of relevant person's representatives under Part 10 of Schedule A1 and independent mental capacity advocates under s.39D which have not, so far as I am aware, been considered in any previous judgment. More fundamentally, the case addresses the question of the extent of the duty on a local authority to ensure that a person who lacks capacity is able to challenge a deprivation of their liberty." | 2015‑02‑12 22:48:15 | 2015 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Essex County Council v RF [2015] EWCOP 1, [2015] MHLO 2 — (1) A final declaration was made that P lacked capacity to make decisions in relation to his residence and care arrangements, but retained capacity to make decisions in relation to contact with others. (2) In considering quantum for unlawful detention there is a difference between procedural breaches (which would have made no difference to P's living or care arrangements) and substantive breaches (where P would not have been detained if the authority had acted lawfully). (3) The judge approved the following compromise agreement: (a) a declaration that ECC unlawfully deprived P of his liberty for approximately 13 months; (b) £60,000 damages; (c) care home fees to be waived (around £23-25,000); (d) damages to be excluded from means testing for community care costs; (e) costs to be paid (may exceed £64,000). (4) The judge described the situation as follows: "It is hard to imagine a more depressing and inexcusable state of affairs. A defenceless 91 year old gentleman in the final years of his life was removed from his home of 50 years and detained in a locked dementia unit against his wishes. Had it not been for the alarm raised by his friend RF he may have been condemned to remain there for the remainder of his days. There can be no doubt that ECC's practice was substandard. They failed to recognise the weakness of their own case and the strength of the case against them. They appeared unprepared to countenance any view contrary to their own. They maintained their resolute opposition to P returning to his home until the last possible moment. In my judgment the conduct of ECC has been reprehensible. The very sad and disturbing consequences for P cannot be ignored." | 2015‑01‑21 21:48:32 | 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Lazariu v Romania 31973/03 [2014] ECHR 1219, [2014] MHLO 139 — Detention in psychiatric hospital breached Article 5(1) and (4). | 2014‑12‑31 20:33:35 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ECHR, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| LB Tower Hamlets v TB [2014] EWCOP 53, [2014] MHLO 130 — "All parties are agreed that TB lacks capacity to make decisions concerning her residence, her care and her contact with SA. The issues that I have to decide are these: (i) Where should TB live in her best interests? ... (ii) If TB does not return to 9 Emerald Mansions what should her contact be with SA, in her best interests? (iii) Does SA have the capacity to consent to sex? This is an abstract question if she does not return to 9 Emerald Mansions, but a very real one if she does. (iv) Whatever I decide about residence does her care regime amount to a deprivation of liberty within the terms of Article 5?" | 2014‑12‑31 10:58:36 | 2014 cases, Best interests, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Sex and marriage cases, Transcript
|
| Barnsley MBC v GS [2014] EWCOP 46, [2014] MHLO 124 — "I very respectfully do not agree with the reasoning in paragraph 6 of the guidance [which was issued jointly by the Ofsted and the President of the Court of Protection on 12/2/14]. There is nothing in either the legislation, or the regulations, or the [National Minimum Standards for Children's Homes] which has the effect that a children's home, which is not an approved secure children's home, is 'unable' to deprive a person of his liberty. ... The NMS 3.19 and 12.7 themselves state that 'No children's home/school ... restricts the liberty of any child as a matter of routine...' Whilst never a matter of routine, those very standards clearly contemplate that a home or school may have to restrict liberty as a matter of non-routine. Such restraint may involve a deprivation of liberty as now understood and, in my view, the unqualified proposition in paragraph 4 of the guidance that there is no purpose to be served in seeking an order of the Court of Protection goes too far. So, accordingly, does the proposition in paragraph 6 and the summary in paragraph 13 of the guidance. In my view, there can indeed be circumstances in which the Court of Protection may authorise a children's home or residential special school to impose restraint which amounts to a deprivation of liberty, and the guidance is mistaken in suggesting that the effect of the NMS is necessarily to prevent the court from doing so." | 2014‑12‑30 23:26:14 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Rochdale MBC v KW [2014] EWCOP 45, [2014] MHLO 123 — The judge in this case decided that KW was not deprived of her liberty, stating as follows: "I am of the view that for the plenitude of cases such as this, where a person, often elderly, who is both physically and mentally disabled to a severe extent, is being looked after in her own home, and where the arrangements happen to be made, and paid for, by a local authority, rather than by the person's own family and paid for from her own funds, or from funds provided by members of her family, Article 5 is simply not engaged. I am of the view that the matter should be reconsidered by the Supreme Court." Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted, and an appeal against the decision was allowed by consent. | 2014‑12‑30 23:10:02 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| TX v A Local Authority [2014] EWCOP 29, [2014] MHLO 117 — "X is a retired lawyer who has suffered, or appears to have suffered, from Korsakoff's syndrome, a mental illness related to the over-consumption of alcohol. ... An urgent authorisation was obtained on 1st May and a standard authorisation to detain him on 13th May. ... X appealed that standard authorisation, hence the case being listed before me in late May. ... X now has capacity to make decisions as to residence, care and medical treatment and that has been amply demonstrated in the case. Even if he has other problems he can reflect and logically reason, and is much improved from the man he was last December. That does not mean he will not relapse. It does not mean that he will not be foolish enough to resume drinking but, in my judgment, in all the circumstances it would be inappropriate to make a declaration under section 48 and in those circumstances, in the absence of a standard authorisation, his compulsory detention comes to an end." | 2014‑12‑30 21:21:26 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| OG v Latvia 66095/09 [2014] ECHR 989, [2014] MHLO 115 — Involuntary psychiatric hospital admission breached Article 5(1) and (4) in this case. | 2014‑12‑30 20:51:25 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ECHR, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| NL v Hampshire CC [2014] UKUT 475 (AAC), [2014] MHLO 107 — The patient was deprived of his liberty and appealed against the tribunal's refusal to exercise its discretion to discharge him from guardianship. (1) Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs stated that the cause of deprivation of liberty was the care plan, not the guardianship, adding in relation to guardianship powers generally: "I find it difficult to imagine a case that could realistically arise in which those basic powers could be used in a way that would satisfy the conditions for deprivation of liberty." (2) He dismissed the appeal on the ground that the guardianship did not give rise to a deprivation of liberty and the tribunal was not obliged to exercise its discretion to discharge the patient. (3) The approach to discretionary discharge in the GA case (relating to CTOs) was equally relevant to guardianship or detention: "it is difficult to imagine a case in which the tribunal could properly exercise its discretion to discharge without there being appropriate safeguards to ensure the necessary treatment and protection." (4) That the burden of proof in guardianship cases remained with the patient (in contrast with detention cases) was not a drafting oversight but a further indication that guardianship is not designed to involve a deprivation of liberty. (5) The tribunal had not misplaced the burden of proof (or given any directions on the legal burden). In assessing arguments on this issue it is important to distinguish between the legal burden and the evidential burden. (6) Tribunals are entitled to require the parties to satisfy them by evidence and argument that concessions (on matters of fact or law) are sound and, if they fail to do so, tribunals are not obliged to accept them. | 2014‑11‑04 22:44:48 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Judgment available on MHLO, Powers, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions
|
| Re X (Deprivation of Liberty) (No 2) [2014] EWCOP 37, [2014] MHLO 98 — "I need now to supplement and elaborate what I said in my previous judgment in relation to Questions (7), (9) and (16). For ease of reference I set out those questions again: '(7) Does P need to be joined to any application to the court seeking authorisation of a deprivation of liberty in order to meet the requirements of Article 5(1) ECHR or Article 6 or both? (9) If so, should there be a requirement that P … must have a litigation friend (whether by reference to the requirements of Article 5 ECHR and/or by reference to the requirements of Article 6 ECHR)? (16) If P or the detained resident requires a litigation friend, then: (a) Can a litigation friend who does not otherwise have the right to conduct litigation or provide advocacy services provide those services, in other words without instructing legal representatives, by virtue of their acting as litigation friend and without being authorised by the court under the Legal Services Act 2007 to do either or both …?' These questions require consideration of a number of issues which I take in order, formulating each of these issues in the form of a question. ..." | 2014‑10‑16 21:29:14 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment missing from Bailii
|
| Re X (Deprivation of Liberty) [2014] EWCOP 25, [2014] MHLO 86 — "The immediate objective, in my judgment, is to devise, if this is feasible, a standardised, and so far as possible 'streamlined', process, compatible with all the requirements of Article 5, which will enable the Court of Protection to deal with all DoL cases in a timely but just and fair way. The process needs, if this is feasible, to distinguish between those DoL cases that can properly be dealt with on the papers, and without an oral hearing, and those that require an oral hearing. In my judgment, that objective is feasible and can be achieved. ... This is a preliminary judgment, setting out briefly my answers to those of the 25 questions which require an early decision if the objective I have identified is to be carried forward. It concentrates on the issues directly relevant to what I will call the 'streamlined' process. It sets out no more than the broad framework of what, in my judgment, is required to ensure that the 'streamlined' process is Article 5 compliant. Additional, detailed, work needs to be carried out as soon as possible by the Court of Protection in conjunction, where appropriate, with the [rules] Committee. A further judgment will follow in due course, elaborating on my reasons for deciding as I have and dealing with the questions ... not dealt with in this judgment." | 2014‑08‑07 14:02:46 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii
|
| Re UF (No 2) [2014] EWCOP 18, [2014] MHLO 78 — "The proceedings were launched by AF, UF's youngest daughter, in August 2013 as a challenge under section 21A MCA 2005 to the standard authorisation of deprivation of liberty. The remit of my enquiry at this hearing was defined by order of Charles J in May 2014, thus: (i) Is it in UF's best interests to return to her home to live with a contingency plan of maintaining her current placement for a period of time? (ii) Should direction be given to the LPA finance about releasing equity from UF's property to pay for her care? (iii) Should the LPA finance be replaced by a Deputy appointed by the Court? (iv) Would any care regime at home still represent a deprivation of liberty?" | 2014‑08‑01 16:01:02 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Norfolk CC v PB [2014] EWCOP 14, [2014] MHLO 75 — "The issue is whether PB has capacity to decide whether to live with TB, what contact to have with him, and what her care arrangements should be (that issue, it is common ground, includes where she is to live); and, if she is to be accommodated in local authority care, whether she is deprived of her liberty and if so whether this should be authorised by the Court. There is an interim declaration to that effect." The judge comments on the capacity test (causative nexus), the inherent jurisdiction, and case management in the Court of Protection. | 2014‑08‑01 11:56:35 | 2014 cases, 39 Essex Street summary, Best interests, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Liverpool City Council v SG [2014] EWCOP 10, [2014] MHLO 67 — "This case raises the following question: Does the Court of Protection have power to make an order which authorises that a person who is not a child (ie who has attained the age of 18) may be deprived of his liberty in premises which are a children's home as defined in section 1(2) of the Care Standards Act 2000 and are subject to the Children's Homes Regulations 2001 (as amended)? Both parties and their counsel in these proceedings submit that the answer is 'yes'. I agree with them that the answer is 'yes'." | 2014‑08‑01 10:57:17 | 2014 cases, 39 Essex Street summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii
|
| * MHT/PB delay R (LV) v SSJ [2014] EWHC 1495 (Admin) — "In the light of authority, Mr Southey accepts that he cannot submit as a matter of principle that the system by which the Claimant's release was considered by two successive bodies, the Tribunal and the Parole Board, is in conflict with the Claimant's Article 5(4) rights. ... He goes on to argue that, on the facts as they are here, if there were to be two hearings before two bodies, the state had a legal obligation to ensure expedition throughout the overall process. He says there was no such expedition, since the review of the legality of the Claimant's detention took almost 22 months from the date when the Claimant applied to the Tribunal on 24 May 2011 to the decision of the Parole Board on 21 March 2013. Within that period, Mr Southey makes a series of specific complaints as to periods of delay. ... The claim for judicial review is dismissed as against both Defendants. ... Although it took a considerable time to be resolved, there was in my view no breach of the obligation on the part of the State to provide a 'speedy' resolution." | 2014‑05‑18 01:11:22 | 2014 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Prison law cases, Judgment available on Bailii, 2014 cases
|
| Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust v ML [2014] EWCOP 2, [2014] MHLO 31 — "The Applicants seek declarations that: (i) ML lacks capacity to litigate and/or to make decisions about his care and /or residence; (ii) it would be in ML's best interest to reside at Bestwood Hospital; (iii) it would be in ML's best interest to undergo treatment at Bestwood Hospital until such time as he is able to be discharged to a suitable assisted living package in the community. Behind these deceptively simple draft declarations is a history of professional and family conflict which has frequently been bitter and occasionally rancorous (amongst the professionals). It is a case which has engendered many high emotions in people who feel strongly about the important nature of the work they are involved in and who are very highly motivated to achieve the best outcomes for ML. Some, though certainly not all, witnesses have overstated their cases, been selective in their use of material, emotive in their use of language, disrespectful to those who hold contrary views. In consequence, despite their laudable objectives, they have made it difficult for me, at times, to get a clear picture of how ML functions and how his needs might best be met." | 2014‑05‑18 00:25:31 | 2014 cases, Best interests, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Milton Keynes Council v RR [2014] EWCOP B19, [2014] MHLO 30 — Having described the council's conduct as "woefully inadequate from the start" the judge declared that there had been breaches of Article 5 and Article 8. | 2014‑05‑18 00:08:30 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| * Challenge to DOLS standard authorisation RB v Brighton and Hove City Council [2014] EWCA Civ 561 — This is the executive summary and conclusion from the Court of Appeal decision: "In June 2007 RB sustained a serious brain injury in an accident. He was treated for eight months in hospital and then transferred to a care home, S House. In 2011 RB ceased participating in rehabilitation programmes and proposed to leave S House. The staff at S House considered that RB was not capable of independent living. Because of his physical and mental disabilities he was likely to (a) resume his former chaotic lifestyle and (b) to suffer serious or fatal injuries in consequence. The Council granted a standard authorisation pursuant to schedule A1 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 ('MCA'), which enabled staff to detain RB at S House. RB brought proceedings in the Court of Protection to terminate the standard authorisation. The Court of Protection dismissed the application and RB appealed to the Court of Appeal. He contends that two preconditions for deprivation of liberty are not satisfied, namely the mental capacity requirement (set out in paragraph 15 of schedule A1) and the best interests requirement (set out in paragraph 16 of schedule A1). In my view RB's appeal should be dismissed. Because of his brain injury RB is unable to use and weigh relevant information. He does not appreciate the dangers of resuming his former chaotic lifestyle in his present condition. Therefore the mental capacity requirement is satisfied. If RB is discharged into the community, he is likely to revert to alcoholism and a chaotic lifestyle. Given his current disabilities, this is likely to lead to serious injury. Therefore confinement in S House, at least for the time being, is in RB's best interests. I reject the submission that IM v LM [2014] EWCA Civ 37M somehow governs the outcome in this case. The court must apply the provisions of the MCA, not judicial glosses on the statute." | 2014‑05‑10 13:59:17 |
|
| Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19 — (1) The 'acid test' for deprivation of liberty is whether the person is under continuous supervision and control and is not free to leave. (2) The following are not relevant: (a) the person's compliance or lack of objection; (b) the relative normality of the placement (whatever the comparison made); and (c) the reason or purpose behind a particular placement. (3) Because of the extreme vulnerability of people like P, MIG and MEG, decision-makers should err on the side of caution in deciding what constitutes a deprivation of liberty. | 2014‑03‑20 22:44:13 | 2014 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| The Local Authority v Mrs D [2013] EWHC B34 (COP), [2013] MHLO 140 — "These proceedings were heard in private however this judgement is being published at the request of the respondents in order to explain the thinking of the court when approving an agreed order compromising a claim for remedies under s.8 Human Rights Act 1998 ('HRA'), which included a sum in damages, for alleged breaches of a party's rights under Articles 5 and 8 ECHR. ... However, despite this non-admission of liability, the Local Authority had offered in compromise: (a) an apology to Mrs D for the delay in bringing these proceedings; (b) to pay a sum of £15,000 to Mrs D; (c) to pay the reasonable costs of the action incurred by Mrs D's litigation friend; (d) to pay a sum of £12,500 to her husband Mr D; (e) to pay Mr D's reasonable costs of the action. ... For all of the above reasons therefore, the Court's view was that the totality of the compromise represented a reasonable settlement and in the circumstances represented sufficient satisfaction for the alleged breaches of rights, and as such it was approved." | 2014‑03‑05 02:33:29 | 2013 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| UF v A Local Authority [2013] EWHC 4289 (COP), [2013] MHLO 105 — Under Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 2013, Legal Aid for MCA 2005 s21A appeals is non-means-tested for as long as the relevant DOLS standard authorisation is in force. In this case the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Aid Agency confirmed that Legal Aid could continue if the court extends the standard authorisation for the duration of the case. | 2013‑12‑09 09:58:13 | 2013 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Re M (Best Interests: Deprivation of Liberty) [2013] EWHC 3456 (COP), [2013] MHLO 97 — "These Court of Protection proceedings under Section 21A of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 were brought in May 2013 on behalf of a 67-year-old lady named M. ... M wants to return to her own home, a bungalow that, until she went into residential care, she had shared for much of the time with her partner of 30 years." | 2013‑11‑12 21:17:02 | 2013 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| * MHT/PB delay R (LV) v SSJ [2013] EWCA Civ 1086 — The applicant had been given an IPP sentence then transferred to hospital under s47/49. On 12/12/11 the MHT decided she met the criteria for conditional discharge. The dossier reached the Parole Board on 29/3/12, and the hearing was arranged for 12/3/13. She claimed a breach of Article 5(4) during: (a) the period before the dossier was ready, when no judicial body was responsible for supervising her progress and the potentiality for release, and (b) the subsequent long period until the Parole Board met. The Court of Appeal gave permission to apply for judicial review (being simpler than giving permission to appeal the High Court's refusal of permission to apply for judicial review). | 2013‑08‑30 21:58:45 | 2013 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, Judgment missing from Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Prison law cases, Transcript, 2013 cases
|
| * Discharge to DOLS AM v SLAM NHS Foundation Trust [2013] UKUT 365 (AAC) — It was argued at the tribunal that AM should be discharged from s2 in order to remain in hospital informally. (1) A tribunal should (a) decide whether the patient has capacity to consent, (b) decide whether DOLS is an alternative, and (c) in considering the MHA 'necessity' test identify the regime which is the least restrictive way of best achieving the proposed aim. (Nobody knows what the judge's third point means in practice.) The tribunal had failed properly to consider whether AM would comply with informal admission (which is relevant to the second question) so the case was remitted to a differently-constituted tribunal. (2) To be compatible with Article 5 ECHR, ss 2, 3 and 72 MHA 1983 have to be applied on the basis that for detention in hospital to be 'warranted' it has to be 'necessary' in the sense that the objective set out in the relevant statutory test cannot be achieved by less restrictive measures. | 2013‑08‑24 14:36:52 |
|
| A Local Authority v WMA [2013] EWHC 2580 (COP), [2013] MHLO 79 — "The case concerns the future of a twenty five year old man, WMA, and where he should live plus what help should be given to him. It raises complex issues about best interests and deprivation of liberty. ... there is no doubt in my mind it is WMA's best interests to move to B ... if one looks at WMA's isolation, the refusal to engage with outside agencies, the poor conditions in the home and the absence of friends, save one for MA, of both mother and son and contrasts them with the opportunities for WMA at B then the opportunity for a higher quality private life is clear. ... I confess for my part it is not easy to follow the reasoning of the Cheshire West decision. That said, I agree strongly with the Official Solicitor that moving WMA to B would be a deprivation of liberty ... The local authority now concedes there will be a deprivation of liberty, at least because the move will be involuntary. I would go further and note that WMA at least in the short term objects to the arrangements for him and he may seek to leave. We simply do not know. So being in B may in itself be a deprivation of liberty. I will not delve into the meaning of 'restraint' and 'deprivation of liberty' as analysed in the Cheshire West and Chester case. ..." | 2013‑08‑24 14:26:37 | 2013 cases, Best interests, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Y County Council v ZZ [2012] EWHC B34 (COP), [2012] MHLO 179 (COP) — "This is an application made by Y County Council in the Court of Protection in relation to Mr ZZ, a man of young middle age. I am invited to make a number of declarations in relation to Mr ZZ. First, I am asked to find that he lacks litigation capacity on the issues in this case. Second, I am invited to declare that he lacks capacity to decide upon the restrictions relevant to supporting his residence and care. Finally, I am asked to declare that he is being deprived of his liberty, but that it is lawful as in his best interests pursuant to schedule A1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Mr ZZ is represented by the Official Solicitor. He has been present throughout the hearing and has conducted himself with dignity throughout. Indeed, he gave unsworn, oral evidence before me in an entirely courteous and helpful way." | 2013‑06‑06 14:09:46 | 2012 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| * Informal admission A PCT v LDV [2013] EWHC 272 (Fam) — "The two questions considered at the hearing, which form the subject of this judgment, are (1) Do L's current circumstances amount objectively to a deprivation of liberty? (2) When assessing whether L has capacity to consent to her accommodation at WH, in circumstances which amount to a deprivation of liberty, what information is relevant to that decision?" | 2013‑03‑25 22:35:38 | 2013 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Judgment available on MHLO, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii, 2013 cases
|
| Re KK; CC v KK [2012] EWHC 2136 (COP), [2012] MHLO 89 — KK was moved to a care home against her wishes, subject to a DOLS standard authorisation, and appealed under MCA 2005 s21A. (1) Having heard her oral evidence, the judge disagreed with the unanimous expert evidence that she lacked capacity to make decisions about her residence and care. (2) In light of the case law and the facts of the case, she had not been deprived of her liberty. | 2012‑09‑27 22:31:54 | 2012 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Other capacity cases, Transcript
|
| Re Steven Neary; LB Hillingdon v Steven Neary [2012] MHLO 71 (COP) — The Court of Protection approved a consent order under which the London Borough of Hillingdon is to pay £35,000 damages to Stephen Neary. | 2012‑07‑26 19:48:49 | 2012 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment does not exist, No transcript
|
| HSE Ireland v SF (A Minor) [2012] EWHC 1640 (Fam), [2012] MHLO 69 — "This application is made by the Health Service Executive of Ireland ('the HSE'), the statutory authority with responsibility for children taken into public care in the Irish Republic, for an urgent order under Article 20 of the Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27th November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No.1347/2000 (commonly known as 'Brussels II Revised') in respect of a 17-year-old girl whom I shall refer to as SF. At the conclusion of the hearing on 4th May 2012, I made the order sought by the HSE. This judgment sets out the reasons for my decision." | 2012‑06‑23 17:45:37 | 2012 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Re HA [2012] EWHC 1068 (COP), [2012] MHLO 67 — "This case comes before me for directions today. The person whose best interests have to be considered by the court is a HA. The Official Solicitor now acts for her as her litigation friend and in that capacity has continued an application under s.21A of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (the Act) that was instigated before his appointment." | 2012‑06‑23 14:28:12 | 2012 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, Judgment missing from Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| EM v SC [2012] EWHC 1518 (COP), [2012] MHLO 56 — "This is an application made by the Official Solicitor on behalf of the Applicant EM, for the discharge of the latest of a series of standard authorisations made on 16 January 2012 pursuant to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The effect of the standard authorisation is to deprive EM of his liberty and oblige him to live at a nursing home, RH, rather than at the home which he had shared with his wife and son for many years." | 2012‑06‑21 21:25:21 | 2012 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, Judgment missing from Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2007] EWCA Civ 989 — Kettling/Article 5 case. | 2012‑05‑08 19:26:31 | 2007 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| A London Borough v VT [2011] EWHC 3806 (COP) — "The primary matters on which decisions need to be made by the court are: (1) Should ST live at L (or possibly some other care home type accommodation in London) or in his property at X, Nigeria; (2) If ST remains at L, is he being deprived of his liberty and, if he is being so deprived, does that remain appropriate; (3) Should ST's property and affairs deputy be AT or Mr G, the current interim independent professional deputy?" | 2012‑03‑28 22:42:02 | 2011 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Austin v UK 39692/09 [2012] ECHR 459, [2012] MHLO 22 — Kettling did not breach Article 5. | 2012‑03‑19 22:51:40 | 2012 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ECHR, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Re RK; RK v BCC [2011] EWCA Civ 1305 — (1) An adult in the exercise of parental responsibility may impose, or may authorise others to impose, restrictions on the liberty of the child. However restrictions so imposed must not in their totality amount to detention. Detention engages the Article 5 rights of the child and a parent may not lawfully detain or authorise the detention of a child. (2) The restrictions authorised by RK's parents did not amount to deprivation of liberty: they were no more than what was reasonably required to protect RK from harming herself or others within her range. | 2011‑12‑08 21:47:01 | 2011 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Hadzic and Suljic v Bosnia Herzegovina 39446/06 [2011] ECHR 911 — The applicants had been detained for several years in a prison 'Psychiatric Annex' which was an inappropriate institution for the detention of mental health patients, in breach of Article 5(1); the applicants were awarded compensation of €15,000 and €25,000 respectively. | 2011‑11‑26 15:17:07 | 2011 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, ECHR, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2011] EWCA Civ 1257 — P's care plan at Z House did not amount to a deprivation of liberty: "At Z House and outside it P is living a life which is as normal as it can be for someone in his situation." [Caution: see Supreme Court decision.] | 2011‑11‑09 21:34:46 | 2011 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| LB Tower Hamlets v BB [2011] EWHC 2853 (Fam) — 'There are two sets of proceedings which concern BB. In the first, her litigation friend, sought guidance from the court under sections 16 and 18(k) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 about the conduct of proceedings concerning BB and declarations that she a) lacks capacity to conduct those proceedings and b) it is in her best interests that, in the event that her marriage to MA is a valid marriage, it be annulled or that there be a declaration that it is not recognised by the law of England and Wales. In the second, the local authority as substituted applicant seeks declarations that BB a) lacks the capacity to litigate, b) lacks capacity to decide where she should live, with whom she should have contact, who should provide her with care, what care should be provided to her and the medical treatment she should receive for her mental disorder. The court is asked to make decisions on her behalf as respects those questions which the court determines she is incapacitated to answer.' | 2011‑11‑09 21:20:31 | 2011 cases, Best interests, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| S v Estonia 17779/08 [2011] ECHR 1511 — Under domestic law S should have been heard 'promptly' after the county court ruled on her compulsory admission to hospital, but was not heard for 15 days; no adequate justification was given; this was a considerable portion of the three-month admission period; the domestic supreme court noted the procedural violation but offered no redress: overall, there had been a breach of Article 5(1), in that she was not detained in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. Compensation of €5000 was awarded. | 2011‑10‑06 21:42:07 | 2011 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, ECHR, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2011] EWHC 1330 (COP) — (1) The new care plan was in P's best interests (paras 35, 39). (2) There was a deprivation of liberty (reasons given in paras 58-60). (3) A costs order was made against the local authority as the serious misconduct of its employees (including misleading the court under oath, failure to disclose documents and falsifying records) rendered the proceedings more costly (para 76). (4) The public interest in holding public authorities accountable amounts to a 'good reason' for naming the local authority; the scale of the possible identification of P was minor enough not to prevent this (paras 89-90). | 2011‑06‑19 22:41:50 | 2011 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Re C; C v Wigan Borough Council [2011] EWHC 1539 (Admin) — Judgment in related COP and Admin Court proceedings relating to an 18-year old with severe autism and severe learning disabilities living at a residential special school. Issues considered include deprivation of liberty and seclusion. | 2011‑06‑16 22:17:33 | 2011 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Re Steven Neary; LB Hillingdon v Steven Neary [2011] EWHC 1377 (COP) — (1) By keeping Stephen away from his home, Hillingdon breached Article 8 and Article 5(1) (notwithstanding DOLS authorisations granted during later stages). (2) By (a) failing sooner to refer the case to the COP, (b) failing sooner to appoint an IMCA, and (c) failing to conduct an effective review of the best interests assessments, Hillingdon breached Article 5(4). | 2011‑06‑09 14:44:57 | 2011 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Re P and Q; P and Q v Surrey County Council; sub nom Re MIG and MEG [2011] EWCA Civ 190 — Judgment of Parker J upheld: neither P (aged 18, in a foster placement) nor Q (aged 17, in a small group home) was deprived of her liberty. [Caution: see Supreme Court decision.] | 2011‑02‑28 13:44:57 | 2011 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Re KM; NCC v KM (2009) COP 1145479102 — Consideration of the legal aid position in relation to deprivation of liberty reviews following final hearing. | 2011‑01‑24 21:23:37 | 2009 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, Neutral citation unknown or not applicable, Transcript
|
| Re P (2010) COP 23/12/10 (Mostyn J) — There was effectively a presumption against deprivation of liberty (pursuant to MCA 2005 s1(6)) and, on the facts, the balance tilted in favour of P returning home pending a final hearing at which full evidence could be considered. [Summary based on counsel's case report.] | 2011‑01‑23 18:02:24 | 2010 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment does not exist, No transcript
|
| Re RK; YB v BCC [2010] EWHC 3355 (COP) — (1) Given the terms of s20(8) Children Act 1989 (that any person with parental responsibility may at any time remove the child) the provision of accommodation to a child under s20(1), (3), (4) or (5) will not ever give rise to a deprivation of liberty within the terms of Article 5. If the child is being accommodated under the auspices of a care order, interim or full, or if the child has been placed in secure accommodation under s25, then the position might be different. (2) In any event: (a) the objective element of deprivation of liberty was not remotely close to being met on the facts; (b) the subjective element was not met, as the parents had consented on RK's behalf; (c) RK's placement was at the behest of her parents and could not be imputed to the state. [Detailed summary to follow.] | 2011‑01‑04 23:38:25 | 2010 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, Judgment missing from Bailii, Transcript
|
| G v E [2010] EWHC 3385 (Fam) — Costs judgment. "In all the circumstances, I conclude that this is a case for departing from the general rule set out in rule 157 of the Court of Protection rules, and I make an order in the following terms: (1) That the local authority should pay the costs of G, F and E, including pre-litigation costs, up to and including the first day of the hearing before me on 14th January 2010 on an indemnity basis. (2) The local authority shall pay one third of the costs of G, F and E from that date up to and including the hearing on 6 May 2010 on a standard basis. (3) All costs will be subject to a detailed assessment, if not agreed." | 2011‑01‑04 23:32:35 | 2010 cases, COP costs cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Re ADE (Scope of Schedule A1) (2010) COP 11821802 — Given that a standard authorisation extends to restraining a person from leaving the accommodation, it must also extend to compelling him to return: "Do the powers under the existing standard authorisation extend to coercing ADE back to the nursing home if ADE refuses to return? It would be little short of absurd if the local authority and AHNH had powers to restrain him from leaving but not to compel him to return: the greater power must include the lesser. I will therefore declare that this power is implicit in the current and any future standard authorisation." | 2010‑12‑17 00:30:50 | 2010 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, Neutral citation unknown or not applicable, Transcript
|
| A County Council v MB [2010] EWHC 2508 (COP) — Court of Protection case about 'DOLS breakdowns'. [Official summary available.] | 2010‑10‑22 23:57:53 | 2010 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii
|
| A Primary Care Trust v P [2009] EW Misc 10 (EWCOP) — (1) P lacked capacity to decide where and with whom he should reside. (2) The removal of P from AH's care at home, as a manifest breach of Article 8, could only be proportionate if the best interests of P compellingly required it. (3) It was in P's best interests to be moved to independent living accommodation. (4) There would be a deprivation of liberty due to (a) the degree of control to be exercised by staff, (b) the constraint on P leaving if he intends to return to AH, (c) the power to refuse a request from AH for P's return, (d) the restraints on contact, (e) the fairly high degree of supervision and control. (5) Directions were given in relation to the conduct of further court reviews. (6) Contact would be dealt with separately in an Order. | 2010‑09‑13 23:44:12 | 2009 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Re MIG and MEG [2010] EWHC 785 (Fam) — Neither MIG (aged 18, in a foster placement) nor MEG (aged 17, in a small group home) was deprived of her liberty. [Caution: see Supreme Court judgment.] | 2010‑09‑03 16:41:13 | 2010 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii
|
| BB v AM [2010] EWHC 1916 (Fam) — (1) BB was not ineligible to be deprived of her liberty within the meaning of Case E of MCA 2005 sch 1A as the psychiatric evidence was that the criteria under s2 or s3 MHA were not made out. (2) In relation to whether or not there was a deprivation of liberty: on one hand (a) BB was under sedation; staff exercised control over her care, movements, assessments and treatments; staff also exercised control over her residence and the contacts she had with other people; her family were hostile to her placement; the court was refusing to sanction the discharge of BB into the care of her parents pending the conclusion of investigations being carried out by the police; on the other hand (b) BB was apparently happy where she was; she had a degree of freedom within the hospital; in addition if she asked to leave, she was allowed to do so, although only under the supervision of accompanying staff; in conclusion (c) she was being deprived of her liberty as she was away from her family, in an institution under sedation in circumstances in which her contact with the outside world was strictly controlled, her capacity to have free access to her family was limited, now by court order, and her movements were under the strict control and supervision of hospital staff. | 2010‑08‑09 22:57:10 | 2010 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on MHLO, Judgment missing from Bailii, Transcript
|
| G v E, Manchester City Council and F [2010] EWHC 2042 (Fam) — (1) The arguments in favour of publication of the local authority's name (openness and accountability) were truly compelling: they amounted to a "good reason" and the balancing exercise came down in favour of publication. It would be a different matter if there was any significant risk that the family might be identified, but Manchester is a large city. (2) It would inappropriate and unfair to name the social workers, because responsibility for what went wrong rested at a much higher level, including the failure to provide any or any adequate training on the introduction of the DOLS. (3) Neither the company running the establishment nor its manager would be identified: (a) they were not represented when the criticisms were made or identification was discussed; (b) it had not been necessary to make findings on the criticisms, the appropriate course being for the OS to raise the issue with the CQC which has some responsibility for such establishments; and (c) crucially, it would lead to a significant risk of the family being identified. (4) In an unreported judgment in May it was ordered that E should return to F's care immediately, and residence and family contact there had been successful. (5) A further judgment will be delivered dealing with: (a) arrangements as to E's future care; (b) whether to appoint G and F as deputies; and (c) whether the OS should be replaced as E's Litigation Friend. (6) A further hearing will deal with: (a) whether the Court of Protection can award damages for human rights breaches; if so, whether to do so; if not, whether to leave or transfer that claim to another jurisdiction; and (b) whether to make a contact order against MCC and if so on that terms. | 2010‑08‑04 22:36:32 | 2010 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| G v E [2010] EWCA Civ 822 — The judge was right to reject the appellant's submission that Article 5 places distinct threshold conditions which have to be satisfied before a person lacking capacity can be detained in his best interests under the MCA 2005. The MCA generally, and the DOLS in particular, plug the Bournewood gap and are Article 5 compliant. | 2010‑07‑18 00:30:09 | 2010 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii
|
| Re A (Adult) and Re C (Child); A Local Authority v A [2010] EWHC 978 (Fam) — The circumstances of the domestic care of A and C by their families in the family home did not involve a deprivation of liberty engaging the protection of Article 5. | 2010‑07‑08 21:55:07 | 2010 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment available on Bailii
|
| G v E [2010] EWCA Civ 548 — Successful renewed application for permission to appeal: it was arguable that the judge was wrong in deciding that the court may entertain an application for an order under s16 MCA 2005 that would have the effect of depriving a person of his liberty without being satisfied that his condition warrants compulsory confinement. Permission was given on other grounds also. | 2010‑07‑08 21:48:27 | 2010 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| R (ZN) v South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust (2010) CO/9457/2009 — The de facto detention of an informal incapacitous patient, and the series of detentions under s5(2), was unlawful. (Claim settled by consent.) | 2010‑06‑28 16:32:40 | 2010 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment does not exist, No transcript, Unlawful detention cases
|
| * Control order and DOL SSHD v AP [2010] UKSC 24 — Whether the curfew amounted to a deprivation of liberty. | 2010‑06‑18 23:23:09 | 2010 cases, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Judgment available on Bailii, 2010 cases
|
| Re MP; LBH v GP (2009) FD08P01058 — (1) MP, who suffered from a learning disability and lacked capacity as to residence and contact, was removed from his mother's accommodation and conveyed by the police to a care home. On the facts, there was presently no deprivation of liberty and it was in MP's best interests to remain at the care home with the existing contact regime continuing. (2) Guidance was given, subsequently approved by the President of the Family Division and Court of Protection, for cases where a vulnerable or incapacited adult requires to be removed from premises with the help of the police. | 2010‑05‑13 20:00:21 | 2009 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on MHLO, Neutral citation unknown or not applicable, Transcript
|
| G v E [2010] EWHC 621 (Fam) — E lacked capacity and was being deprived of his liberty at a residential unit by the local authority. They had breached his Article 5 rights by doing so without seeking a DOLS authorisation or court order, and had breached his Article 8 rights by actions including a failure properly to involve his carer. However, the court authorised continuing deprivation of liberty at the residential unit pending the final hearing as this was in his best interests. There is no threshold condition for an order under s16 depriving someone of his liberty, other than that P lacks the relevant capacity. When considering DOL there is a clear distinction between a placement at home, with family or an adult carer, and a residential placement. Hearsay from an incompetent witness is admissible but no weight would be given to E's statements. | 2010‑03‑31 22:32:14 | 2010 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Transcript, Judgment missing from Bailii
|
| Dorset CC v EH [2009] EWHC 784 (Fam) — The Official Solicitor's view and independent expert's opinion was that EH, an elderly lady with dementia, should be assisted to continue to live at home; notwithstanding this, the judge agreed with the local authority that it was in EH's best interests to be deprived of her liberty in residential accommodation for her own safety. | 2010‑03‑28 13:34:42 | 2009 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, Judgment missing from Bailii, Transcript
|
| R (Degainis) v SSJ [2010] EWHC 137 (Admin) — In relation to a 7-month delay in holding a Parole Board hearing, the SSJ admitted breach of Article 5(4) and apologised, but the claimant sought damages under Article 5(5). (1) Article 5(5) (which gives an "enforceable right to compensation") and s8 HRA 1998 (which limits the power to award damages) are not inconsistent because compensation in Article 5(5) is not limited to money. (2) The first of two grounds for the claim was that the delay increased the length of detention: because of the number of imponderables in the case it was impossible to conclude this. (3) The second ground was based on an inference that frustration and anxiety had been caused: the judge was not prepared to infer, in the absence of specific evidence, a level of frustration of distress sufficient to warrant an award of damages. (4) In general, as to whether or not to award damages, the length of the delay, the effect of the delay, and the impact on the claimant are relevant factors; the seriousness of the original offence is not. | 2010‑02‑05 20:51:38 | 2010 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript, Tribunal delay
|
| R (Miller) v Independent Assessor [2009] EWCA Civ 609 — The Independent Assessor must have erred in law by failing to make proper use of the civil law awards, because without much explanation he arrived at an award which is irrationally low (namely £55,000 for over 4 years' detention following wrongful conviction for murder). | 2009‑12‑09 23:35:49 | 2009 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| * MHA/MCA detention interface GJ v The Foundation Trust [2009] EWHC 2972 (Fam) — (1) As between the MHA 1983 and the MCA 2005 Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, the MHA has primacy: professionals cannot pick and choose as they think fit. (2) In deciding whether P is within the scope of the MHA, the eligibility assessor must ask whether, in his own opinion, P could be detained under the MHA. (3) With respect to objections, what matters is whether P objects generally to what is proposed. (4) The correct overall approach for the eligibility assessor is to (a) look at the reality of the situation, rather than the words of the authorisation, (b) separate the mental treatment from the purely physical treatment, and (c) apply a "but for" test, i.e. whether, but for the physical treatment, P should be detained (and whether the only effective reason for detention is physical treatment); if "no" (and "yes", respectively) then P isn't ineligible for DOLS. (5) On the facts, but for his diabetes, P would not have been detainable, so he was not ineligible. It is worth reading the full summary page and the judgment. | 2009‑11‑24 07:53:19 |
|
| * DOLS and Case E Re Brammall: W Primary Care Trust v TB [2009] EWCOP 1737 — TB was eligible to be deprived of her liberty under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (either under DOLS provisions or s16 court order): she might have been ineligible under Case E, but she was not a "mental health patient" because her care home did not fall within the definition of a hospital. | 2009‑07‑23 22:08:17 | Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Cases, Judgment available on Bailii, 2009 cases
|
| * Conditions of discharge and DOL R (SSHD) v MHRT, re PH [2002] EWHC 1128 (Admin) — Condition of discharge not to leave without escort not unlawful on the facts. | 2009‑04‑12 13:01:39 |
|
| IH v UK 17111/04 [2005] ECHR 934 — The claimant was granted a deferred conditional discharge but subsequently not released as no supervising psychiatrist could be found; the House of Lords found that Article 5(4) had been breached as the Tribunal could not revisit their decision (as the law was then understood). The claimant's Article 5(1)(e) complaint was rejected (on the facts, the alternative to conditional discharge was continued detention rather than absolute discharge), as were his complaints under Article 5(4) (no longer a victim as domestic courts had acknowledged breach and afforded appropriate redress) and Article 5(5) (no longer a victim, no absolute right to compensation). | 2009‑04‑10 13:40:33 | 2005 cases, Brief summary, Deferred conditional discharge cases, Deprivation of liberty, ECHR, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5 — (1) The difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is merely one of degree or intensity, not one of nature or substance; it is highly sensitive to the facts of each case. (2) Where the purpose of the measure is relevant, it must be to enable a balance to be struck between what the restriction seeks to achieve and the interests of the individual; there is room, even in the case of fundamental rights, for a pragmatic approach which takes full account of all the circumstances; however, in general, purpose is relevant, not to whether the Article 5 threshold is crossed, but to justification under 5(1)(a) to (e). (3) Measures of crowd control will fall outside the ambit of Article 5 so long as they are not arbitrary, i.e. they must be resorted to in good faith, they must be proportionate, and they must not be enforced for longer than is reasonably necessary; the confinement by the police of the claimant for seven hours in Oxford Circus in order to avoid physical injuries and property damage therefore did not engage Article 5; if Article 5 had been engaged then the deprivation of liberty could not have been justified under Article 5(1)(a) to (e) for each individual in the crowd. | 2009‑01‑29 23:21:14 | 2009 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| R (Abu-Rideh) v SSHD [2007] EWHC 2237 (Admin) — The claimant's appeal under s10(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 against the modification of his control order (that the cumulative effect in his changed circumstances, in particular because he now lives alone and his perceived declining mental health, had led to breaches of Articles 5, 3 and 8) failed. | 2009‑01‑19 20:58:06 | 2007 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| Salford City Council v GJ, re GJ NJ and BJ (Incapacitated Adults) [2008] EWHC 1097 (Fam) — The appropriate safeguards to be put in place when the court authorises the placement of an incapacitated adult in circumstances engaging Article 5 of the Convention. | 2008‑12‑28 19:31:41 | 2008 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Other capacity cases, Transcript
|
| LLBC v TG [2007] EWHC 2640 (Fam) — Best interests/deprivation of liberty case. | 2008‑10‑06 16:07:24 | 2007 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| R (L) v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust [1998] UKHL 24 — Bournewood gap. | 2008‑09‑13 06:09:48 | 1998 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| R (L) v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust [1997] EWCA Civ 2879 — Bournewood gap. | 2008‑09‑13 06:09:03 | 1997 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| R (L) v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust [1997] EWHC Admin 850 — Bournewood gap. | 2008‑09‑13 06:08:05 | 1997 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on MHLO, Judgment missing from Bailii, No summary, Transcript
|
| Re PS (An Adult); City of Sunderland v PS [2007] EWHC 623 (Fam) — Under inherent jurisdiction the court made orders that (1) PS could lawfully be prevented from leaving residential care unit (2) a receiver would be appointed without the need for a separate application to the Court of Protection. | 2008‑02‑23 00:02:26 | 2007 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, Other capacity cases, Transcript
|
| * Conditions of discharge and DOL R (SSHD) v MHRT, re PH [2002] EWCA Civ 1868 — Conditions of discharge are lawful so long as they do not amount to a deprivation of liberty: in this case, a condition that the patient could not leave a hostel unescorted was lawful; so too could be a condition of residence at a hospital. | 2007‑02‑06 18:15:31 | Pages using DynamicPageList3 parser function, Cases, Judgment available on Bailii, 2002 cases
|
| JE v DE and Surrey County Council [2006] EWHC 3459 (Fam) — In determining whether a person is deprived of his liberty, the crucial question is whether he is is “free to leave” the institution, not only for approved outings but also permanently to go or live where or with whom he chooses; there can be deprivation of liberty in the absence of a lock or physical barrier, and it can equally be caused by the misuse or misrepresentation of even non-existent authority | 2007‑01‑20 11:09:41 | 2006 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Other capacity cases, Transcript
|
| R (G) v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2004] EWHC 2193 (Admin) — The Tribunal were right to conclude that the conditions which the claimant patient contended for (continued residence at Thornford Park) would be a deprivation, rather than a restriction, of his liberty. The patient's consent to this continuing deprivation of liberty would not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal.' | 2006‑04‑10 20:46:03 | 2004 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Discharge conditions cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
| R (SSHD) v MHRT, re MP [2004] EWHC 2194 (Admin) — Conditions attached to conditional discharge of restricted patients must not be so severe as to deprive the patient of his liberty (as opposed to merely restricting it). In this case the condition that the patient may not leave a hostel without escorts deprived him of his liberty. Re PH distinguished: the purpose of the restrictions (and the hope in PH that the need for them might diminish) was different. | 2006‑04‑10 20:33:12 | 2004 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Discharge conditions cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript
|
Article titles
The following 149 pages are in this category.
A
- A County Council v MB (2010) EWHC 2508 (COP)
- A Hospital NHS Trust v CD (2015) EWCOP 74, (2015) MHLO 94
- A Local Authority v M (2015) EWCOP 69, (2015) MHLO 135
- A Local Authority v TA (2021) EWCOP 22
- A Local Authority v WMA (2013) EWHC 2580 (COP), (2013) MHLO 79
- A Local Health Board v AB (2015) EWCOP 31, (2015) MHLO 95
- A London Borough v VT (2011) EWHC 3806 (COP)
- A PCT v LDV (2013) EWHC 272 (Fam)
- A Primary Care Trust v P (2009) EW Misc 10 (EWCOP)
- A v A Local Authority (2011) EWCOP 727
- AM v SLAM NHS Foundation Trust (2013) UKUT 365 (AAC)
- An NHS Trust v A (2015) EWCOP 71, (2015) MHLO 91
- AP v Tameside MBC (2017) EWHC 65 (QB)
- Atudorei v Romania 50131/08 (2014) ECHR 947
- Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2007) EWCA Civ 989
- Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2009) UKHL 5
- Austin v UK 39692/09 (2012) ECHR 459, (2012) MHLO 22
B
C
D
E
G
- G v E (2010) EWCA Civ 548
- G v E (2010) EWCA Civ 822
- G v E (2010) EWHC 3385 (Fam)
- G v E (2010) EWHC 621 (Fam)
- G v E, Manchester City Council and F (2010) EWHC 2042 (Fam)
- GJ v The Foundation Trust (2009) EWHC 2972 (Fam)
- Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust v R (2020) EWCOP 4
- GW v Gloucestershire County Council (2016) UKUT 499 (AAC)
H
J
K
L
- Lazariu v Romania 31973/03 (2014) ECHR 1219, (2014) MHLO 139
- LB Tower Hamlets v BB (2011) EWHC 2853 (Fam)
- LB Tower Hamlets v TB (2014) EWCOP 53, (2014) MHLO 130
- Liverpool City Council v SG (2014) EWCOP 10, (2014) MHLO 67
- LLBC v TG (2007) EWHC 2640 (Fam)
- London Borough of Haringey v Emile (2020) MHLO 70 (CC)
- London Borough of Havering v AEL (2021) EWCOP 9
- London Borough of Tower Hamlets v A (2020) EWCOP 21
- LV v UK 50718/16 (2019) MHLO 32 (ECHR)
M
N
- NL v Hampshire CC (2014) UKUT 475 (AAC), (2014) MHLO 107
- NM v Kent County Council (2015) UKUT 125 (AAC), (2015) MHLO 34
- Norfolk CC v PB (2014) EWCOP 14, (2014) MHLO 75
- North Yorkshire County Council v MAG (2015) EWCOP 64, (2015) MHLO 69
- North Yorkshire County Council v MAG (2016) EWCOP 5, (2016) MHLO 26
- Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust v ML (2014) EWCOP 2, (2014) MHLO 31
P
R
- R (Abu-Rideh) v SSHD (2007) EWHC 2237 (Admin)
- R (Degainis) v SSJ (2010) EWHC 137 (Admin)
- R (Ferreira) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South London (2017) EWCA Civ 31
- R (G) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (2004) EWHC 2193 (Admin)
- R (Jalloh) v SSHD (2020) UKSC 4
- R (L) v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust (1997) EWCA Civ 2879
- R (L) v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust (1997) EWHC Admin 850
- R (L) v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust (1998) UKHL 24
- R (Liverpool City Council) v SSH (2017) EWHC 986 (Admin)
- R (LV) v SSJ (2013) EWCA Civ 1086
- R (LV) v SSJ (2014) EWHC 1495 (Admin)
- R (Miller) v Independent Assessor (2009) EWCA Civ 609
- R (SSHD) v MHRT, re MP (2004) EWHC 2194 (Admin)
- R (SSHD) v MHRT, re PH (2002) EWCA Civ 1868
- R (SSHD) v MHRT, re PH (2002) EWHC 1128 (Admin)
- R (ZN) v South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust (2010) CO/9457/2009
- R v LV; R (LV) v SSJ (2015) EWCA Crim 45, (2015) EWCA Civ 56
- RB v Brighton and Hove City Council (2014) EWCA Civ 561
- Re A (Adult) and Re C (Child); A Local Authority v A (2010) EWHC 978 (Fam)
- Re AB (A child: deprivation of liberty) (2015) EWHC 3125 (Fam), (2015) MHLO 74
- Re AB (Inherent Jurisdiction: Deprivation of Liberty) (2018) EWHC 3103 (Fam)
- Re ADE (Scope of Schedule A1) (2010) COP 11821802
- Re AJ (DOLS) (2015) EWCOP 5, (2015) MHLO 11
- Re Brammall: W Primary Care Trust v TB (2009) EWCOP 1737
- Re C; C v Wigan Borough Council (2011) EWHC 1539 (Admin)
- Re HA (2012) EWHC 1068 (COP), (2012) MHLO 67
- Re HC (A Minor: Deprivation of Liberty) (2018) EWHC 2961 (Fam)
- Re JM (2016) EWCOP 15
- Re KK; CC v KK (2012) EWHC 2136 (COP), (2012) MHLO 89
- Re KM; NCC v KM (2009) COP 1145479102
- Re KT (2018) EWCOP 1
- Re KW (2015) EWCOP 53, (2015) MHLO 88
- Re M (Best Interests: Deprivation of Liberty) (2013) EWHC 3456 (COP), (2013) MHLO 97
- Re MIG and MEG (2010) EWHC 785 (Fam)
- Re MOD (Deprivation of Liberty) (2015) EWCOP 47, (2015) MHLO 48
- Re MP; LBH v GP (2009) FD08P01058
- Re NRA (2015) EWCOP 59, (2015) MHLO 66
- Re P (2010) COP 23/12/10 (Mostyn J)
- Re P (Application for Secure Accommodation Order) (2015) EWHC 2971 (Fam), (2015) MHLO 77
- Re P and Q; P and Q v Surrey County Council; sub nom Re MIG and MEG (2011) EWCA Civ 190
- Re PS (An Adult); City of Sunderland v PS (2007) EWHC 623 (Fam)
- Re RD (Deprivation or Restriction of Liberty) (2018) EWFC 47
- Re RK; RK v BCC (2011) EWCA Civ 1305
- Re RK; YB v BCC (2010) EWHC 3355 (COP)
- Re SF (2020) EWCOP 15
- Re Steven Neary; LB Hillingdon v Steven Neary (2011) EWHC 1377 (COP)
- Re Steven Neary; LB Hillingdon v Steven Neary (2012) MHLO 71 (COP)
- Re UF (No 2) (2014) EWCOP 18, (2014) MHLO 78
- Re X (Court of Protection Practice) (2015) EWCA Civ 599, (2015) MHLO 44
- Re X (Deprivation of Liberty) (2014) EWCOP 25, (2014) MHLO 86
- Re X (Deprivation of Liberty) (No 2) (2014) EWCOP 37, (2014) MHLO 98
- Re YC (2021) EWCOP 34
- Rochdale MBC v KW (2014) EWCOP 45, (2014) MHLO 123
- Rochdale MBC v KW (2015) EWCA Civ 1054, (2015) MHLO 71
- Rochdale MBC v KW (2015) EWCOP 13, (2015) MHLO 24
- Royal Borough of Greenwich v CDM (2018) EWCOP 15
S
- S v Estonia 17779/08 (2011) ECHR 1511
- Salford City Council v GJ, re GJ NJ and BJ (Incapacitated Adults) (2008) EWHC 1097 (Fam)
- Somerset NHS Foundation Trust v Amira (2023) EWCOP 25
- Somerset v MK (2014) EWCOP B25, (2014) MHLO 146
- SSHD v AP (2010) UKSC 24
- SSJ v KC (2015) UKUT 376 (AAC)
- SSJ v MM (2018) UKSC 60
- SSJ v RB (2010) UKUT 454 (AAC)
- SSJ v RB (2011) EWCA Civ 1608
- SSJ v Staffordshire County Council and SRK (2016) EWCA Civ 1317
- Staffordshire County Council (18 004 809) (2019) MHLO 41 (LGSCO)
- Staffordshire County Council v SRK (2016) EWCOP 27
- Sunderland City Council v AS (2020) EWCOP 13
- Surrey Police v PC (2024) EWHC 1274 (Fam)
T
The following category (in the blue box) can be clicked to view a list of other pages in the same category: