March 2023 update

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Website

  • Magic Book. The Magic Book is a database of contact details. The main idea is to add the hospitals and other places you visit (not just your own place of work). To create/edit contacts, there is no need to log in and the process is very quick and simple. See Magic Book
  • Mental Health Law Online CPD scheme: 12 points for £60. Obtain 12 CPD points online by answering monthly questionnaires. The scheme is an ideal way to obtain your necessary hours, or to evidence your continued competence. It also helps to support the continued development of this website, and your subscriptions (and re-subscriptions) are appreciated. For full details and to subscribe, see CPD scheme.
  • Cases. By the end of this month, Mental Health Law Online contained 2313 categorised cases


Cases

  • Case (Appeal against restriction order). R v Inneh [2021] EWCA Crim 2004 — The patient appealed against the restriction order aspect of the s37/41 hospital order, arguing that the judge had focussed too much on the background of the her behaviour up to and including the present offence and not enough on the progress which has been made over the lengthy period which had elapsed during her in-patient treatment. The Court of Appeal decided that the restriction order was necessary for public protection, particularly because there was evidence of sudden relapse not only from ceasing medication but also stress and pressure, and that when unwell the she had struggled to control her temper and had shown herself capable of causing serious injury to others.
  • Case (Capacity). The Local Authority v A [2019] EWCOP 68 — (1) A lacked capacity in relation to residence, care, contact, and medical treatment, and to execute an LPA. (2) The LPA was invalid for want of capacity. (3) The living will was similarly invalid as an ADRT, and invalid as an expression of her wishes and feelings as there was good reason to doubt its accuracy. (4) It was in A's best interests to: (a) receive treatment for epilepsy, primary ovarian failure and vitamin D deficiency; and (b) have care and support, and contact with her mother and grandparents, in accordance with the relevant plan and declarations.
  • Case (Covert medication - closed proceedings). A Local Authority v A [2020] EWCOP 76 — This application was to consider the administration to A of covert medication in relation to primary ovarian failure. (1) It was permissible and proportionate for A's mother not to be informed of the proceedings because she would seek to subvert the medical treatment. (2) The advantages (to achieve adulthood via puberty, the possibility of developing her own family, cognitive development and maturity, proportionate independence and personal autonomy, a hundred percent effectiveness, no associated risk, a normal life expectancy, no death by a serious fracture or cardiovascular disease by 30 to 40 years of age, and the fact that covert administration is the least restrictive approach pursuant to the MCA 2005) outweighed the disadvantages (it was against A's current wishes, if A discovered that she had been covertly medicated she might lose trust or confidence with the placement) and it was in A's best interests to receive the treatment.
  • Case (Capacity and fact finding). Sunderland City Council v FP [2020] EWCOP 75 — (1) The judge decided to assess capacity before moving on to fact finding: "I feel uncomfortable in assessing credibility and making findings and possibly making significant criticism without determining whether or not FP lacks capacity. If the evidence provides that FP has capacity across the board, the role of the Court of the Protection is rendered nugatory. If the Court is satisfied, on the evidence, that FP lacks capacity, in whatever regard, it is then the responsibility of the Court to investigate and reach conclusions about the best interests of FP in respect of matters on which she is found not to have capacity to decide. Therefore, I will consider the issue of capacity before proceeding, if justified, to make findings in this matter." (2) FP lacked capacity in relation to her care and support needs, residence and contact. (3) The LPA, under which FP's mother was the donee, was revoked. (4) Decisions about contact were for the Responsible Clinician (FP was detained under s3) but the court declared in the interim that FP should not live with her mother.
  • Case (Adjournment and recommendations). AC v Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2023] MHLO 1 (UT) — The tribunal panel refused the s3 patient's adjournment request (which was on the basis of a lack of aftercare planning) though it indicated that it would be revisited if aftercare information proved necessary to decide on discharge. It refused to make a statutory recommendation but made an extra-statutory recommendation about transferring hospital and appropriate accommodation. Permission to appeal having been refused by the FTT and UT, the patient now renewed her application for permission. (1) The patient argued that the adjournment refusal was procedurally unfair, but the UT decided that: (a) in high-level terms, case management rulings should only be interfered with when "plainly wrong"; and (b) specifically, the panel's decision was consistent with caselaw in the mental health jurisdiction. (2) The patient also argued that the type of recommendation made undermined the purpose of the statute, given that a statutory recommendation was possible, but the Upper Tribunal decided that the panel had concisely explained a rational basis for its decision and was entitled to take the view that it should not get involved in the onward supervision of the patient's care. (3) The UT set out the test to be applied for permission to appeal: "I must find that the proposed grounds of appeal are arguable, in the sense that there is a realistic prospect of success in showing that the First-tier Tribunal went wrong in law in some way." [The Court of Appeal has expressed this differently: "The court will only refuse leave if satisfied that the applicant has no realistic prospect of succeeding on the appeal. ... The court can grant the application even if it is not so satisfied. ... For example ... public interest ... or ... the law requires clarifying."] (4) The UT noted the courts' approach to expert tribunals' decisions: (a) it is probable that such a tribunal got the law right, decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear the tribunal misdirected itself on the law, and courts should not rush to find misdirections just because of the tribunal's conclusions on the facts (the UT judge christened this "the Lady Hale principle"); and (b) judicial restraint should be exercised when reasons are being examined, and the court should not assume a misdirection too readily just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out (christened "the Lord Hope principle").
  • Case (Hearing in patient's absence). PC v Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2023] UKUT 64 (AAC) — The tribunal panel refused an adjournment request and proceeded in the patient's absence. (1) The panel found, under rule 39(1)(a) and (b) respectively, that reasonable steps had been taken to notify the patient of the hearing and that it was in the interests of justice to proceed. However, it made no findings, under rule 39(2)(a)(i) and (ii) respectively, in relation to whether the patient had decided not to attend the hearing or was unable to attend for reasons of ill health, and it was not self-evident that either requirement was satisfied. Proceeding in the patient's absence was therefore an error of law. (2) The First-tier Tribunal judge refusing the appeal had used an out-of-date version of the rules (though this did not affect her reasoning) and had misunderstood the rules, confusing rule 39(1)(a) and rule 39(2)(a). (3) The Upper Tribunal concluded: "A tribunal must always operate within its rules of procedure and that is particularly important when liberty is at stake. This is why I have dealt not only with the tribunal’s reasoning but also with the reasoning in the refusal of permission."
  • Case (Ex turpi causa). Traylor v Kent and Medway NHS Social Care Partnership Trust [2022] EWHC 260 (QB) — The patient stabbed his daughter several times during a psychotic episode. He sought damages from the Trust for negligence, and she for breaches of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. (1) The court held that the patient had not established a breach of duty, and commented obiter on other aspects: (a) defences based on causation or voluntary acceptance of risk (as the patient had stopped his medication and lied about it) could not succeed because the relevant duty of care is a duty to prevent harm that would arise from the claimant's own deliberate act; (b) the illegality defence would not be available (the patient had been found not guilty by reason of insanity); (c) if the claim had otherwise succeeded it would be just and equitable to reduce the damages recoverable by three quarters for contributory fault. (2) The Osman duty arose in respect of the daughter but the Trust had taken reasonable steps to avert the risk.
  • Case (Capacity to marry). X v A [2021] EWFC 118 — "The issues the Court has to determine at this hearing are: (i) whether on the date of the parties' marriage, on 2 April 2019, the Respondent did not within the meaning of section 12(1)(c) or (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (a) validly consent to the marriage in consequence of "unsoundness of mind" or duress; or (b) "though capable of giving a valid consent, was suffering, (whether continuously or intermittently) at the time of the marriage from a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983 of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfitted for marriage such that the marriage was voidable." (ii) whether on 21 May 2019 when the Respondent transferred a half-share in the former matrimonial home to the Applicant, she had the capacity to authorise that transfer (iii) whether under section 33 of the Family Law Act 1996 the Court has the power to or should make an order that the Applicant is entitled to occupy the former matrimonial home bearing in mind, inter alia, the Respondent's present lack of capacity, the latter having been determined by the Court in the preliminary issue judgment dated 18 March 2021 to which I have already referred. (iv) Whether the court should make an order on the Respondent's application for an Occupation Order excluding the Applicant."
  • Case (FOI request). Clitheroe v Information Commissioner (2023) UKFTT 299 (GRC) — This appeal under s57 Freedom of Information Act 2000 concerned requested information about a review project associated with the work of associate hospital managers conducted by Verita Consultancy for Lancashire and South Cumbria NHS Foundation Trust. The Trust originally applied s36 (prejudice to the effective conduct of public affairs) to one part of the request and refused to comply another part under s12 (cost exceeds appropriate limit) but subsequently withdrew its reliance on those exemptions. The Trust had complied with s1(1) but had communicated some information outside the 20-working-day requirement so had breached s10(1). There had been an error of law but no action was required.
  • Case (Litigation capacity in disciplinary proceedings). Cannon v Bar Standards Board [2023] EWCA Civ 278 — The appellant had been disbarred for professional misconduct. In the Court of Appeal she argued that she had lacked mental capacity to participate in the Bar Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings and to give instructions in relation to her appeal to the High Court, and she sought permission to adduce psychiatric and other evidence which had not been before the court below. Permission to appeal was refused on this and other grounds.
  • Case (Forced marriage). Coventry City Council v MK [2023] EWHC 249 (Fam) — "The application for a Forced Marriage Protection Order arose out of the discovery that there had been an arranged putative wedding between MK and a woman in Pakistan. [His parents] accept that this took place over Whatsapp. ... The issues falling to be determined at this hearing may conveniently be summarised as follows: (i) Is MK's marriage to A valid? (ii) In the event that MK's marriage to A is not valid, what is the appropriate remedy to recognise the invalidity? (iii) What should be the terms of any forced marriage protection order? (iv) Is it in MK's best interests to remain living in the placement? (v) Is it in MK's best interests to continue to receive care and support in accordance with the current care plan? (vi) Is any confinement consequent upon MK's care plan necessary and proportionate? (vii) Do any decisions need to be made in relation to MK's contact with A? (viii) What arrangements, in relation to MK's internet and social media use are in MK's best interests and if there are to be restrictions on his use what should be the extent of such and what should be the arrangements for reviewing them?"
  • Case (FMPO). Re P (Appeal: Forced Marriage Protection Order: Jurisdiction) [2023] EWHC 195 (Fam) — P had been forced into a religious marriage, under pressure from both families, and repeatedly raped. The Family Law Act 1996 allowed a Forced Marriage Protection Order to be made even though she was neither physically present in this jurisdiction nor a British citizen. The judge concluded: "I observe that this interpretation of the Act's wide and protective jurisdiction sends two clear messages which are of real importance. First, victims abroad who are forced into marriage with a British national or someone habitually resident here may be able to avail themselves of protective orders in this jurisdiction to counter such abusive behaviour and mitigate its harms. Second, British nationals or those who are resident here should be aware that they cannot force a person into marriage and escape legal sanction for their behaviour in the family court merely because their victim is neither habitually resident nor a British national."
  • Case (Immigration). FXJ v SSHD [2022] EWHC 1531 (QB) — "The principal issue in this appeal is whether the Respondent owes a duty of care in tort to the Appellant in circumstances where a delay before withdrawing an appeal against a decision as to immigration status had exacerbated the Appellant's mental health condition thereby leading to his hospitalisation."
  • Case (FOI request). Care Quality Commission [2023] UKICO 193752 — ICO's summary: "The complainant has requested the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to disclose information relating to Mental Health Act complaints and an inspection of an NHS Trust’s Mental Health Services. The CQC refused to disclose the inspection information citing section 31(1)(g) by virtue of 31(2)(c) of FOIA (law enforcement), section 40, section 41 and section 44 of FOIA. For the complaints information the CQC refused to disclose on the basis of the same exemptions. The Commissioner’s decision is that the CQC is entitled to refuse to disclose the inspection information in accordance with section 31(1)(g), by virtue of 31(2)(c) of FOIA and for the complaints information the CQC is entitled to refuse the request on the basis of section 40(2). The CQC however breached section 10 of FOIA by failing to respond to the complainant’s request within 20 working days of receipt."
  • Case (Death). An NHS Foundation Trust v Kwame [2023] EWHC 134 (Fam) — Kwame was found unresponsive at his home after what it seemed was an attempt to take his own life, and for the following 20 months remained on a ventilator on a Paediatric Intensive Care Unit. The court declared: "(i) It is not in Kwame's best interests to continue to receive mechanical ventilation; (ii) It is in Kwame's best interests that there be defined limits on the treatment provided to him after that withdrawal of mechanical ventilation with the effect that he will be allowed to die and it is not in his interests to receive further life sustaining treatment."
  • Case (Coronavirus vaccination). An ICB v RN and TN [2022] EWCOP 41 — RN had already contracted coronavirus and recovered, and his mother objected to administration of a coronavirus vaccination. The court decided that it would be in his best interests, primarily because of government guidance (which the doctors followed) and because the court should take the same approach to adults lacking capacity as to children, and partly because the "altruistic argument" that receiving the vaccine would help others "is a powerful factor that is likely to be a strong argument for the vaccine for people in a risk group such as RN".
  • Case (DOL of child in general ward). Re Troy (A Child) [2022] EWHC 3426 (Fam) — A child had been detained in an acute children's ward at a general hospital after discharge from s2. This deprived the NHS of beds for children needing physical medical care and involved a risk of infection. The judge described the situation as "shocking" but noted that a hospital is at least subject to regulation by the CQC and it is not a criminal offence to place a child in a hospital (contrasted with an unregistered children's home). He concluded: "Given there has been no alternative place for Troy to live and that restrictions amounting to the deprivation of liberty have been needed to keep Troy safe whilst living at the hospital, I must give that permission. The court is unable to find alternative placements and so, if the deprivation of a child's liberty is authorised, judges are limited to trying to ensure that the child is kept safe and is well cared for, and to hope and encourage others to act to find suitable accommodation and care arrangements."
  • Case (Life sentence replaced by hospital order). R v Miller [2021] EWCA Crim 1955 — (1) The Court of Appeal quashed a life sentence and substituted a restricted hospital order, believing that this would better protect the public. (2) It is misconceived to submit tribunal decisions as fresh evidence in criminal appeals.
  • Case (Leave for restricted patient). R (C) v SSJ [2014] EWHC 167 (Admin) — (1) The SSJ's refusal to grant permission for the s47/49 patient to receive unescorted community leave, after the tribunal's decision under s74 that he no longer met the MHA detention criteria, was not unlawful. (2) The hospital and staff should remain anonymous but not the patient.
  • Case (Litigation capacity assessed by judge). R (Percival) v Police and Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire [2022] EWHC 3544 (Admin) — This case concerned whether the claimant had capacity to conduct claims for judicial review. The judge made his decision by reference to the Equal Treatment Bench Book, from speaking to the claimant, and considering the conduct of proceedings so far, and concluded: "Whilst it has been emphasised that judges should be slow to form a view as to capacity without the benefit of any external expertise, I do not consider that anything is likely to be achieved, other than further significant delay, by seeking to contact the Official Solicitor to obtain updated medical evidence and in circumstances where, despite HHJ Gosnell's earlier invitation, the Official Solicitor has still not been actively engaged. Having today listened to Professor Percival and having considered the manner in which he has conducted the judicial review proceedings to date over a prolonged period of time, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities and applying the presumption of capacity, that Professor Percival does indeed have capacity to conduct these proceedings when applying the appropriate legal test as set out in sections 2 and 3 of the 2005 Act. In particular, I am satisfied that Professor Percival is able at least in these judicial review proceedings to understand, retain, use and weigh in the balance relevant information for making decisions in relation to these claims and to communicate those decisions both to the Court and to the defendants."
  • Case (DOL of child). A County Council v A [2022] EWHC 3572 (Fam) — Owing to the national shortage of secure accommodation placements, the hospital board reluctantly agreed to continue to keep a 16-year-old girl on a mental health ward for a further week pending a further court hearing and further searches for accommodation. Although the ward was "thoroughly inappropriate", as most of the patients were adults, some with behaviours risky to the girl, it was safer than being put out into the community. It was unlikely that the court could have compelled the hospital board, given that the girl was not detainable under s3, it was "not in her best interests to be there", and that other people needed the hospital bed.
  • Case (Treatment of baby). Kettering General Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C [2023] EWHC 239 (Fam) — The High Court granted anticipatory declarations under its inherent jurisdiction relating to an unborn child to secure the administration of anti-retroviral medication to the baby in the absence of the HIV-positive mother's consent. The judge noted that there was no jurisdiction in this case under the MCA: "The fact that C's views in relation to the proposed treatment may be entirely out of step with received medical opinion, does not challenge and certainly does not rebut, the presumption that she is capacitious to take the decision herself."
  • Case (DOL of child). Trafford Borough Council v B [2022] EWHC 1406 (Fam) — "This matter concerns the application by the local authority for an order under the inherent jurisdiction for declarations authorising the deprivation of liberty ('DoL order') of a young person, X age 14, in circumstances where there was no suitable residential therapeutic placement to meet her needs."
  • Case (Negligence claim). Williams v Betsi Cadwaladr University Local Health Board [2022] EWHC 455 (QB) — "The essence of the Claimant's claim can be summarised as follows. At about 9.30am on the morning of the 9th February 2014 Mrs Williams had telephoned the Defendant's Heddfan Psychiatric Unit based at Maelor Hospital in Wrexham. She reported a relapse in her husband's condition. She was put through by the Hospital's general switchboard to a senior nurse within the unit, Nurse Freestone. The 9th February 2014 was a Sunday and out of hours provision only was available. Nurse Freestone did not take any steps for immediate action or assessment. She did advise that if Mrs Williams was concerned her husband could come to the A and E Department at the same Hospital for psychiatric assessment and/or admission or that alternatively she could contact the out of hours GP. In addition she reminded Mrs Williams that if there was an imminent danger to the safety of Mr Williams or others she should phone the emergency services. Approximately 7 hours later Mr Williams took his own life. The Claimant says that Nurse Freestone dealt with that telephone call in breach of her duty of care to Mr Williams and/or that the Defendant's out of hours provision fell below the reasonable standard. Later that day the Claimant found her husband where he had hanged himself close to the family home. She claims that as such she qualifies as a secondary psychiatric victim of the alleged negligence."
  • Case (Appeal against hybrid order). R v Byrne [2022] EWCA Crim 1630 — The appellant unsuccessfully sought a s37/41 restricted hospital order instead of a s45A hybrid order and 16-year-tariff life sentence.
  • Case (DOL of 17-year-old). Blackpool Borough Council v HT (A Minor) [2022] EWHC 1480 (Fam) — "The background to this matter will be depressingly familiar to those who are involved with proceedings concerning the deprivation of a child's liberty. ... Applications for declarations authorising the deprivation of liberty of a child often come before this court in the context of a dispute (either apparent or real) between the applicant local authority and the relevant NHS Clinical Commissioning Group and NHS England as to whether the subject child should be provided by NHS England with a CAMHS Tier 4 inpatient bed, or be provided with a placement and services by the local authority pursuant to its under the Children Act 1989, with the deprivation of the child's liberty being authorised under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. That is the position that has presented itself in this case. It is important to note at the outset that this should not be the position in this case, or indeed other similar cases. The courts have repeatedly emphasised the need for the State agencies engaged in cases of this nature to work co-operatively to achieve the best outcome for the child or young person."
  • Case (Possession claim). Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council v Mailley [2022] EWHC 2328 (QB) — "Amongst other issues this case raises the effect of a period of time spent in residential care by a person with no mental capacity and whether it should deprive a member of the family who had resided with them at a property of their right to succeed to that property. The Claimant [council]'s case is simple. In October 2016 Mrs Dorothy Mailley, who was then resident in a care home with no prospect of return to her home, ceased to occupy No 19 as her only or principal residence. As such her tenancy ceased to be secure as the tenant condition was not satisfied. The Claimant served a notice to quit upon Mrs Dorothy Mailley at the care home and as a result her tenancy came to an end. Thereafter her daughter, the Defendant, who remained living at the property, was a trespasser, and the Claimant is entitled to possession."
  • Case (Life sentence replaced by hospital order). R v Crerand [2022] EWCA Crim 962 — The Court of Appeal quashed a sentence of life imprisonment and substituted a s37/41 restricted hospital order, "taking into account the nature of his mental illness, its causal connection with the offence, its treatability and the clear evidence that his condition will be better managed on release under the Mental Health Act regime and the public better protected".

Legislation

Resources

  • Contract management guidance. Legal Aid Agency, 'Contract management: mental health guidance' (v4, 20/3/23) — The reason given for this version is: "Amended to include Rule 11(7)(a) & 13(5)(a)(i) appointments & information on remote communication with clients". These sections are new: (4) Remote Hearings; (5) Remote Communication with Clients; (6) Rule 11(7)(a) and 13(5)(a)(i) Appointments. The full text of those sections is reproduced here. The remainder is unchanged.
  • Mental capacity law newsletter. 39 Essex Chambers, 'Mental Capacity Report' (issue 130, March 2023) — "Highlights this month include: (1) In the Health, Welfare and Deprivation of Liberty Report: fluctuating capacity and emotional dysregulation; (2) In the Property and Affairs Report: the Court of Protection divorce, refreshed deputy standards and relevant legislative developments; (3) In the Practice and Procedure Report: ‘closed hearings’ guidance and Forced Marriage Protection Orders; (4) In the Wider Context Report: covert medication guidance, an updated litigation capacity certificate, the malign influence of Andrew Wakefield, and changes afoot in Ireland; (5) In the Scotland Report: a Scottish perspective on the Powers of Attorney Bill and implementation of the Scott Report."

Events

  • Event. Event:MHLA: Advocacy, Risk and Cross-Examination Masterclass (Leicester, 17/10/23) — This one-day course is designed to enhance advocacy and case preparation skills. The focus is on preparing for advocacy, with advice on ‎cross-examination of the medical witnesses and taking evidence-in-chief from the client, along with formulation and delivery of effective submissions. Cost: £150 (members), £195 (non-members). See MHLA website for further details and booking information.
  • Event. Event:MHLA: Refresher and Re-accreditation course (online, 18/9/23) — This course will be suitable for those seeking re-accreditation, by: reviewing the legal and procedural developments of the last three years; providing a forum for discussing these along with the re-accreditation process; attracting the six mental health PD points required for re-accreditation. Cost: £150 (members), £195 (non-members). See MHLA website for further details and booking information.
  • Event. Event:MHLA: Foundation course (London, 4/9/23) — This course is aimed at new practitioners and those intending to attend the Panel course in the near future. Attendance at the Foundation course is strongly recommended in order to achieve a sound understanding of the basic principles of mental health law, practice and procedure and in order to achieve the most from the two-day Panel course, which is a pre-requisite for application to The Law Society’s mental health panel. Cost: £150 (members), £195 (non-members). See MHLA website for further details and booking information.
  • Event. Event:MHLA: Conducting face-to-face tribunal hearings (London, 11/7/23) — Conducting Face-to-Face Hearings and Basic Case Law for Tribunals. The course aims to refresh your skill set and is ideal for practitioners seeking an update on conducting face-to-face hearings, along with a review of the day-to-day case law issues that are relevant for Part II cases before the tribunal. Speakers: Tam Gill and Neil Cronin. Cost: £150 (members), £195 (non-members). See MHLA website for further details and booking information.
  • Event. Event:MHLA: Legal Aid supervision (London, 14/6/23) — Our expert trainers will provide guidance and advice on how to supervise effectively and in line with your contractual obligations. Whether you are an experienced supervisor looking to refresh and enhance your skills to inform effective supervision, or thinking about applying for supervisor status, this course will provide you with the opportunity to develop your skills and technique. Cost: £150 (members), £195 (non-members). See MHLA website for further details and booking information.
  • Event. Event:MHLA: Panel course (online, 20-21 April 2023) — The Mental Health Lawyers Association is an approved provider of the two-day course which must be attended by prospective members of the Law Society’s accreditation scheme (formerly called the ‘panel’). Cost: £300 (members), £390 (non-members), £270 (group discount). See MHLA website for further details and booking information.
  • Event. Event:MHLA: Foundation course (Manchester, 17/4/23) — This course is aimed at new practitioners and those intending to attend the Panel course in the near future. Attendance at the Foundation course is strongly recommended in order to achieve a sound understanding of the basic principles of mental health law, practice and procedure and in order to achieve the most from the two-day Panel course, which is a pre-requisite for application to The Law Society’s mental health panel. Cost: £150 (members), £195 (non-members). See MHLA website for further details and booking information.

Jobs

Social media

Nothing to report this month.


Other items

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