| Display title | Re G (Court of Protection: Injunction) [2022] EWCA Civ 1312 |
| Default sort key | Re G (Court of Protection: Injunction) (2022) EWCA Civ 1312 |
| Page length (in bytes) | 1,577 |
| Page ID | 14672 |
| Page content language | en - English |
| Page content model | wikitext |
| Indexing by robots | Allowed |
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| Counted as a content page | Yes |
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| Page creator | Jonathan (talk | contribs) |
| Date of page creation | 20:23, 27 October 2022 |
| Latest editor | Jonathan (talk | contribs) |
| Date of latest edit | 20:24, 27 October 2022 |
| Total number of edits | 2 |
| Total number of distinct authors | 1 |
| Recent number of edits (within past 90 days) | 0 |
| Recent number of distinct authors | 0 |
Description | Content |
Article description: (description)
This attribute controls the content of the description and og:description elements. | "The Court of Protection does have power to grant injunctions under s.16(5) of the 2005 Act, both in the case where a deputy has been appointed under s.16(2)(b) and in the case where the Court has made an order taking a decision for P under s.16(2)(a). In doing so, it is exercising the power conferred on it by s.47(1) and such an injunction can therefore only be granted when it is just and convenient to do so. This requirement is now to be understood in line with the majority judgment in Broad Idea as being satisfied where there is an interest which merits protection and a legal or equitable principle which justifies exercising the power to order the defendant to do or not do something. In the present case, as is likely to be the case wherever an injunction is granted to prevent the Court's decision under s.16(2)(a) from being frustrated or undermined, those requirements are satisfied because G's interest in the December order being given effect to is an interest that merits protection, and the principle that the Court may make ancillary orders to prevent its orders being frustrated is ample justification for the grant of injunctive relief if the facts merit it." |