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December 2014 update

Case law

Deprivation of liberty cases

  • Deprivation of liberty case. Rochdale MBC v KW [2014] EWCOP 45, [2014] MHLO 123 — The judge in this case decided that KW was not deprived of her liberty, stating as follows: "I am of the view that for the plenitude of cases such as this, where a person, often elderly, who is both physically and mentally disabled to a severe extent, is being looked after in her own home, and where the arrangements happen to be made, and paid for, by a local authority, rather than by the person's own family and paid for from her own funds, or from funds provided by members of her family, Article 5 is simply not engaged. I am of the view that the matter should be reconsidered by the Supreme Court." Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted, and an appeal against the decision was allowed by consent.§
  • Best interests and deprivation of liberty case. LB Tower Hamlets v TB [2014] EWCOP 53, [2014] MHLO 130 — "All parties are agreed that TB lacks capacity to make decisions concerning her residence, her care and her contact with SA. The issues that I have to decide are these: (i) Where should TB live in her best interests? ... (ii) If TB does not return to 9 Emerald Mansions what should her contact be with SA, in her best interests? (iii) Does SA have the capacity to consent to sex? This is an abstract question if she does not return to 9 Emerald Mansions, but a very real one if she does. (iv) Whatever I decide about residence does her care regime amount to a deprivation of liberty within the terms of Article 5?"§
  • Daily Telegraph, 'Man banned from having sex with wife by High Court judge' (17/12/14). Subtitle: "Bangladeshi man claims he has right under his culture to have sex with wife, who has mental age of a child, whenever he pleases and she has no right to refuse". See LB Tower Hamlets v TB [2014] EWCOP 53, [2014] MHLO 130
  • Deprivation of liberty case. TX v A Local Authority [2014] EWCOP 29, [2014] MHLO 117 — "X is a retired lawyer who has suffered, or appears to have suffered, from Korsakoff's syndrome, a mental illness related to the over-consumption of alcohol. ... An urgent authorisation was obtained on 1st May and a standard authorisation to detain him on 13th May. ... X appealed that standard authorisation, hence the case being listed before me in late May. ... X now has capacity to make decisions as to residence, care and medical treatment and that has been amply demonstrated in the case. Even if he has other problems he can reflect and logically reason, and is much improved from the man he was last December. That does not mean he will not relapse. It does not mean that he will not be foolish enough to resume drinking but, in my judgment, in all the circumstances it would be inappropriate to make a declaration under section 48 and in those circumstances, in the absence of a standard authorisation, his compulsory detention comes to an end."§
  • Deprivation of liberty case. Barnsley MBC v GS [2014] EWCOP 46, [2014] MHLO 124 — "I very respectfully do not agree with the reasoning in paragraph 6 of the guidance [which was issued jointly by the Ofsted and the President of the Court of Protection on 12/2/14]. There is nothing in either the legislation, or the regulations, or the [National Minimum Standards for Children's Homes] which has the effect that a children's home, which is not an approved secure children's home, is 'unable' to deprive a person of his liberty. ... The NMS 3.19 and 12.7 themselves state that 'No children's home/school ... restricts the liberty of any child as a matter of routine...' Whilst never a matter of routine, those very standards clearly contemplate that a home or school may have to restrict liberty as a matter of non-routine. Such restraint may involve a deprivation of liberty as now understood and, in my view, the unqualified proposition in paragraph 4 of the guidance that there is no purpose to be served in seeking an order of the Court of Protection goes too far. So, accordingly, does the proposition in paragraph 6 and the summary in paragraph 13 of the guidance. In my view, there can indeed be circumstances in which the Court of Protection may authorise a children's home or residential special school to impose restraint which amounts to a deprivation of liberty, and the guidance is mistaken in suggesting that the effect of the NMS is necessarily to prevent the court from doing so."§

Capacity - medical cases

  • Medical case. Royal Free NHSFT v AB [2014] EWCOP 50, [2014] MHLO 127 — "The Trust seeks three declarations that: (a) AB lacks capacity to consent to medical treatment, including to a Caesarean Section; (b) AB lacks capacity to monitor and regulate her own intake of food and/or drink; (c) AB lacks capacity to decide whether to comply with her regime of diabetic medication."§
  • Medical case. Gloucestershire CCG v AB [2014] EWCOP 49, [2014] MHLO 126 — "All parties are now agreed that AB's life is futile, in the sense of that word used by Lord Goff in the Bland case. ... AB has no awareness. He merely exists. There is no prospect of recovery. This court accepts the fundamental importance of the sanctity of life, but, as Butler-Sloss P noted in the passage cited above, that is not an absolute principle and does not impose an obligation to provide treatment where life is futile. ... I unhesitatingly conclude that ... it would be in his best interests for artificial nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn, provided this is carried out in an appropriate fashion by nursing staff trained in the provision of palliative care. In his final report, Professor Wade makes a number of recommendations as to the management of the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration and subsequent treatment ... and I endorse those recommendations."§
  • Capacity case. NHS Trust v FG [2014] EWCOP 30, [2014] MHLO 118 — "I have been invited by the Official Solicitor to give guidance on the steps to be taken when a local authority and/or medical professionals are concerned about and dealing with a pregnant woman who has mental health problems and, potentially lacks capacity to litigate and to make decisions about her welfare or medical treatment. There is concern that in a number of recent cases there has not been a full appreciation or understanding of: (a) the planning to be undertaken in such cases; (b) the procedures to be followed; (c) the timing of an application to the Court of Protection and/or the Family Division of the High Court; and (d) the evidence required to support an application to the court."§
  • Vulnerable adult case.. Re DM [2014] EWHC 3119 (Fam), [2014] MHLO 112 — "This Claimant local authority sought declaratory relief sanctioning a birth plan in respect of a vulnerable adult, which contemplated: (i) interference with the mother/baby relationship following the birth, to a degree which involved some unspecified level of forced separation and, potentially, removal of the child; (ii) that the mother should not be informed of key aspects of the plan. I phrase the ambit of the relief sought carefully, because it seems to me that, whilst the local authority thought long and hard about the birth plan, it had not managed to reflect fully on the practicalities, extent of their intervention or the proportionality of the measures required."§

COP costs cases

  • COP costs case. Re A and B (Court of Protection: Delay and Costs) [2014] EWCOP 48, [2014] MHLO 125 — "Two cases that I heard on consecutive days last month illustrate the problem of delay and expense in proceedings in the Court of Protection. In Case A, the proceedings lasted for 18 months. ... In Case B, the proceedings lasted for five years. ... Each case therefore generated legal costs at a rate of approximately £9,000 per month. ... The main responsibility for this situation and its solution must lie with the court, which has the power to control its proceedings. The purpose of this judgment is to express the view that the case management provisions in the Court of Protection Rules have proved inadequate on their own to secure the necessary changes in practice. While cases about children and cases about incapacitated adults have differences, their similarities are also obvious. There is a clear procedural analogy to be drawn between many welfare proceedings in the Court of Protection and proceedings under the Children Act. As a result of the Public Law Outline, robust case management, use of experts only where necessary, judicial continuity, and a statutory time-limit, the length of care cases has halved in two years. Yet Court of Protection proceedings can commonly start with no timetable at all for their conclusion, nor any early vision of what an acceptable outcome would look like. The young man in Case B is said to have a mental age of 8. What would we now say if it took five years – or 18 months – to decide the future of an 8-year-old? I therefore believe that the time has come to introduce the same disciplines in the Court of Protection as now apply in the Family Court. Accordingly, and at his request, I am sending a copy of this judgment to the President of the Court of Protection, Sir James Munby, for his consideration."§
  • COP costs case. Milton Keynes Council v RR [2014] EWCOP 34, [2014] MHLO 120 — "MKC had set a juggernaut in motion by their initial failure to investigate the safeguarding alerts and their decision to remove P from her home in circumstances which were unlawful. This case concerned the very sad and tragic consequences for P which flowed from that decision. I have no difficulty in concluding that MKC’s practice in this case was substandard. It is P’s misfortune to have been the victim of that substandard practice. MKC’s acts and omissions have detrimentally affected both P and her family and changed the course of their lives. In my judgment an award of costs is manifestly justified. I have considered whether a partial costs order is appropriate but have come to the conclusion that this is an exceptional case in which a full costs order is justified. Accordingly the Applicant shall pay the 2nd respondent’s costs of the proceedings to date to be subject to detailed assessment unless agreed between the parties. The costs order shall include a detailed assessment of any publicly funded costs of the 2nd Respondent."§
  • LPA/costs case. The Public Guardian v CT [2014] EWCOP 51, [2014] MHLO 128 — "This is the first occasion on which a respondent has sought an order for costs against the Public Guardian in respect of a safeguarding application regarding the respondent's conduct as the donee of a Lasting Power of Attorney."§

LPA and deputyship cases

  • LPA case. The Public Guardian v Marvin [2014] EWCOP 47, [2014] MHLO 125 — "This is an application by the Public Guardian to revoke two Lasting Powers of Attorney – an LPA for property and financial affairs and an LPA for health and welfare. The attorney concedes that he has contravened his authority and failed to act in the donor's best interests in respect of the donor's property and affairs, and has no objection to court revoking the LPA for property and financial affairs. However, he does not consider that he has contravened his authority or failed to act in the donor's best interests with regard to the donor's health and welfare."§
  • LPA case. The Public Guardian v AW (Application to revoke LPA) [2014] EWCOP 28, [2014] MHLO 116 — "This is an application by the Public Guardian to revoke and cancel the registration of a Lasting Power of Attorney ... Having regard to all the circumstances, therefore, I shall revoke AW's appointment as attorney because I am satisfied that: (a) OB lacks capacity to revoke the LPA herself; and (b) AW has contravened her authority by taking advantage of her position."§

Other capacity cases

  • Capacity case. Bradbury v Paterson [2014] EWHC 3992 (QB), [2014] MHLO 110 — "The application before me raises a novel point about what the Court should do when the Official Solicitor concludes that he can no longer continue to act as litigation friend for a protected party in litigation because the anticipated source of funding for the Official Solicitor's costs ceases to be available."§
  • Capacity/community care case. Aster Healthcare Ltd v The Estate of Mohammed Shafi [2014] EWHC 77 (QB), [2014] MHLO 133 — "This is an appeal from the decision ... to grant summary judgment to the Claimant in a claim against the Estate of the late Mr Mohammed Shafi for outstanding care home fees. It raises interesting and important issues about the relationship between section 7 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the provisions of Part III of the National Assistance Act 1948, Part III of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, and related statutes, regulations and guidance that concern the obligations or powers of a local authority to provide residential accommodation and care services for persons who by reason of age, illness, disability or any other circumstances are in need of care and attention which is not otherwise available to them. ... The total amount claimed is £62,199.94. The key issue is who, if anyone, is legally liable for payment of fees to the Claimant? There are only two candidates; the Estate of the late Mr Shafi (represented by his wife), and Brent."§
  • Capacity case (habitual residence). An English Local Authority v SW and A Scottish Local Authority [2014] EWCOP 43, [2014] MHLO 122 — "The issue in this case is where an adult ('SW'), who lacks capacity, is habitually resident. This is for the purposes of determining whether the English court has jurisdiction to deal with applications under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. ... The parties' respective positions are as follows. The Official Solicitor submits that SW is habitually resident in England and Wales. The [English Local Authority] and the [Scottish Local Authority] submit that she is habitually resident in Scotland."§
  • Capacity case. Kicks v Leigh [2014] EWHC 3926 (Ch), [2014] MHLO 136 — "The Claimants claim that the transfer by Mrs Smith to the Defendant of the Proceeds should be set aside on either of two grounds, namely that: (1) Mrs Smith lacked the mental capacity to make such a gift or transfer; (2) The gift or transfer was procured by the Defendant's exercise of undue influence over Mrs Smith."§
  • Capacity case. Derbyshire County Council v AC [2014] EWCOP 38, [2014] MHLO 121 — "In inviting the Court of Protection to exercise its jurisdiction, the Local Authority asserts that AC lacks capacity in the following areas: (i) to litigate in these proceedings; (ii) to make choices about her future care, therapeutic and educational needs; (iii) in relation to contact with others; and (iv) in making informed decisions about her future residence. In respect of (i)-(iii) above, the Local Authority invites me to make final declarations under section 15 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. In respect of (iv) it invites me to make an interim declaration under section 48 of the 2005 Act, pending further capacity assessments of AC. The Local Authority has invited the court to consider AC's capacity to consent to sexual relations; it invites me to conclude that she does have capacity in this regard. The Local Authority further invites me to make limited best interests decisions following on from the capacity declarations. Specifically, and importantly, it invites me to declare (re (iv) above) that it is in AC's best interests that she reside at Pennine House (a pseudonym), a residential home which is geographically local to her parents' home."§
  • Capacity case. A Local Authority v M [2014] EWCOP 33, [2014] MHLO 119 — (1) Legal Aid: "One lesson of this case is that, if parties such as E and A are to be unrepresented in hearings of this kind, be it in the Court of Protection or in the Family Court, the hearings will often take very considerably longer than if they were represented. Denying legal aid in such cases is, thus, a false economy." (2) Disclosure: "In total, the court papers filled some 33 lever arch files (court documents and file records) plus two further lever arch files of documents produced by E and A during the hearing. No doubt if the parents had been represented, it might have been possible to reduce this material into a core bundle, as I did myself at the conclusion of the hearing. Even those 35 files may not represent the totality of the disclosable documents that might have been produced. ... This illustrates another consequence of parties appearing without representation in these cases, namely that the courts may have to devise new rules as to disclosure." (3) Fact finding: "The principal focus of this hearing has been to make findings on disputed issues of fact as the basis for future decisions about M's life. In my judgment, the legal principles to be applied at a fact finding hearing in the Court of Protection should be broadly the same as in children's proceedings where a court is investigating allegations that a child has been ill-treated or neglected. I have summarised those principles in a number of children's cases, including Re JS [2012] EWHC 1370 (Fam)B. Of those principles, the following seem to me to be of particular importance in this case. ..." (4) Orders: Various interim orders, including on contact and residence, were made and a decision on deputyship was adjourned.§

Criminal cases

  • Criminal appeal. AG's reference (no 91 of 2014) sub nom R v Joseph Williams [2014] MHLO 137 (CA) — The trial judge had imposed a sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, together with with a s45A hospital order and limitation direction, on an offender (W) who had pleaded guilty to attempted murder. Following an AG's reference the Court of Appeal held that: (1) The appropriate range was 17-25 years, the starting point was 20 years after a trial, and the judge was not at fault for reducing the sentence by six years given the unusual facts of the case that related to W's mental health. (2) It was not certain that the offence was motivated by antipathy to V's sexual orientation; it could equally have been the case that W did not want to share his flat with anyone. (3) As the judge considered that W's dangerousness was not confined to his mental illness, he should have passed an extended sentence to protect the public in the event that the criteria for the hospital order and restrictions were no longer satisfied, but the offender remained a risk to the public. (4) An extended period of five years was added to the 14-year sentence. The hospital direction with restrictions remained unchanged. (Summary based on Lawtel summary of ex tempore judgment.)§
  • Julia Collins, 'Court of Appeal tells Margate homophobic thug Joseph Williams he will serve at least two thirds of sentence years for attack on Connor Huntley' (Kent Online, 26/11/14). Despite the Court of Appeal's statement that it was uncertain, the Solicitor General is quoted as saying "I hope the increased sentence of 19 years sends out a clear message that attacks motivated by homophobia will be dealt with by long prison sentences". See AG's reference (no 91 of 2014) sub nom R v Joseph Williams [2014] MHLO 137 (CA)
  • Terrorism case. DD v SSHD [2014] EWHC 3820 (Admin), [2014] MHLO 140 — "Currently, the effects of the [Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure] in general, whatever the particular effects of certain restrictions, and the effects of the three most contentious conditions apart from the tag, plainly do not cross that high threshold so as to breach of Article 3. I reach that conclusion recognising that the maintenance of the TPIM and those conditions is significantly worse for DD than for a person who is in normal mental health, and that particular care is required in judging whether a mentally ill and vulnerable person is being treated with proper respect for the fact that he is a human being. The tag as described by Professor Fahy and Dr Deeley is undoubtedly the most severe requirement in its impact on DD, because of his paranoid ideation. DD's delusions about the tag being an explosive device and a camera are very frightening and distressing. He wants to remove it, as voices tell him to, yet knows this would continue with the cycle of breaching the TPIM, facing prison, release, revival of the TPIM and breach. The doctors agree that the removal of the tag would not simply lead to paranoid delusions associated with it being transferred to another object, because of the particular nature of the tag. Its removal would reduce the number and intensity of the stressors he has to cope with, which could increase his ability to handle those which remain. That is a judgment I make, but it is consistent with the medical evidence; indeed it seems obvious. However, I am not persuaded that the effect of the tag, on top of the other TPIM effects, does breach Article 3 in these circumstances in view of the high threshold required to be crossed."§

Immigration cases

  • Immigration case. BCZ v SSHD [2014] EWHC 3585 (Admin), [2014] MHLO 114 — "This case concerns the position of a person in detention facing deportation who refuses food and fluid with a view to pressurising the SSHD into giving him leave to remain but who, in consequence, is at risk of suffering a serious neurological condition. Cases such as these highlight acute conflicting public interest considerations. On the one hand the State has in place an immigration policy which it seeks, and is entitled, to enforce vigourously and which includes detention pending removal as an important protective component. On the other hand detention is an acute deprivation of a person's civil liberties and, ordinarily, should be used only exceptionally where other courses short of detention are unavailable."§
  • Immigration detention case. R (Alemi) v SSHD [2014] EWHC 3858 (Admin), [2014] MHLO 111 — "I have reached the conclusion that no reasonable Secretary of State could have concluded that detention within a detention centre was in accordance with her published guidance once confronted with the contents of Dr Thomas's report. ... I cannot be precise about the time which would have elapsed, necessarily, before all necessary steps had been taken transfer to the Claimant but it seems reasonable to estimate that the process would have taken at least two weeks. In the result I conclude that the Claimant was unlawfully detained from midnight 23 May 2013 until his transfer to the psychiatric unit on 16 August 2013. ... At the commencement of the hearing before me I made it clear that I would adjudicate upon the issue of liability alone. I make it clear that nothing in this judgment precludes the Defendant from seeking to argue that the Claimant is entitled to nominal as opposed to substantial damages. All issues relating to damages will be considered, as appropriate, after a trial in the Queen's Bench Division."§

Miscellaneous cases

  • Litigation case. Hysaj v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, [2014] MHLO 135 — In each of these three cases, which were heard together, the applicant failed to file a notice of appeal within the time prescribed by CPR 52.4(2), which made it necessary for him to seek an extension of time. The mental health case involved a nearest relative who had been awarded costs after displacement proceedings and who (nearly six years out of time) wished to appeal against the sum ordered by the judge. The Court of Appeal, having held that the guidance in the Mitchell and Denton cases applied to applications for extensions of time for filing a notice of appeal, dealt with some questions of general importance (public law cases, shortage of funds, litigants in person, the merits). In the mental health case, the extension of time was refused.§
  • Miscellaneous case. Graves v Capital Home Loans Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1297, [2014] MHLO 113 — "Mr Graves has permission to appeal on the question whether the provisions of ss.140A and 140B apply to the mortgage in this case and, if so, whether the relationship between himself and CHL was unfair because of (a) the inclusion of clause 9.1.6 of the mortgage; and/or because of (b) the way in which CHL exercised or enforced its rights under the agreement in the light of its knowledge of Mr Graves' mental disability." (Section 140A Consumer Credit Act 1974 is entitled "Unfair relationships between creditors and debtors" and s140B "Powers of court in relation to unfair relationships".)§
  • Neutral citation added. Case was already on MHLO. Derbyshire County Council v Kathleen Danby [2014] EWCOP B26, [2014] MHLO 106 — "Today was listed to give Mrs Danby the opportunity of persuading me that the sentence I imposed in April was wrong, that I should reduce it, mitigate it or even quash it, and she has failed to avail herself of that opportunity. So, in the circumstances, I have no alternative other than to leave the sentence outstanding, together with the warrant of arrest. If Mrs Danby is arrested pursuant to that warrant she can apply to purge her contempt and I will see her as soon as is possible to look at the matter."§

Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal

  • Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal decision. Lucia Benyu (strike off) and Ronnie Benyu (section 43 order) [2014] MHLO 138 (SDT) — (1) In relation to Lucia Shingirai Benyu, née Ndoro, who at the material time practised as a sole practitioner under the style of Peters & Co Solicitors, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal concluded that: "The First Respondent had admitted a lack of integrity and had had several allegations of dishonesty proved against her. The Tribunal had heard a litany of the most ruthless exploitation of an obviously vulnerable individual and had disbelieved much of what the First Respondent had to say whilst giving evidence on oath. In cases where dishonest misappropriation of client’s funds had been found then it was well-established that that would invariably lead to strike off. There were no circumstances put before the Tribunal that might lead it to mitigate that penalty. The First Respondent would be struck off the Roll of Solicitors. Indeed, the seriousness of her misconduct was such that this would have been the appropriate sanction even if she had not been found to be dishonest." (2) In relation to Ronnie Benyu, her husband who held the position of Practice Manager and Bookkeeper, the SDT concluded that: "It was clear that, even by his own admission, the Second Respondent was a totally unfit person to work in a solicitor’s office. The Tribunal would have no hesitation in making the section 43 Order requested by the Applicant." §

Mental Health Tribunal

  • Tribunal contact details. A circular email from the Tribunal secretariat dated 2/12/14 contained the following information: (1) from 1/1/15 three reports-related email addresses (northreportsteam@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk, southreportsteam@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk and reportsenquiries@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk) will cease to function; (2) all reports and related enquiries (such as extension, directions and order requests) should instead be sent to mhtreports@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk See Mental Health Tribunal
  • Tribunal contact details. An email address not in the most recent contact sheet is tsmhrelist@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk (for all enquiries regarding relisting a case). See Mental Health Tribunal

Home Office

  • Home Office, 'Policy Equality Statement: Policy on the immigration detention of those suffering from mental health problems' (27/11/14). Extract from website: "In March 2012 the Home Office made a commitment to the High Court to undertake an equality impact assessment of its policy on detaining people with mental health problems. This policy equality statement fulfils that commitment and has been informed by consultation with various stakeholders." See Repatriation

Office of the Public Guardian

  • Office of the Public Guardian, 'Fundamental Review of the Supervision of Court Appointed Deputies by the Public Guardian: Report to Parliament' (December 2014). Extract: "The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice announced in an adjournment debate in October 2012 that the Public Guardian was to commence a fundamental review of how deputies appointed by the Court of Protection to protect people lacking mental capacity are supervised. This report is to inform Parliament of the findings of the review and to set out what measures are now being implemented." See OPG

Department of Health

  • Department of Health and Home Office, 'Review of the Operation of Sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983: Review Report and Recommendations' (December 2014). The consultation page also contains an executive summary, an easy read version, a summary of responses and a literature review. See Consultations#Department of Health
  • Department of Health, 'Consultation outcome: Updating our care and support system: draft regulations and guidance' (published 6/6/14, updated 23/10/14). Main consultation page. See Care Act 2014
  • Department of Health, 'Response to the consultation on draft regulations and guidance for implementation of Part 1 of the Care Act 2014' (Cm 8955, 23/10/14). See Care Act 2014
  • Department of Health, 'Final Affirmative Regulations Under Part 1 of the Care Act' (23/10/14). See Care Act 2014
  • Department of Health, 'Final Negative Regulations Under Part 1 of the Care Act' (23/10/14). See Care Act 2014
  • Department of Health, 'The Care and Support (Children's Carers) Regulations 2014 Keeling Schedule' (23/10/14). See Care Act 2014
  • Department of Health, 'Care and Support Statutory Guidance: Issued under the Care Act 2014' (23/10/14). See Care Act 2014
  • Department of Health, 'Care Act 2014 Part 1: factsheets' (6/6/14, updated 23/10/14). These factsheets, which set out local authorities' duties and powers, have been updated following the government's response to the consultation on regulations and guidance. See Care Act 2014

Independent investigation

  • Independent investigation into the care and treatment of Leslie Gadsby. (1) Androulla Johnstone, 'Independent Investigation into the Care and Treatment Provided to Mr. Y by the Mersey Care NHS Trust and Imagine Independence (Mental Health Charity)' (Health and Social Care Advisory Service, 16/12/14). (2) Health and Social Care Advisory Service, 'Independent Investigation into the Care and Treatment Provided to Mr. Y by the Mersey Care NHS Trust and Imagine Independence (Commissioned by NHS North West Strategic Health Authority): Summary Note' (16/12/14). See Independent investigations

Newsletters

  • Mind, 'Legal Newsletter' (Issue 17, December 2014). See Mind (Charity)

Articles

  • Michael Buchanan, 'Seven mental health patients died waiting for beds (BBC News, 28/11/14). Extract: "Seven mental health patients have killed themselves in England since 2012 after being told there were no hospital beds for them, the BBC has learned." See Miscellaneous external links
  • Tabitha Collingbourne, 'The Care Act 2014: a missed opportunity?' (2014) 20(3) Web JCLI. See Care Act 2014
  • Piers Gooding, 'Change and Continuity: A Historical Overview of the Significance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to Mental Health Law' (2014) 20(3) Web JCLI. See CRPD
  • Peter Bartlett, 'Reforming the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS): What Is It Exactly that We Want?' (2014) 20(3) Web JCLI. See DOLS#Academic articles etc
  • Local Government Lawyer, 'Department of Health issues final Care Act regulations and guidance' (24/10/14). See Care Act 2014
  • Social Care Institute for Excellence: Care Act 2014 website pages. See Care Act 2014

Wales

  • National Assembly for Wales, 'Inquiry into Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS)' (Children, Young People and Education Committee, November 2014). See CAMHS
  • CSSIW and HIW, 'A National Review of the use of Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) in Wales' (2014). See DOLS#HIW and CSSIW

Website and CPD

  • CPD scheme. Obtain 12 accredited CPD points online for £60. See CPD scheme

Twitter

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