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Recent updates on website

For details of any news item, click on the relevant link below.

  • 03/11/19
    (2332)
    : Case (Inherent jurisdiction or s48 interim order). CD v London Borough of Croydon [2019] EWHC 2943 (Fam)(1) Cobb J discussed the inherent jurisdiction, setting out the following summary: (a) first the inherent jurisdiction may be deployed for the protection of vulnerable adults, (b) secondly in some cases a vulnerable adult may not be incapacitated within the meaning of the 2005 Mental Capacity Act but may nevertheless be protected under the inherent jurisdiction; (c) third that in some of those cases capacitous individuals may be of unsound mind within the meaning of article 5(i)(e) of the European Rights Convention; (d) fourth, in exercising my powers under the inherent jurisdiction I am bound by the European Convention and the case law under the convention and must only impose orders that are necessary and proportionate and at all times have proper regard to the personal autonomy of the individual; and (e) fifth and finally, that in certain circumstances it may be appropriate for a court to take or maintain interim protective measures while carrying out all necessary investigations. (2) In the end he made an interim order under MCA 2005 s48 enabling the Local Authority to gain access to CD's accommodation in order to provide appropriate care and make it safe for human habitation. (3) CD was a vulnerable adult but the order was made under the MCA because the judge was "satisfied that it is more appropriate, where statute provides a route, that the statute is used".
  • 18/10/19
    (2044)
    : Panel interview procedure clarification — The Law Society website (at the time of writing, 18/10/19) states that "there will not be an opportunity consult any reference materials during the interview itself", despite the guidance document stating that "[a]pplicants may make use of books and other reference material when preparing the case study and may take these and any notes into the interview". It would be wise to check this for yourself as conflicting answers have been given in the past. The official position in 2017 was that the website was wrong (email from Jane Sweetman, 27/2/17). The official position now is that you are allowed to use reference materials for the Case Study Q&A but not for the Professional Ethics Q&A (email from Beth Hamill, 18/10/19) and the Law Society have again undertaken to amend the guidance. See Law Society mental health accreditation scheme.
  • 17/10/19
    (2227)
    : Case (Withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment - transfer to Italy). Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWHC 2531 (Admin)This judgment related to: (a) the child's (Tafida's) judicial review of the Trust's decision not to agree to transfer her to an Italian hospital; (b) the Trust's application for a specific issue order under s8 Children Act 1989, and for an inherent jurisdiction declaration, that it was in the child's best interests for life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn. Both applications were dismissed, with the effect that one of the hospitals had to continue life-sustaining treatment and, there being no justification for interfering with Tafida's right (under Article 56 Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union) to receive treatment in another EU state, it was anticipated that the transfer would take place. The judgment provides guidance on dealing with a request by parents of an EU citizen child for transfer for medical treatment in another Member State,
  • 17/10/19
    (2157)
    : Case (Sentence appeal - s45A). R v Yuel [2019] EWCA Crim 1693(1) The appellant accepted that the s45A hybrid order was reasonable in the circumstances. The court discussed the mental health sentencing regime (including s45A and restricted hospital orders) at paragraphs 44-47. (2) The trial judge's sentence was 11 years' imprisonment for each of six rapes and three years for breach of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order, to be served concurrently.On appeal this was increased to 14 years with a five-year extended licence period.
  • 16/10/19
    (2211)
    : Speakers added to Edge 2019 AMHP conference listing — Speakers include: Rhys Hadden (An introduction to Coroners court and inquests - what an AMHP needs to know); Claire Barcham (Learning from research: Managing the interface between MHA assessments and custody); Robert Lewis; Steve Gilbert; Steven Richards (DOLS - A new beginning? The Liberty Protection Safeguards). Chaired by Christine Hutchison, Director of Edge Training & Consultancy Ltd. See Edge Training: 2019 AMHP Conference - London, 6/12/19.
  • 15/10/19
    (2048)
    : State of Care report 2018/19. CQC, 'The state of health care and adult social care in England 2018/19' (14/10/19) — This document contains chapters on mental health care and the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards. The headings in the summary chapter are: (1) The care given to people with a learning disability or autism is not acceptable; (2) Other types of care are under pressure; (3) More and better community care services are needed; (4) Care services and organisations must work more closely together; (5) More room and support need to be given for innovations in care.
  • 08/10/19
    (1841)
    : Case (Inherent jurisdiction prevents elderly man from living with son). Southend-On-Sea Borough Council v Meyers [2019] EWHC 399 (Fam) — "The essence of his vulnerability is, in fact, his entirely dysfunctional relationship with his son ... Mr Meyers, I am satisfied, is entirely capable of and has the capacity ... for determining where he wishes to reside and with whom. ... I instinctively recoil from intervening in the decision making of a capacitious adult ... Here Mr Meyers' life requires to be protected and I consider that, ultimately, the State has an obligation to do so. Additionally, it is important to recognise that the treatment of Mr Meyers has not merely been neglectful but abusive and corrosive of his dignity. To the extent that the Court's decision encroaches on Mr Meyers' personal autonomy it is, I believe, a justified and proportionate intervention. The preservation of a human life will always weigh heavily when evaluating issues of this kind. ... The objective here ... is that Mr Meyers be prevented from living with his son, either in the bungalow or in alternative accommodation. I do not compel him to reside in any other place or otherwise limit with whom he should live. ... The impact of the Court's intervention is to limit Mr Meyers's accommodation options but it does not deprive of his physical liberty which is the essence of the right guaranteed by Article 5. ... It is also necessary to restrict the extent of Mr Meyers's contact with his son in order to keep him safe. ... To the extent that this interferes with his Article 8 rights it is, again as I have indicated above, a necessary and proportionate intervention. ... The ideal solution here, it seems to me, would be for Mr Meyers to return to his bungalow with a suitable package of support, his son having been excluded from the property."
  • 05/10/19
    (2116)
    : Case (Claimant not told value of settlement). DXW v PXL [2019] EWHC 2579 (QB) — "In the Application Notice seeking approval of the settlement, the Claimant also sought what has been called an "EXB Order" after the judgment of Foskett J in EXB v FDZ and others [2018] EWHC 3456 (QB)!. In that case, Foskett J made what was a novel form of order to the effect that it was not in the best interests of the claimant to know the amount of a settlement of his personal injuries action in circumstances where the court had also determined that the claimant lacked capacity to decide whether or not he should know the amount of the settlement."

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