View source for R v Bala (2017) EWCA Crim 1460

{{Case
|Date=2017/10/06
|NCN=[2017] EWCA Crim 1460
|Other citations=[2017] MHLO 31
|Court=Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
|Judges=Thirlwall, Warby, Deborah Taylor
|Parties=Mehmet Bala
|Sentence=Unsuccessful life sentence appeal
|Summary=The appellant unsuccessfully argued that he should have received a [[s37/41]] restricted hospital order instead of a life sentence. Extract from judgment: "His applications for an extension of time of 10 years to apply for leave to appeal against sentence and to call fresh evidence were referred to the full court by the single judge. It is the appellant's case that instead of a sentence of Custody for Life the judge should have imposed a hospital order under section 37 Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983 together with a Restriction Order under section 41. ... In [[R v Vowles; R (Vowles) v SSJ (2015) EWCA Crim 45, (2015) EWCA Civ 56, (2015) MHLO 16]] this court set out in detail the approach to be taken by sentencing judges dealing with offenders with mental disorders. At paragraph 54, having earlier set out the statutory framework, the court described the situation in which a section 37/41 order is likely to be the correct disposal in a case where a life sentence is being considered. It is that 1) the mental disorder is treatable 2) once treated there is no evidence the offender would be in any way dangerous, and 3) the offending is entirely due to that mental disorder. In this case the new evidence does not demonstrate that the offending was entirely due to the mental disorder. We are quite satisfied, on the evidence available at the time and the more recent evidence, that the appellant's behaviour when committing the offence was affected by both mental illness and his personality disorder. On the face of it therefore this case did not come within the situation described as likely to lead to a section 37/41 order as described in Vowles. To that we would add the reminder in Vowles that consideration should be given to whether the powers of the Secretary of State under section 47 to transfer a prisoner for treatment would, taking into account all the other circumstances, be appropriate. It is clear from the court log that the judge had well in mind those powers, in the light of Dr Payne's reference to a further review after three months. We are satisfied therefore that even on the fresh evidence the judge could not have concluded, as required by section 37(2)(b), that 'having regard to all the circumstances including the nature of the offence and the character and antecedents of the offender, and to the other available methods of dealing with him, that the most suitable method of disposing of the case is by means of an order under [section 37.]' In short the judge's conclusion was correct at the time and, with hindsight and fresh evidence, remains correct. The real purpose of this appeal was to move the appellant from the release regime consequent upon a life sentence to the regime consequent on a hospital order. That is not a proper basis for an appeal if the original sentence was not wrong in principle. There are some, relatively few, cases where medical evidence obtained years after sentence convincingly demonstrates that the sentencing court proceeded on the wrong basis because of an error by an expert – see eg [[R v Ahmed (2016) EWCA Crim 670]]. On analysis that is not this case. The sentence was not wrong in principle."
|Detail===Note==
The written judgment lists the third judge as "The Honorary Recorder of Westminster", which I think is HHJ Deborah Taylor.
|Subject=Life sentence cases
|News=No
|RSS pubdate=2019/04/30 12:35:25 AM
}}