View source for R (Maher) v First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health) (2023) EWHC 34 (Admin)

{{Case
|Date=2023/01/13
|NCN=[2023] EWHC 34 (Admin)
|Essex issue=129
|Essex page=28
|Court=High Court (Administrative Court)
|Judges=Stacey
|Parties=Teresa Maher, First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health), Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice, Richard Wilson-Michael
|Sentence=Failure to provide reasons to victim
|Summary=(1) The Mental Health Tribunal in its first decision, in which it had refused to provide the mother of a victim of manslaughter the reasons for the conditional discharge decision, or a gist of them, had unlawfully fettered its discretion by applying a blanket policy or practice. (2) Around a year later, after judicial review permission on the "blanket policy" ground had been granted, the Deputy Chamber President decided to make a further decision. The tribunal had power to make this decision under its case management powers, but the decision itself was unlawful: (a) instead of directing herself that departing from the open justice principle can only be justified in exceptional circumstances when strictly necessary to secure the proper administration of justice, the DCP jumped straight to the presumption of privacy contained in the tribunal's rules; as a consequence she did not engage with the purpose of the open justice principle which is to both assist in justice being done through transparency and also to enable the public to have confidence in the system; (b) her focus on the mother's motives, which should not have been given weight in the overall balance, clouded her consideration of other, more relevant issues; (c) she did not direct herself that the extent of the derogation from the principle of open justice should be no more than is strictly necessary to achieve the desired purpose, and did not consider providing the mother with a gist or summary of the reasons; (d) she did not explain why a redacted version of the conditional discharge decision could not meet the patient's privacy rights or why redacted reasons were "not possible"; (e) she did not adequately explain her reasons; (f) she did not engage sufficiently with the reasons that the mother had put forward. The court noted: "The direction of travel in the last 30 years or so has been towards openness and a more rigorous scrutiny of exceptions to the open justice principle and creative thinking about how conflicting rights can be reconciled." (3) The refusal to provide the gist of the reasons for the conditional discharge decision, when the Parole Board would have provided a gist of its reasons in similar circumstances, was unlawful discrimination under [[Article 14]] in relation to the mother's [[Article 8]] rights. (4) The tribunal's decision not to allow a Victim Personal Statement, and the inability of a victim to request a reconsideration, were not unlawful discrimination given the different functions of the PB and the MHT.
|Detail===See also==
* {{nsum|2023-01-14 Provision of tribunal reasons to victims}}
* {{rsum|Jag Bahra, 'High Court victory for victims' rights and open justice' (Saunders Law, 13/1/23)}}
|Subject=Powers
|News=Yes
|RSS pubdate=2023/01/13 11:51:51 PM
}}