| Display title | Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC 3275 (QB) |
| Default sort key | Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust (2016) EWHC 3275 (QB) |
| Page length (in bytes) | 2,844 |
| Page ID | 8656 |
| Page content language | en - English |
| Page content model | wikitext |
| Indexing by robots | Allowed |
| Number of redirects to this page | 1 |
| Counted as a content page | Yes |
| Edit | Allow only users with "editing" permission (infinite) |
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| Page creator | Jonathan (talk | contribs) |
| Date of page creation | 21:07, 27 December 2016 |
| Latest editor | Jonathan (talk | contribs) |
| Date of latest edit | 08:22, 2 May 2021 |
| Total number of edits | 8 |
| Total number of distinct authors | 1 |
| Recent number of edits (within past 90 days) | 0 |
| Recent number of distinct authors | 0 |
Description | Content |
Article description: (description)
This attribute controls the content of the description and og:description elements. | "On 25th August 2010 Ms Henderson ('the Claimant') stabbed her mother to death. She was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time, and her condition had recently worsened. It is common ground between the parties that this tragic event would not have happened but for the Defendant's breaches of duty in failing to respond in an appropriate way to the Claimant's mental collapse. The Claimant has now brought proceedings in the tort of negligence claiming general damages under various heads, special damages and future losses, and liability has been admitted. The Defendant's position is that all of the claims should be defeated on illegality or public policy grounds, and that binding authority of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords compels that outcome. ... In my view, there are three main questions for me to consider within the agenda circumscribed by the preliminary issue: (1) the correct interpretation of the sentencing remarks of Foskett J [in the Claimant's case], and the extent to which it is permissible, if at all, to go behind them; (2) whether there is binding authority of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords precluding some or all of these claims; and (3) if not, whether the law as accurately enunciated (there remains a dispute between the parties as to what it is) permits, or obviates, the maintenance of some or all of these claims. I frame the questions in this manner because it is the Defendant's submission that I am bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Clunis v Camden and Islington HA (1998) QB 978B and that of the House of Lords in Gray v Thames Trains Ltd (2009) 1 AC 1339B. If I were to uphold the Defendant's submission on stare decisis, the parties are agreed that I need not express a view on question (3) above on the hypothetical basis that I might be overruled. If, on the other hand, question (3) does properly arise for decision, the parties are agreed that the case should be listed for further argument on this point. ...I ... refuse to issue a certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969. I also refuse permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal for the reason indicated under paragraphs 99 and 104 above." |
