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|M v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board (2018) UKUT 120 (AAC)||Covert medication and MHT||The tribunal had failed to turn its mind to the extent to which (despite his lack of capacity to conduct proceedings) the patient was capable of participating in proceedings before addressing the test for non-disclosure. The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the tribunal to re-make its decision.|
|R (Maguire) v HM's Senior Coroner for Blackpool and Fylde (2019) EWHC 1232 (Admin)||Inquest and DOLS||"First, the claimant contends that the defendant erred in law by determining at the end of the evidence that article 2 no longer applied under Parkinson, thereby prejudging a matter that should have been left to the jury. Secondly, the Coroner erred in law by determining that the jury should not be directed to consider whether neglect should form part of their conclusion. ... That the case law has extended the positive duty beyond the criminal justice context in Osman is not in doubt. The reach of the duty, beyond what Lord Dyson called the "paradigm example" of detention, is less easy to define. We have reached the conclusion, however, that the touchstone for state responsibility has remained constant: it is whether the circumstances of the case are such as to call a state to account: Rabone, para 19, citing Powell. In the absence of either systemic dysfunction arising from a regulatory failure or a relevant assumption of responsibility in a particular case, the state will not be held accountable under article 2. ... We agree that a person who lacks capacity to make certain decisions about his or her best interests - and who is therefore subject to DOLS under the 2005 Act - does not automatically fall to be treated in the same way as Lord Dyson's paradigm example. In our judgment, each case will turn on its facts. ... [The Coroner] properly directed himself as to the appropriate test to apply to the issue of neglect and having done so declined to leave the issue to the jury."|
|R (Maughan) v Her Majesty's Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire (2019) EWCA Civ 809||Suicide burden of proof at inquests||"This appeal involves questions of importance concerning the law and practice of coroners' inquests where an issue is raised as to whether the deceased died by suicide. The questions can be formulated as follows: (1) Is the standard of proof to be applied the criminal standard (satisfied so as to be sure) or the civil standard (satisfied that it is more probable than not) in deciding whether the deceased deliberately took his own life intending to kill himself? (2) Does the answer depend on whether the determination is expressed by way of short-form conclusion or by way of narrative conclusion? Those are the questions falling for decision in this case; but to an extent they have also required some consideration of the position with regard to unlawful killing. ... I conclude that, in cases of suicide, the standard of proof to be applied throughout at inquests, and including both short-form conclusions and narrative conclusions, is the civil standard of proof."|
|R (Silvera) v HM Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire (2017) EWHC 2499 (Admin)||JR of decision not to resume inquest||"In this claim for judicial review Muhammad Silvera challenges the decision of the Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire not to resume the inquest into the death of his mother, Ms Vittoria Baker. It is submitted that the decision of the Senior Coroner not to resume the inquest and thereby to hold a full inquest into this death was unlawful. It is submitted that the Senior Coroner breached the investigative duty under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and was irrational and in breach of the duty at common law to fully investigate this death. ... The Senior Coroner refers in his letter of February 2016 to the 'Crown Court Trial' together with the two reports as being sufficient to satisfy Article 2 of the Convention. There was, in fact, no Crown Court trial. At an early hearing an acceptable plea was tendered and 'K' was made the subject of a hospital order. The two other investigations comprised an internal NHS Trust investigation that was carried out in private and the DHR was expressed to be private and confidential. ... In all the circumstances, this claim for judicial review should be allowed."|
|R v C (2008) EWCA Crim 1155||Capacity to consent to sexual activity||If the complainant consented to sexual activity against her inclination because she was frightened of the defendant, even if her fear was irrational and caused by her mental disorder, it did not follow that she lacked the capacity to choose whether to agree to sexual activity. [Overturned on appeal.]|
|R v C (2009) UKHL 42||Sexual consent||For the purposes of s30 Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) lack of capacity to choose can be person or situation specific; (2) an irrational fear arising from mental disorder that prevents the exercise of choice could amount to a lack of capacity to choose; (3) inability to communicate could be as a result of a mental or physical disorder.|
|SB v South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (2020) UKUT 33 (AAC)||Reviewing appointment of legal representative||The tribunal appointed a representative under Tribunal rule 11(7)(b) and later refused to put on record another representative who stated that he was acting on instructions. (1) The initial appointment was unlawful because Form 6b was deficient: the rubric did not mention the 14-day time limit for challenging a delegated decision under Tribunal rule 4. If it had done then the patient's attempt to have a new representative put on record might not have been made too late to be resolved before the hearing. (2) By basing its refusal to review the appointment purely on the appointed solicitor's objection, the tribunal had abdicated its decision-making responsibility and had not given sufficient weight to the presumption of capacity in the face of new evidence of instruction. (3) The decision of the tribunal panel in not discharging the patient was not flawed in any material respect. (4) Neither of the unlawful decisions were set aside as the patient had since been discharged. (5) No damages were awarded as the Upper Tribunal has no power to do so.|
|VS v St Andrew's Healthcare (2018) UKUT 250 (AAC)||Capacity to make tribunal application||(1) The capacity that a patient must have in order to make a valid MHT application is that the patient must understand that he is being detained against his wishes and that the First-tier Tribunal is a body that will be able to decide whether he should be released. This is a lower threshold than the capacity to conduct proceedings. (2) (Obiter) a solicitor appointed under rule 11(7)(b) can request to withdraw an application in the best interests of the patient, but on the facts the tribunal had been entitled to give effect to the patient's own desire to come before a tribunal. (3) When a tribunal lacks jurisdiction it should strike out the proceedings but (obiter) if the proceedings were fair then the use of withdrawal rather than strike out is unlikely to be a material error of law.|