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Cases > Subject : Bias or Other criminal law cases or Repatriation cases

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Page name Sentence Summary
AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD (2017) EWCA Civ 1123 Immigration tribunal - fair hearing, litigation friends In this judgment the Court of Appeal gave guidance on the general approach to be adopted in FTT and UT immigration and asylum cases to the fair determination of claims for asylum from children, young people and other incapacitated or vulnerable persons whose ability to effectively participate in proceedings may be limited. In relation to litigation friends, despite there being no provision in the tribunal rules for litigation friends, the court decided that: "[T]here is ample flexibility in the tribunal rules to permit a tribunal to appoint a litigation friend in the rare circumstance that the child or incapacitated adult would not be able to represent him/herself and obtain effective access to justice without such a step being taken. In the alternative, even if the tribunal rules are not broad enough to confer that power, the overriding objective in the context of natural justice requires the same conclusion to be reached."
ARF v SSHD (2017) EWHC 10 (QB), (2017) MHLO 17 Damages for unlawful immigration detention "In this case the Claimant claims damages for unlawful detention between 31 August 2011 and 22 January 2014 (save for a period when she was in prison on remand between 25 October 2011 and 15 December 2011). She was detained by the Defendant under section 2 (2) and (3) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 throughout this period pending the making and enforcement of a deportation order. She was detained in two psychiatric facilities following her transfer pursuant to section 48 of the Mental Health Act 1983 between 11 October 2012 and 22 January 2014. Although initially disputed, the Defendant now accepts that when she was detained under the mental health legislation the Claimant was simultaneously detained under her immigration powers. The Claimant argues that her total period of detention was unlawful and puts forward four bases for this contention. Firstly, at common law pursuant to the Hardial Singh principles it is argued that: she was detained when there was no reasonable prospect of her deportation; she was detained for longer than necessary; and no steps were taken to expedite her deportation. Secondly, it is argued that there was a public law error in the failure to apply policy properly or at all under Chapter 55.10 (Enforcement Instructions and Guidance) primarily because the Claimant was suffering from a serious mental illness, but also because there was evidence that she had been both trafficked and tortured and so should have been considered suitable for detention only in very exceptional circumstances. Thirdly, it is argued that the circumstances of her detention whilst suffering severe mental illness gave rise to breaches of the Claimant's human rights under Articles 3 and 8. Finally, it is argued that the report of trafficking was not investigated timeously or at all such as to give rise to a breach of Article 4."
BA v SSHD (2017) UKAITUR IA343212013 Article 3 immigration case "The Appellant is a citizen of Nigeria born on 26th February 1980. His appeal against a refusal to vary leave was allowed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Abebrese on Article 8 grounds on 23 rd May 2016. ... The Appellant sought permission to appeal against the Article 3 findings only ... On the basis of the factual findings, the opinion in the Amnesty International Report and the opinion of Dr Bell, the Appellant is likely to suffer a breakdown at some point on return to Nigeria whether that be at the airport or some time later. He is likely to come to the attention of the police if he has such a breakdown and he would not be able to access the psychiatric hospital in Lagos because he is unable to afford treatment there. Accordingly, it is likely that he would be held in prison where the conditions for this particular Appellant with his particular condition would result in treatment in breach of Article 3. ... The Applicant would not be at risk of Article 3 treatment because of a heightened risk of suicide. He would, however, be at risk of inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 because of the conditions of return. ... The medical evidence indicates that the Appellant is vulnerable to relapse even in the UK and without the threat of removal. His removal to Nigeria is likely to trigger a relapse and his behaviour will draw hostile attention. His treatment by the authorities in detaining him under the Lunacy Act 1958 would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. There is a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would be detained in a prison, there would be no treatment for his mental health, his situation would deteriorate, the length of detention is indeterminate, there is no right of appeal and there is no requirement for him to consent to treatment. Accordingly, I allow the Appellant's appeal on Article 3 grounds."
Cash v Court of First Instance, Strasbourg, France (2018) EWHC 579 (Admin) Extradition "At the conclusion of the hearing on 13 March 2018 I allowed the Appellant's appeal and quashed the extradition order made by District Judge Grant on 15 March 2017. I did so on the grounds that it would be unjust and oppressive to extradite the Appellant because he is currently unfit to stand trial and is seriously mentally ill with paranoid schizophrenia, and thus the judge should have decided that extradition is barred by s 25 of the Extradition Act 2003."
JG v Kent and Medway NHS and Social Care Partnership Trust (2019) UKUT 187 (AAC) Non-legal research by judge Judicial summary from gov.uk website: "Mental Health First-tier Tribunal - Judicial Bias - Apparent bias - Breach of Natural Justice - Procedural Irregularity. Where a First-tier Tribunal judge undertook non-legal research by accessing a court of appeal judgment in respect of the appellant, did this lead to a presumption of bias and automatic disqualification? Did it lead to a conclusion of a real possibility of bias? Whether so doing amounts to a procedural irregularity leading to a breach of natural justice in that it rendered the hearing unfair. In the circumstances appertaining there can be no presumption of bias leading to automatic disqualification. On the facts of the case there was no real possibility of bias. Undertaking the non-legal research was a procedural irregularity but on the facts the hearing was not unfair."
LMN v Government of Turkey (2018) EWHC 210 (Admin) Extradition "It would be unlawful for this country to extradite the appellant to Turkey if he would there face a real risk of being treated in a manner which breached his Article 3 right not to be "subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment": see R (Ullah) v Special Immigration Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC 323B. It is for the appellant to establish that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited, he will face such a risk; and the ill-treatment must reach a minimum level of severity before Article 3 would be breached. Given that Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and a signatory to the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture, the respondent is entitled to rely on the presumption that the Turkish authorities will protect prisoners against breaches of their Article 3 rights. Mr Josse has not invited this court to decide the appeal on the basis of findings about the Turkish prison system as a whole, and in any event there is no evidence which would enable the court to do so. ... There are in my judgment two key aspects of the evidence relating to the Article 3 issue: the expert evidence as to the appellant's mental health; and the expert evidence as to prison conditions in Turkey following the attempted coup. ... In those circumstances, I accept the expert evidence now available as establishing that the appellant is presently suffering from a recognised medical condition, namely severe depressive episode; that he also presents some features of PTSD; that he is currently prescribed antidepressant medication, and in receipt of regular psychological counselling; that there is a continuing need for coordinated care management; and that there is a high risk of suicide in the event of extradition. ... The further evidence now before the court shows, as I have indicated, a continuing need for medication and healthcare. The appellant has very plainly raised the issues of whether his healthcare needs would in fact be met, and whether the healthcare which is in principle available in Turkish prisons would in fact be available to the appellant in the context of the greatly-increased prison population. There is simply no evidence that such care will be available to him. ... In my judgment, taking into account the risk of suicide, a failure to meet the mental healthcare needs of the appellant would in the circumstances of this case attain the minimum standard of severity necessary to breach his Article 3 rights. ... It follows that his extradition would not be compatible with Article 3 or with section 87 of the 2003 Act."
Miller v DPP (2018) EWHC 262 (Admin) Appropriate adult "This is an appeal by way of case stated from a pre-trial ruling of the Black Country Magistrates' Court sitting at Dudley on 13 October 2016 in respect of an information preferred against the Appellant for failing to provide a specimen of blood in breach of section 7 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, not to exercise its discretion under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to exclude evidence of the drug drive procedure at Oldbury Police Station that led to the charge being made. ... On 24 June 2016, the Appellant was stopped by the police on suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs. When arrested and taken into custody, he behaved erratically and aggressively. It appears that he was known to the police as a person who had learning difficulties and autism. ... As Mr Scott submitted, the presence of an appropriate adult (whilst not being able to provide technical, legal or medical advice) would have provided the Appellant with the opportunity not only to have the question as to whether or not to provide a sample explained to him, but also to obtain an appreciation of the consequences of failing to do so. He points out that the offence of failing to provide a blood sample is predicated not only on the person's comprehension of the requirement to provide a sample, but also of the consequences of failing to do so in terms of criminal liability. The Appellant was clearly very exercised whilst being detained, and there is a very real possibility that the presence of an appropriate adult would have calmed him, and led him to behave differently and make different choices from those he in fact made. ... [H]aving found there to have been a breach of Code C in failing to inform and summon an appropriate adult to the police station, we do not consider that the magistrates did properly exercise their discretion under section 78 of PACE not to exclude the evidence of the drug drive procedure. Their reasoning was, unfortunately, fundamentally flawed; and, had they exercised their discretion properly, they would have been bound to have excluded the evidence of the drug drive procedure."
R (Adegun) v SSHD (2019) EWHC 22 (Admin) Damages for unlawful immigration detention "There are two bases of challenge to Mr Adegun's detention which, in broad outline, are as follows. ... There is first an issue, which I shall call the "rule 34 issue", as to whether Mr Adegun declined a medical examination pursuant to rule 34 of the Detention Centre Rules when he was taken into detention. ... The second issue I shall call the "paragraph 55.10 issue". It arises because there is evidence, not disputed by the Secretary of State, that Mr Adegun was suffering from a mental health condition which was not recognised by the Home Office until some time after his admission into detention and was not treated with medication until 19 January 2016. ... I therefore propose to award nominal damages in respect of the early period of Mr Adegun's detention and substantial damages in respect of 40 days' detention."
R (ASK) v SSHD (2017) EWHC 196 (Admin) Immigration detention "The issue in this case concerns an allegation that in 2013 the Claimant - 'ASK' - was unlawfully detained in an Immigration Removal Centre pending removal from the United Kingdom and, once he was definitively declared unfit to fly, detained for an unreasonably long period of time before eventual transfer to a psychiatric unit. I was told that there are a growing number of similar cases before the Courts. The case raises a number of issues. First, the implications of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in R (on the application of O) (by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 19M and the change that it has brought to the law relating to detention, in the light of R (Das) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mind and another intervening) [2014] EWCA Civ 45B. In O v SSHD the Supreme Court modified the test for when a person awaiting removal could be detained in a detention centre by rejecting the view of the Court of Appeal in Das that the Defendant was not required to take account of the possibility that a detainee would receive better care and treatment in a psychiatric unit relative to that available in the IRC. Second, the extent of the duty on the Secretary of State to make inquiries as to a person's mental health before she transfers an immigration over-stayer to an IRC and whether it is sufficient to complete the medical assessment only once the person has been detained? Third, whether there is a duty upon IRC caseworkers when they complete their records to refer expressly to HO policy and the questions they need to address and whether the omission of such information or entries in recorded form has significance in law? Fourth, how a court is to assess the point in time at which a detainee must be treated as definitively unfit to fly for the purpose of determining when an otherwise legitimate rationale of detention for the purpose of removal ends? Fifth, once a decision is taken that a detainee must be transferred to a psychiatric unit under the Mental Health Act 1983 what is meant by?'"`UNIQ--nowiki-00000049-QINU`"'?prompt?'"`UNIQ--nowiki-0000004A-QINU`"'? transfer and in particular what happens if there is disagreement between the transferring clinicians who issue certificates under sections 47 and 48 MHA 1983 and the receiving clinician(s) to whom the IRC wishes to transfer and entrust the detainee? Sixth, how the Court should evaluate different types of evidence including: caseworkers reviews and notes, contemporaneous clinical notes and reports, and subsequent (ex post facto) expert reports which rely upon earlier notes and clinical reports."
R (ASK) v SSHD (2019) EWCA Civ 1239 Immigration detention "These appeals raise important issues concerning the powers of the Respondent Secretary of State to detain those who suffer from mental health conditions pending removal from the United Kingdom. In each case, the Appellant is a foreign national who satisfied the statutory criteria for detention pending removal, but who suffered from mental illness such that it is said that, for at least some of the period he was detained, he was not only unfit to be removed and/or detained in an immigration removal centre ("IRC"), but did not have mental capacity to challenge his detention and/or engage with the procedures to which he was subject as a detainee. As a result, it is submitted that, in detaining each Appellant, the Secretary of State acted unlawfully in one or more of the following ways. ..."
R (JS) v SSHD (2019) UKUT 64 (IAC) Litigation friends for children in immigration tribunal proceedings The Upper Tribunal provided mainly age-based guidance on whether a child applicant in immigration proceedings requires a litigation friend, and on the role of the litigation friend.
R (VC) v SSHD (2016) EWHC 273 (Admin), (2016) MHLO 7 Immigration detention Repatriation case with mental health background. "There are two strands to the contentions made by the Claimant in this claim, as argued before me: (1) a challenge to the lawfulness of his detention on the basis that it was in breach of (a) the Defendant's policy on detaining the mentally ill which, had it been applied lawfully, would have precluded the Claimant's detention; (b) Hardial Singh principle 3 because from 31 October 2014 there was no realistic prospect of the Claimant's removal within a reasonable timescale; and (c) Hardial Singh principle 2 because the Claimant was detained for an unreasonable length of time. (2) a challenge to the treatment of the Claimant in detention on the basis that it was: (a) in violation of Article 3 ECHR; (b) contrary to the Mental Capacity Act 2005; (c) discriminatory, contrary to the Equality Act 2010; and (d) procedurally unfair."
R (VC) v SSHD (2018) EWCA Civ 57 Immigration detention "There are broadly two questions before the court in this appeal. The first concerns the application of the Secretary of State for the Home Department's policy governing the detention under the Immigration Act 1971 of persons who have a mental illness, and the consequences if she is found not to have applied that policy correctly. The second concerns the adequacy at common law and under the Equality Act 2010 of the procedures under which mentally ill detainees can make representations on matters relating to their detention."
R v Spencer (1987) UKHL 2 Nurses' appeal against ill-treatment conviction Six nurses appealed against convictions for ill-treating a patient contrary to s126 Mental Health Act 1959 (the old equivalent of MHA 1983 s127), three successfully.
R v Taj (2018) EWCA Crim 1743 Intoxication (1) Appeal against conviction: "The defence sought to rely on self-defence as codified in s76 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 noting, in particular, s76(4)(b) which makes it clear that the defence is available even if the defendant is mistaken as to the circumstances as he genuinely believed them to be whether or not the mistake was a reasonable one for him to have made. Although s76(5) provides that a defendant is not entitled to rely upon any mistaken belief attributable to intoxication that was voluntarily induced, it was argued that as there was no suggestion that Taj had alcohol or drugs present in his system at the time, he was not 'intoxicated' and so was not deprived of the defence. It was also submitted that R v McGee, R v Harris, R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223 supported the proposition that to be in a state of 'voluntarily intoxication' there had to be alcohol or drugs active in the system at the time of the offence. ... In our view, the words "attributable to intoxication" in s. 76(5) are broad enough to encompass both (a) a mistaken state of mind as a result of being drunk or intoxicated at the time and (b) a mistaken state of mind immediately and proximately consequent upon earlier drink or drug-taking, so that even though the person concerned is not drunk or intoxicated at the time, the short-term effects can be shown to have triggered subsequent episodes of e.g. paranoia. This is consistent with common law principles. We repeat that this conclusion does not extend to long term mental illness precipitated (perhaps over a considerable period) by alcohol or drug misuse. In the circumstances, we agree with Judge Dodgson, that the phrase "attributable to intoxication" is not confined to cases in which alcohol or drugs are still present in a defendant's system. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether this analysis affects the decision in Harris: it is sufficient to underline that the potential significance of voluntary intoxication in the two cases differs." The appeal against conviction was dismissed. (2) The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
R v Tunstill (2018) EWCA Crim 1696 Infanticide wrongly withdrawn from jury "This was a case where the child was killed soon after birth so that this case can be distinguished from the situation where mental ill health, usually post-partum psychosis, develops over a period of time. Nonetheless, there was evidence from Dr Bashir and Dr Khisty which showed that notwithstanding the existence of the appellant's pre-birth mental disorder, the effects of giving birth had led to a further condition, characterised by Dr Bashir as an acute stress reaction which was a causative factor in disturbing the balance of the appellant's mind. The issue of causation is a matter of fact for a jury after appropriate direction from a judge as to what can constitute a legally effective cause. For the reasons given, we consider that the effects of birth are not required by s.1(1) to be the sole cause of a disturbance of balance of the mind. In the circumstances, we are persuaded that the judge should not have withdrawn infanticide from the jury. There was evidence fit for the jury's consideration. It is not for this court to assess the likelihood of its success. Dr Barlow's evidence was to the contrary, but the issue for us is whether a jury should have had this alternative option to consider. We think it should have had that opportunity. In the circumstances, therefore, the conviction for murder is unsafe and the verdict is quashed. In our judgment, the interests of justice require a re-trial and we so order."
Re M: A v Z (2018) EWCOP 4 COP bias "This matter concerns an appeal from the order of HHJ Roberts made on 18 July 2018 in Court of Protection (COP) proceedings concerning M. The appellants are M's mother and father in law who have the care of X, M's son age 12. ... Mr Simblet relies on four grounds of appeal: (1) There was apparent bias, in that the judge stated her intention in the exchange between the judge and the legal representatives, in the absence of the parties, to decide the application consistent with decisions made in different proceedings. (2) The judge wrongly felt constrained to reach a decision that would be consistent with a decision she had reached in different proceedings. (3) There was a material irregularity, in that the Judge took into account material from different proceedings, and the [paternal grandparents] within the COP proceedings were unable to properly know the case against them or that they had to meet. (4) In reaching her decision the judge failed to identify or give sufficient weight to factors that were relevant to M's best interests."
SSHD v KE (Nigeria) (2017) EWCA Civ 1382 Deportation following hospital order "This is an appeal [which] gives rise to the narrow, but important, issue as to whether a non-British citizen who is convicted and sentenced to a hospital order with restrictions under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 is 'a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years' for the purposes of section 117C(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, so that the public interest requires his deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances that mean that it would be a disproportionate interference with his rights under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to deport him."

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