July 2016 chronology

See July 2016 update for a thematic summary of these changes.

  • 30/07/16 (1): SRA case added. Jimoh Adun of Nieko Solicitors (SRA decision: control of practice) [2016] MHLO 23(1) The SRA decided on 15/7/15 (decision published 24/7/15) that Mr Adun's practising certificate for 2014/2015 would be subject to the following conditions: "(a) Mr Adun is not to be a recognised sole practitioner, manager or owner of any authorised body or authorised non-SRA firm; (b) Mr Adun shall immediately inform any actual or prospective employer and relevant authorised body's authorised signatory and/or organisation contact of these conditions and the reasons for their imposition." (2) Reasons: "Jimoh Adun is subject to Regulation 3 of the SRA Practising Regulations 2011. He was the sole manager and owner of the firm Nieko Solicitors, which was subject to an intervention decision dated 5 December 2014. The grounds for intervention were abandonment of practice and that the intervention was necessary to protect the interests of clients (former or potential) of Mr Adun. The SRA had been advised that he was being investigated by the Legal Aid Agency. His conduct is currently being investigated by the SRA."§
  • 25/07/16 (1): CPD invoice page fixed. The "obtain an invoice" page is working again now - apologies for any inconvenience. See CPD scheme
  • 13/07/16 (1): Best interests case. Re A (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 759 — "This is an appeal against the making of a declaration by Mrs Justice Parker on 20 June 2016 whereby she declared that: 'It is lawful and in A's best interest to remove his respiratory support by extubating him and, if he becomes unstable, not to reintroduce his respiratory support again but instead generally to furnish such treatment by way of pain relief or sedation and nursing as may be appropriate to ensure that A suffers the least distress and pain at the time and in the manner of his dying.'"
  • 09/07/16 (2): Fitness to plead case. R v Orr [2016] EWCA Crim 889, [2016] MHLO 21 — "The appeal concerns the definition of 'fitness to plead' and the process engaged by the trial judge in the instant trial which proceeded after he found the defendant 'unfit to be cross examined'. ... Once the issue of fitness to plead has been raised it must be determined. In this case, the judge explicitly found that the appellant had been fit to participate in his trial up to the point of cross examination and thereby implicitly determined that the appellant was no longer able to fully participate in his trial within the 'Pritchard' refined criteria. In these circumstances, the procedure to be adopted was clearly set out by section Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, 4A. We agree with the submission that this is a statutory mandatory requirement which cannot be avoided by the court's general discretion to order proceedings otherwise, however beneficial to the defendant they may appear. It follows that, in this case, the jury should not have been allowed to return a verdict, other than a verdict of acquittal if they were not satisfied on the evidence already given in the trial that the appellant did the act charged against him. The appeal against conviction must be allowed."§