Category

Brief summary

Case and summary Date added Categories
A Local Authority v BF [2018] EWCA Civ 2962An interim order made on 10/12/18 required BF to reside at a care home, over Christmas, and not at his own or his son's home, despite BF's having capacity to make decisions about his residence and wanting to return home. The order was expressed to last until a further hearing to take place no later than 31/1/19 (later fixed for 16/1/19) when the judge could hear full argument on what relief could be granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction. The local authority appealed on the basis that the order infringed Article 5. The appeal was dismissed: (1) BF is a vulnerable adult (old, blind, infirm, in a squalid and dangerous home, with undue influence present in relationship with son) who needs protection despite not lacking capacity. (2) The test of "unsound mind" is different from the test of capacity, and there is prima facie evidence that he may be of unsound mind. (3) In an emergency situation, someone may be deprived of their liberty in the absence of evidence of mental disorder without infringing Article 5 (Winterwerp); even if BF is found not to be of unsound mind, his vulnerability is such that he could not be returned home without careful planning, which is a crucial component of the protection afforded by the inherent jurisdiction. [This is a surprising decision on both the "unsoundness of mind" and "emergency situation" fronts. This permission judgment of 21/12/18 was published on 21/1/19; presumably the full judgment from the 10/12/18 and 16/1/19 hearings will be published soon.] 2019‑01‑22 23:50:19 2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Transcript


LW v Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust [2018] UKUT 408 (AAC)(1) Having considered the statutory framework of CTOs and the legislative purposes behind them the UT concluded, primarily on that basis, that in cases where there is a risk of a relapse which might necessitate recall, how soon that such a relapse is likely to occur is a relevant consideration. However, other factors, including the risk to the patient and/or others if a relapse were to occur, may also be relevant, and there is no requirement for likely relapse to be "soon", "in the near future" or within the permitted duration of a CTO. (2) Addressing the claimants' arguments on the analogy between detention and CTO cases, the judge stated that while there are some parallels between the s3 regime and CTOs they are not such that the same principles necessarily apply to both, and (to the extent necessary to reach a view on the detention cases) neither of the previous judgments cited in CM v Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust [2011] UKUT 129 (AAC) provided an authoritative basis for the view that imminence of relapse is the only factor or need be in the near future. 2019‑01‑11 14:05:05 2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


Lord Chancellor v Blavo and Co Solictors Ltd [2018] EWHC 3556 (QB)The High Court gave judgment for the Lord Chancellor against John Blavo in the sum of £22,136,001.71 following the allegation that Blavo & Co made dishonest claims for payment on the legal aid fund for thousands of cases where it was not entitled to any fee. 2019‑01‑01 17:19:29 2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Miscellaneous, Transcript


John Blavo v Law Society [2018] EWCA Civ 2250The Law Society successfully appealed against a decision to set aside two statutory demands (of £151,816.27 and £643,489.20) which had been served on John Blavo in relation to costs incurred in respect of the intervention into his practice. 2019‑01‑01 17:01:07 2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, ICLR summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


R (CXF) v Central Bedfordshire Council [2018] EWCA Civ 2852The patient's mother drove weekly to accompany her son on escorted community leave bus trips. When he turned 18, the Children Act 1989 funding ceased and she sought judicial review of the refusal to fund her travel costs under MHA 1983 s117. (1) The patient did not "cease to be detained" or "leave hospital" within the meaning of s117(1) when on leave and so was not a person to whom s117 applied, and also the services provided did not constitute "after-care services" within the meaning of s117(6). (2) In other cases, such as a patient living in the community on a either a full-time or part-time trial basis, the s117 duty could arise. (3) (Obiter) It was difficult to see how s117 could have covered the mother's costs as there was no evidence that she was authorised to provide services on behalf of any CCG or LA. (4) The MHA Code of Practice is analogous to delegated legislation (which can only be used as an aid to interpretation if it formed part of Parliament's background knowledge when legislating) and so cannot be used to construe s117(1) which is part of the original text. (5) The court was critical of and provided guidance in relation to the quality of pleadings in statutory interpretation cases. (6) Even if the evidence provided by Mind's QC in written submissions had been relevant, it would not excuse the flagrant breach of the court's order not to stray into the giving of evidence. The matters which are admissible are so limited in statutory interpretation cases that it may be that there is nothing useful an intervenor can contribute. 2018‑12‑20 14:51:52 2018 cases, After-care, Brief summary, Cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript


Re AB (Inherent Jurisdiction: Deprivation of Liberty) [2018] EWHC 3103 (Fam)AB had capacity to consent to the care, support and accommodation arrangements which were provided as part of his conditional discharge but, following the MM case, there was an unlawful deprivation of liberty. The High Court extended the inherent jurisdiction to regularise the position of a capacitous detained mental health patient subject to restrictions as part of his conditional discharge which satisfied the objective elements of a deprivation of liberty (firstly, it was clear that there was no legislative provision governing this situation in that the Mental Health Act provided no remedy; secondly, it was in the interests of justice; and, thirdly, there were sound and strong public policy justifications). The court order: authorised the deprivation of liberty for 12 months; required the applicant to apply to court if the restrictions increase, and no less than one month before the expiry of the authorisation; and provided for a review on the papers unless a party requests or the court requires an oral hearing. 2018‑12‑19 01:55:42 2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Transcript


Welsh Ministers v PJ [2018] UKSC 66(1) There is no power to impose conditions in a CTO which have the effect of depriving a patient of his liberty. (2) The patient's situation may be relevant to the tribunal's discharge criteria, and the tribunal may explain the true legal effect of a CTO (for the RC to act on that information), but if a patient is being unlawfully detained then the remedy is either habeas corpus or judicial review. 2018‑12‑17 14:40:29 2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, Powers, Transcript


SSJ v MM [2018] UKSC 60The patient had capacity to and was prepared to consent to a conditional discharge requiring that he live at a particular place, which he would not be free to leave, and from which he would not be allowed out without an escort. (1) The Supreme Court decided 4-1 that the MHA 1983 does not permit either the First-tier Tribunal or the Secretary of State to impose conditions amounting to detention or a deprivation of liberty upon a conditionally discharged restricted patient. (2) The dissenting decision was that the tribunal has the power to impose such conditions so long as the loss of liberty is not greater than that already authorised by the hospital and restriction orders, and that this power does not depend on the consent of the (capacitous) patient. 2018‑11‑28 13:49:47 2018 cases, Brief summary, Cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Powers, Transcript


Z v Kent County Council [2018] EWFC B65This family court case - subtitled 'Revocation of placement order - Failure to assess Mother's capacity and Grandparents' - has a detailed consideration of the MCA 2005. Extract: "The law - capacity, presumption of capacity and determining protected party status. This issue is governed primarily by the Family Procedure Rules 2010 Part 15 and Practice Directions 15A and 15B, and by the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Additionally, there is guidance provided by the Department for Children, Schools and Families’ publication 'The Children Act 1989 Guidance and Regulations', and in April 2010 the Family Justice Council published guidance for proceedings and pre-proceedings called 'Parents who Lack Capacity to Conduct Public Law Proceedings' [updated in April 2018]." 2018‑11‑08 02:26:08 2018 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Manchester City Council Legal Services v LC [2018] EWCOP 30After a circuit judge endorsed a care plan which led to the repeated sexual exploitation by strangers of a young woman with autism and significant learning disabilities (who had capacity to consent to sexual relations but lacked capacity to make decisions on her contact with men), Hayden J provided guidance that 'where issues arise that may necessitate restrictions in areas where adults have capacity, these should be heard by a High Court Judge in the Court of Protection'. 2018‑11‑07 13:41:36 2018 cases, 39 Essex Chambers summary, Brief summary, Capacity to consent to sexual relations, No transcript


VS v St Andrew's Healthcare [2018] UKUT 250 (AAC)(1) The capacity that a patient must have in order to make a valid MHT application is that the patient must understand that he is being detained against his wishes and that the First-tier Tribunal is a body that will be able to decide whether he should be released. This is a lower threshold than the capacity to conduct proceedings. (2) (Obiter) a solicitor appointed under rule 11(7)(b) can request to withdraw an application in the best interests of the patient, but on the facts the tribunal had been entitled to give effect to the patient's own desire to come before a tribunal. (3) When a tribunal lacks jurisdiction it should strike out the proceedings but (obiter) if the proceedings were fair then the use of withdrawal rather than strike out is unlikely to be a material error of law. 2018‑08‑25 22:22:47 2018 cases, 39 Essex Chambers summary, Brief summary, MHT capacity cases, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


M v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board [2018] UKUT 120 (AAC)The tribunal had failed to turn its mind to the extent to which (despite his lack of capacity to conduct proceedings) the patient was capable of participating in proceedings before addressing the test for non-disclosure. The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the tribunal to re-make its decision. 2018‑04‑20 20:33:54 2018 cases, Cases, MHT capacity cases, Upper Tribunal decisions


Jhuti v Royal Mail Group Ltd (Practice and Procedure) (2017) UKEAT 0062/17Summary from judgment: "While there is no express power provided by the ETA 1996 or the 2013 Rules made under it, the appointment of a litigation friend is within the power to make a case management order in the 2013 Rules as a procedural matter in a case where otherwise a litigant who lacks capacity to conduct litigation would have no means of accessing justice or achieving a remedy for a legal wrong." 2018‑03‑28 22:58:54 2017 cases, Brief summary, Cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Miscellaneous, Powers, Transcript


Jhuti v Royal Mail Group Ltd (Practice and Procedure) (2017) UKEAT 0062/17Summary from judgment: "While there is no express power provided by the ETA 1996 or the 2013 Rules made under it, the appointment of a litigation friend is within the power to make a case management order in the 2013 Rules as a procedural matter in a case where otherwise a litigant who lacks capacity to conduct litigation would have no means of accessing justice or achieving a remedy for a legal wrong." 2018‑03‑28 22:58:54 2017 cases, Brief summary, Cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Miscellaneous, Powers, Transcript


R (Mitocariu) v Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWHC 126 (Admin)Two hospital order patients contended that if for any reason they were not in receipt of benefits then the trust should provide regular payments to ensure their dignity was maintained whilst in care. (1) The trust did have a power, arising from s43 NHS Act 2006 (which identified the functions of foundation trusts), and either s46 or s47 (which provided sufficiently general powers), to make payments to patients. Any contract with NHS England purporting to restrict the statutory power would be ultra vires. Similarly, any payment outside the s43 purposes (namely, the provision of services to individuals for or in connection with the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of illness and the promotion and protection of public health) would be ultra vires. (2) The amount, timing and frequency of payments was a matter for the discretion of the Defendant, taking into account all relevant factors, including the specific therapeutic requirements of the patient. (3) A standardised approach of making regular payments irrespective of and unrelated to the therapeutic needs of the patient, as sought by the Claimants, would be outside the powers granted to a foundation trust. (4) On the facts, the Defendant had lawfully exercised its power: the financial circumstances of the patients were regularly considered and addressed appropriately (e.g. paying for a winter coat and travel costs). (5) The absence of a policy did not mean that the Defendant had acted unlawfully. 2018‑02‑02 00:33:06 2018 cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


DL-H v West London MH Trust [2017] UKUT 387 (AAC), [2017] MHLO 33 — Judicial summary from Gov.uk website: (1) "In deciding whether a patient is manifesting religious beliefs or mental disorder, a tribunal is entitled to take account of evidence from both religious and medical experts." (2) "A tribunal is entitled to use its own expertise to make a different diagnosis from those of the medical witnesses, provided it allows the parties a chance to make submissions and explains its decision." 2017‑10‑13 22:09:08 2017 cases, Brief summary, Mind summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


R v Bala [2017] EWCA Crim 1460, [2017] MHLO 31The appellant unsuccessfully argued that he should have received a s37/41 restricted hospital order instead of a life sentence. Extract from judgment: "His applications for an extension of time of 10 years to apply for leave to appeal against sentence and to call fresh evidence were referred to the full court by the single judge. It is the appellant's case that instead of a sentence of Custody for Life the judge should have imposed a hospital order under section 37 Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983 together with a Restriction Order under section 41. ... In R v Vowles; R (Vowles) v SSJ [2015] EWCA Crim 45, [2015] EWCA Civ 56, [2015] MHLO 16 this court set out in detail the approach to be taken by sentencing judges dealing with offenders with mental disorders. At paragraph 54, having earlier set out the statutory framework, the court described the situation in which a section 37/41 order is likely to be the correct disposal in a case where a life sentence is being considered. It is that 1) the mental disorder is treatable 2) once treated there is no evidence the offender would be in any way dangerous, and 3) the offending is entirely due to that mental disorder. In this case the new evidence does not demonstrate that the offending was entirely due to the mental disorder. We are quite satisfied, on the evidence available at the time and the more recent evidence, that the appellant's behaviour when committing the offence was affected by both mental illness and his personality disorder. On the face of it therefore this case did not come within the situation described as likely to lead to a section 37/41 order as described in Vowles. To that we would add the reminder in Vowles that consideration should be given to whether the powers of the Secretary of State under section 47 to transfer a prisoner for treatment would, taking into account all the other circumstances, be appropriate. It is clear from the court log that the judge had well in mind those powers, in the light of Dr Payne's reference to a further review after three months. We are satisfied therefore that even on the fresh evidence the judge could not have concluded, as required by section 37(2)(b), that 'having regard to all the circumstances including the nature of the offence and the character and antecedents of the offender, and to the other available methods of dealing with him, that the most suitable method of disposing of the case is by means of an order under [section 37.]' In short the judge's conclusion was correct at the time and, with hindsight and fresh evidence, remains correct. The real purpose of this appeal was to move the appellant from the release regime consequent upon a life sentence to the regime consequent on a hospital order. That is not a proper basis for an appeal if the original sentence was not wrong in principle. There are some, relatively few, cases where medical evidence obtained years after sentence convincingly demonstrates that the sentencing court ..→ 2017‑10‑08 20:38:54 2017 cases, Brief summary, Life sentence cases, Transcript


R (Brady) v Lord Chancellor [2017] EWHC 410 (Admin), [2017] MHLO 21To obtain Legal Aid funding, a representative must have a contract under LASPO 2012 covering mental health law, and there is no ECHR right to publicly-funded representation for a lawyer of choice. "In this case, Ian Stewart Brady applies for permission to bring a claim for judicial review of two decisions relating to his legal representation in proceedings before the First-Tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Mental Health. The Claimant wishes to be represented at those proceedings by a solicitor, Mr Robin Makin, and is seeking public funding for that representation. The decisions challenged are: (1) The decision of the Lord Chancellor dated 3 November 2016, the First Defendant, effectively not to make available or facilitate the public funding of Mr Makin as the Claimant's solicitor in the Proceedings. (2) The decision of the Tribunal, the Second Defendant, dated 4 October 2016 declining to appoint Mr Makin as the Claimant's legal representative under Rule 11(7)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008." 2017‑06‑10 00:03:09 2017 cases, Brief summary, Other Tribunal cases, Transcript


SSJ v MM; Welsh Ministers v PJ [2017] EWCA Civ 194, [2017] MHLO 16(1) MM wanted to be conditionally discharged into circumstances which would meet the objective component of Article 5 deprivation of liberty. The Court of Appeal decided that: (a) the tribunal has no power to impose a condition that is an objective deprivation of liberty; (b) a general condition of compliance with a care plan would be an impermissible circumvention of this jurisdictional limitation; (c) purported consent, even if valid, could not provide the tribunal with jurisdiction. (2) PJ argued that his CTO should be discharged as it could not lawfully authorise his deprivation of liberty. The Court of Appeal decided that a CTO provides the power to provide for a lesser restriction of movement than detention in hospital which may nevertheless be an objective deprivation of liberty provided it is used for the specific purposes set out in the CTO scheme. 2017‑05‑07 23:52:25 2017 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Powers, Transcript


N v ACCG [2017] UKSC 22, [2017] MHLO 11 — "So how is the court’s duty to decide what is in the best interests of P to be reconciled with the fact that the court only has power to take a decision that P himself could have taken? It has no greater power to oblige others to do what is best than P would have himself. This must mean that, just like P, the court can only choose between the 'available options'." 2017‑04‑27 22:59:08 2017 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Transcript


Victoria Wadsworth (strike off) [2016] MHLO 58 (SDT)Since 2007 Victoria Wadsworth had been in charge of a law firm's mental health department, and had invented another firm called "Healthy Minds" to pretend to write medical reports for clients, at the Legal Services Commission's expense. In the Crown Court she had admitted to obtaining £25,000 between 2007 and 2012 (though the law firm stated it had repaid £181,887.72, and the Legal Aid Agency statement referred to a value exceeding £134,000 being repaid). At the time of the hearing, she was in prison having been sentenced to three years (reduced to two on appeal) for fraud, but the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal proceeded in her absence. The Tribunal agreed that the rule 5(2) allegations which had commenced its proceedings had been superseded by the conviction and should lie on file. The Tribunal found breaches of Principle 1 (which requires a solicitor to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice), Principle 2 (which requires a solicitor to act with integrity) and Principle 6 (which requires a solicitor to behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in him and in the provision of legal services). The mitigation related to Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 proceedings, financial hardship, and caring responsibilities for her severely disabled adult son. She was struck off the roll of solicitors and ordered to pay the agreed costs of £21,864.10. 2017‑02‑11 21:38:18 2016 cases, Brief summary, SRA decisions, Transcript


R (OK) v FTT [2017] UKUT 22 (AAC), [2017] MHLO 3The First-tier Tribunal's decision to strike out a case for want of jurisdiction (on the basis that the patient had lacked capacity to make the application) was upheld in these judicial review proceedings. (1) The solicitor had applied to the Tribunal under s66 in relation to a patient detained under s3. She then sought to be appointed under Tribunal rule 11(7)(b) as the client lacked capacity to represent himself. The tribunal panel found that "[i]t does not appear that the patient has the capacity to authorise anyone to make an application on his behalf and has not done so" and adjourned the hearing to allow the patient’s solicitors "to consider whether they agree that the application is invalid or provide reasons why they consider that it is valid." (2) The tribunal had not mentioned Tribunal rule 8 (Striking out a party’s case), but was in effect making a decision under it: the rule required the Tribunal to strike out proceedings where it "does not have jurisdiction", but only after "giving the applicant an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out". (3) The solicitor accepted that the patient had lacked capacity to make the application, but argued: (a) that R (MH) v Secretary of State for the Department of Health [2005] UKHL 60 (in which the House of Lords had decided that the MHA scheme was Convention compliant) was distinguishable, as MH related to section 2 where different timescales applied; and, therefore, (b) that s66 (Applications to tribunals), in order to be Convention compliant, should be read as applying to a patient "with the assistance of a litigation friend if needed". (4) The First-tier Tribunal judge's subsequent decision "that the matter may be closed as an invalid application", which was effectively a rule 8 strike-out decision, was the decision considered by the Upper Tribunal. (5) The challenge was made by way of judicial review, but there was a right of appeal so that route would have been more appropriate. (6) UTJ Jacobs, dismissing the JR application, decided that MH could not be distinguished (the timescales in the MH case were not significant, still less decisive) and there was no Convention breach: any apparent gap in the Tribunal rules (in the protection of a patient's right to bring his case to the Tribunal) disappeared when the various duties and powers under those rules, the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are considered as a package. In conclusion, he stated that "[a]n application for the Secretary of State to refer his case could have been made under section 67 and, if that was refused, the patient could have had recourse to judicial review". (6) The Upper Tribunal decision makes no reference to the later ECHR decision in the MH case (MH v UK 11577/06 [2013] ECHR 1008, [2013] MHLO 94), which found that, during part of MH's detention, neither the Secretary of State referral process nor habeas corpus were adequate remedies ..→ 2017‑01‑27 23:58:57 2017 cases, Brief summary, MHT capacity cases, Powers, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


R v Fuller [2016] EWCA Crim 1867, [2016] MHLO 53(1) IPP sentence quashed and replaced with a restricted hospital order. (2) Request for anonymisation refused. 2016‑12‑15 20:47:18 2016 cases, Anonymisation cases, Brief summary, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


Jimoh Adun of Nieko Solicitors (SRA decision: control of practice) [2016] MHLO 23(1) The SRA decided on 15/7/15 (decision published 24/7/15) that Mr Adun's practising certificate for 2014/2015 would be subject to the following conditions: "(a) Mr Adun is not to be a recognised sole practitioner, manager or owner of any authorised body or authorised non-SRA firm; (b) Mr Adun shall immediately inform any actual or prospective employer and relevant authorised body's authorised signatory and/or organisation contact of these conditions and the reasons for their imposition." (2) Reasons: "Jimoh Adun is subject to Regulation 3 of the SRA Practising Regulations 2011. He was the sole manager and owner of the firm Nieko Solicitors, which was subject to an intervention decision dated 5 December 2014. The grounds for intervention were abandonment of practice and that the intervention was necessary to protect the interests of clients (former or potential) of Mr Adun. The SRA had been advised that he was being investigated by the Legal Aid Agency. His conduct is currently being investigated by the SRA." 2016‑07‑30 22:46:06 2016 cases, Brief summary, No transcript, SRA decisions


RP v Dudley and Walsall Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust [2016] UKUT 204 (AAC), [2016] MHLO 15Unsuccessful Article 8 challenge to conditions of discharge. 2016‑05‑09 22:44:39 2016 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


Re P (Huntingdon's disease patient at Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University Hospitals NHS Trust) [2016] MHLO 13This case involved a man in his 30s in the advanced stages of Huntington’s disease who had repeatedly pulled out a feeding tube attached to his stomach. The Trust applied for a ruling on what treatment would be in his best interests. Having heard evidence from a consultant neurologist (who said that it would not be right, and would be futile, to re-insert the feeding tube), and other evidence, including from relatives, Hayden J concluded that the tube should not be reinserted, even though this would hasten the man’s death. (Summary based on Press Association article.) 2016‑05‑01 20:16:08 2016 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


Birmingham City Council v D [2016] EWCOP 8, [2016] MHLO 5(1) A parent cannot consent to the confinement (i.e. the objective element of Article 5 deprivation of liberty) of a child who has attained the age of 16. (2) The confinement was imputable to the state despite the accommodation being provided under s20 Children Act 1989, as the local authority had taken a central role; in any event, even if D's confinement were a purely private affair the state would have a positive obligation under Article 5(1) to protect him. (3) The judge did not resile from his previous judgment that D's parents could consent to his confinement in hospital when he was under 16. 2016‑01‑31 23:02:21 2016 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Transcript


R v Fletcher [2015] EWCA Crim 2007, [2015] MHLO 133The appellant unsuccessfully sought a restricted hospital order in place of an IPP sentence. 2016‑01‑28 17:18:26 2015 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


R (C) v SSJ [2016] UKSC 2, [2016] MHLO 2(1) There is no presumption of anonymity in proceedings which are about the compulsory powers of detention, care and treatment under the 1983 Act: in each case the judge must decide whether or not anonymity is necessary in the interests of the patient. (2) On the facts, an anonymity order was necessary in the interests of this particular patient. Extracts from judgment: "The first issue before us is whether there should be a presumption of anonymity in civil proceedings, or certain kinds of civil proceedings, in the High Court relating to a patient detained in a psychiatric hospital, or otherwise subject to compulsory powers, under the Mental Health Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”). The second issue is whether there should be an anonymity order on the facts of this particular case. ... The question in all these cases is that set out in CPR 39.2(4): is anonymity necessary in the interests of the patient? It would be wrong to have a presumption that an order should be made in every case. There is a balance to be struck. The public has a right to know, not only what is going on in our courts, but also who the principal actors are. This is particularly so where notorious criminals are involved. They need to be reassured that sensible decisions are being made about them. On the other hand, the purpose of detention in hospital for treatment is to make the patient better, so that he is no longer a risk either to himself or to others. That whole therapeutic enterprise may be put in jeopardy if confidential information is disclosed in a way which enables the public to identify the patient. It may also be put in jeopardy unless patients have a reasonable expectation in advance that their identities will not be disclosed without their consent. In some cases, that disclosure may put the patient himself, and perhaps also the hospital, those treating him and the other patients there, at risk. The public’s right to know has to be balanced against the potential harm, not only to this patient, but to all the others whose treatment could be affected by the risk of exposure. ... I conclude that an anonymity order is necessary in the interests of this particular patient. His regime before he left hospital, involving escorted leave in the community, demonstrated the need for anonymity and the case is even stronger now (as foreseen in R (M) v Parole Board). Without it there is a very real risk that the progress he has made during his long years of treatment in hospital will be put in jeopardy and his re-integration in the community, which was an important purpose of his transfer to hospital, will not succeed. I would therefore allow this appeal and maintain the anonymity order in place." 2016‑01‑27 23:45:15 2016 cases, Anonymisation cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Transcript


WH v Partnerships in Care [2015] UKUT 695 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 132The tribunal, having decided that the appropriate treatment test in s72(1)(b)(iia) was met, refused to discharge a patient who had a diagnosis of dissocial personality disorder. (1) The Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal on the following grounds: (a) The appropriate treatment test relates only to the treatment that a patient is receiving at the detaining hospital, so the tribunal erred in law by considering the test met because treatment was available elsewhere. (b) The tribunal also erred in law by providing inadequate reasons: (i) the reasons were not set out by reference to the relevant criteria; (ii) the tribunal failed to address any of the solicitor's submissions about appropriate treatment; (iii) it was unclear what evidence was accepted or rejected, and why; (iv) the tribunal made findings which were wholly unsupported by the evidence. (2) The Upper Tribunal also stated that: (a) The tribunal is required to evaluate the evidence and reach its own conclusions, so was not obliged to accept the RC's opinion that no appropriate treatment was available; (b) Looking at the evidence as a whole, it was not necessarily the case that there was no evidence of appropriate treatment being provided to the patient; (c) It would be desirable for the MHRT for Wales to adopt the English Practice Direction on Reports, as the Welsh Rules provided little useful guidance, and full reports would have assisted in this difficult case; (d) The patient was currently detained in England so the Welsh tribunal was invited to transfer the case to England. 2016‑01‑03 23:08:27 2015 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


AM v Partnerships in Care Ltd [2015] UKUT 659 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 106The First-tier Tribunal, on the basis of their finding that the patient had committed two rapes, refused to discharge because sexual understanding and treatment work had not been undertaken. The Upper Tribunal held: (1) The tribunal had made a mistake of fact which undermined its conclusion as to the rapes, which was a fundamental error in the light of which the tribunal’s decision not to discharge could not stand. (2) The tribunal’s decision was made in error of law because of its failure to take into account relevant considerations. It had not scrutinised the evidence carefully or addressed features of the evidence which may cast doubt on the allegations; rather, the reasons gave the impression that, having found that AM lacked credibility generally, the tribunal simply and illogically accepted that the rape allegations were true because they were viewed as credible at the time. (3) A decision as to risk must involve findings of fact, not merely suspicion that an act was done which would be indicative of risk. Although the discharge criteria involve mixed questions of fact and judgement or evaluation, the judgement or evaluation of what is likely to occur must be based on fact. The next tribunal may consider that there are relevant facts other than the alleged rapes. 2015‑12‑17 23:08:13 2015 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Missing from Bailii, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


AM v Partnerships in Care Ltd [2015] UKUT 659 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 106The First-tier Tribunal, on the basis of their finding that the patient had committed two rapes, refused to discharge because sexual understanding and treatment work had not been undertaken. The Upper Tribunal held: (1) The tribunal had made a mistake of fact which undermined its conclusion as to the rapes, which was a fundamental error in the light of which the tribunal’s decision not to discharge could not stand. (2) The tribunal’s decision was made in error of law because of its failure to take into account relevant considerations. It had not scrutinised the evidence carefully or addressed features of the evidence which may cast doubt on the allegations; rather, the reasons gave the impression that, having found that AM lacked credibility generally, the tribunal simply and illogically accepted that the rape allegations were true because they were viewed as credible at the time. (3) A decision as to risk must involve findings of fact, not merely suspicion that an act was done which would be indicative of risk. Although the discharge criteria involve mixed questions of fact and judgement or evaluation, the judgement or evaluation of what is likely to occur must be based on fact. The next tribunal may consider that there are relevant facts other than the alleged rapes. 2015‑12‑17 23:08:13 2015 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Missing from Bailii, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


AM v Partnerships in Care Ltd [2015] UKUT 659 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 106The First-tier Tribunal, on the basis of their finding that the patient had committed two rapes, refused to discharge because sexual understanding and treatment work had not been undertaken. The Upper Tribunal held: (1) The tribunal had made a mistake of fact which undermined its conclusion as to the rapes, which was a fundamental error in the light of which the tribunal’s decision not to discharge could not stand. (2) The tribunal’s decision was made in error of law because of its failure to take into account relevant considerations. It had not scrutinised the evidence carefully or addressed features of the evidence which may cast doubt on the allegations; rather, the reasons gave the impression that, having found that AM lacked credibility generally, the tribunal simply and illogically accepted that the rape allegations were true because they were viewed as credible at the time. (3) A decision as to risk must involve findings of fact, not merely suspicion that an act was done which would be indicative of risk. Although the discharge criteria involve mixed questions of fact and judgement or evaluation, the judgement or evaluation of what is likely to occur must be based on fact. The next tribunal may consider that there are relevant facts other than the alleged rapes. 2015‑12‑17 23:08:13 2015 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Missing from Bailii, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


MM v WL Clinic [2015] UKUT 644 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 103(1) For the purposes of Article 5, a restricted patient with the capacity to do so can give a valid and effective consent to conditions of a conditional discharge that when implemented will, on an objective assessment, create a deprivation of liberty. (2) In determining whether to discharge conditionally, the tribunal has to consider whether the consent is freely given and (as raised in KC at [134-139]) consider any practical problems arising from the ability to withdraw consent. (3) MM's case was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with a direction that it apply the decisions in KC and this case. (Caution: see Court of Appeal decision.) 2015‑11‑26 20:58:29 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, MHLR summary, Powers, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


M v Mrs N [2015] EWCOP 76, [2015] MHLO 102It was in the best interests of N, who was in a minimally-conscious state, not to continue to receive clinically assisted nutrition and hydration. The judge concluded that: "Ultimately, I have concluded that her wishes, so thoughtfully presented by her family, coupled with the intrusive nature of the treatment and its minimal potential to achieve any medical objective, rebut any presumption of continuing to promote life. Quite simply, I have come to the conclusion that it would be disrespectful to Mrs. N to preserve her further in a manner I think she would regard as grotesque." 2015‑11‑23 21:41:29 2015 cases, Brief summary, Medical treatment cases, Transcript


R (Howard League for Penal Reform) v Lord Chancellor [2015] EWCA Civ 819, [2015] MHLO 101This was an appeal against the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review of changes introduced to criminal legal aid for prison law by the Criminal Legal Aid (General) (Amendment) Regulations 2013. (1) The 'lack of consultation' challenge was unarguable. (2) The appellants also challenged the removal of criminal legal aid funding in seven principal areas of prison law (including pre-tariff reviews and return to open condition cases before the Parole Board) on the basis that they either impact upon the liberty of the prisoner or they engage his or her Article 8 Convention rights in a way that is systemically unfair. The Court of Appeal accepted that it was arguable that, without appropriate assistance, the system could carry an unacceptable risk of unlawful decision making in relation to those with mental health, learning or other difficulties which effectively deprive them of the ability effectively to participate in the relevant decisions. 2015‑11‑14 22:04:40 2015 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


XZ v The Public Guardian [2015] EWCOP 35, [2015] MHLO 98 — "This is an application regarding the effectiveness of some provisions contained in a Lasting Power of Attorney ('LPA') for property and financial affairs. It is not a type of application for which permission would normally be given for a judgment to be published. However, paragraph 16 of the Practice Guidance (Transparency in the Court Of Protection) [2014] EWHC B2 (COP), [2014] MHLO 5, says that "permission to publish a judgment should always be given whenever the judge concludes that publication would be in the public interest." I can't imagine that the general public would have the slightest interest in this judgment, but its publication may be of interest to professionals who specialise in this area of the law and draft LPAs on a regular basis, and also to people who are considering making an LPA themselves, and for this reason I shall permit its publication. ... XZ wants his attorneys to act only when he lacks capacity. In his LPA he has described in intricate detail the circumstances in which he can be identified as no longer having the capacity to make a relevant decision, whereupon his attorneys may make the decision on his behalf and in his best interests. ... XZ acknowledges that his LPA will be less effective because of these provisions but, nevertheless, he wishes them to remain as an integral part of the registered instrument for his own reassurance and peace of mind. Some people may think that this is unwise, but it is his will and preference and it should be treated with respect. The Public Guardian has no right to make a paternalistic judgment on his behalf and decide that it would be in his best interests for these provisions to be severed. ... The Public Guardian's function under paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the Act is limited to considering whether the conditions and restrictions are (a) ineffective as part of an LPA or (b) would prevent the instrument from operating as a valid LPA. ... I also order the Public Guardian to register the LPA." 2015‑11‑13 23:23:27 2015 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - other, Transcript


L v NG [2015] EWCOP 34, [2015] MHLO 97Headnote from judgment: "Application by the sister of NG to be appointed as his deputy for property and affairs together with her sons – Even if NG lacked capacity to manage his property and affairs it was not in his best interests to appoint a deputy to manage his property and affairs." The main part of the decision is the following: "Section 16(4) of the Act provides that when deciding whether it is in the relevant person's interests to appoint a deputy, the court must have regard to section 4 (best interests) and the principle that a decision by the court is to be preferred to the appointment of a deputy to make a decision. The fact that a person generally lacks capacity to manage their property and affairs does not automatically mean that it is in their best interests to appoint a deputy to manage their property and affairs. The best interests requirements of section 4 require the court to consider the wishes, feelings, beliefs and values of the person concerned. One of the principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is that before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the person's rights and freedom of action. On the evidence a deputyship order is either unnecessary or not in NG's best interests provided that a restriction is entered in the Land Registry requiring the court to authorise any dealings with his home. Any risks in respect of NG's other property and financial affairs which would be minimised by the appointment of a deputy are outweighed by the effect of such an order on his self-esteem, the resulting interference with his autonomy and the impact on family relationships. The sole purpose of the restriction is to act as a light touch safeguard. The court will only not authorise a proposed transaction if NG is being taken advantage of by a third party during a period of illness or is acting in a way that he will be likely to regret on recovering from a period of illness." 2015‑11‑13 23:14:12 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deputyship cases, Transcript


A Hospital NHS Trust v CD [2015] EWCOP 74, [2015] MHLO 94CD was willing to have the total abdominal hysterectomy, in order to remove two very large ovarian growths, which the medical experts recommended. (1) Mostyn J held that she lacked capacity in relation to this but that it was in her best interests to have the surgery. (2) The correct way to interpret the MCA ineligibity rules is as follows: "if the MHA regime whereby CD is compulsorily detained in a mental hospital imposes a specific requirement for dealing with the problem of the ovarian masses then CD is ineligible to be deprived of her liberty under the 2005 Act for the purposes of dealing with the problem by a different procedure under that Act. It doesn't (obviously) so she isn't ineligible." (3) In relation to deprivation of liberty the judge noted: "In KW & Ors v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2015] EWCA Civ 1054 at para 32 the Court of Appeal stated 'even if Cheshire West is wrong, there is nothing confusing about it'. It may seem that way from the lofty heights of the Court of Appeal; and of course the literal words of the Supreme Court's test are perfectly easy to understand. But for we hoplites who have to administer it at first instance the scope and ramifications of the test are, with respect, extremely confusing. As Mr Matthewson, instructed by the Official Solicitor for CD, rightly stated 'anyone who deals with this day by day knows this is confusing'. What of the situation where, as here, the protected person actively and fervently expresses the wish to undergo the procedure that is said to amount to a deprivation of liberty? What of the situation, as was the case in Bournemouth Borough Council v PS [2015] EWCOP 39, [2015] MHLO 112, where the protected person shows no inclination whatsoever to leave the home where he is cared for round the clock? What of the situation where the protected person is seriously disabled, perhaps bedridden, perhaps in a coma, and is thus physically incapable of exercising the freedom to leave? The answers I received from the Bar when discussing these scenarios belie the blithe suggestion that 'there is nothing confusing' about the test. I do not accept the criticism that my approach to these cases is 'distorted' by my 'passionate' and 'tenacious' belief that Cheshire West is wrong. Rather, it is a loyal approach which tries to apply literally and purposively the Supreme Court's test while at the same time pointing out how confusing and curious it is, to say nothing of the cost it causes to the public purse. The confusion surrounding the main test is mirrored by the confusion that the interface with the MHA gives rise to." 2015‑11‑13 22:53:01 2015 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript


An NHS Trust v A [2015] EWCOP 71, [2015] MHLO 91A patient detained under MHA 1983 s3 was not ineligible to be deprived of his liberty in a general hospital under the MCA 2005 for the purpose of physical treatment (and the previous case on this point, A Local Health Board v AB [2015] EWCOP 31, [2015] MHLO 95, should be read as if the judge accidentally omitted a negative and inadvertently and mistakenly stated the law wrongly). 2015‑11‑12 18:42:52 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript


Tricker v Church [2013] EWCOP 2, [2013] MHLO 152The application for an order to enforce the receiver's security bonds was rejected, and costs were to be paid by the applicant personally. 2015‑11‑04 23:04:41 2013 cases, Brief summary, Deputyship cases, Transcript


R (MM and DM) v SSWP (Costs) [2015] UKUT 566 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 73Tribunals Judiciary website summary: "When a case is transferred to the Upper Tribunal by the High Court in the exercise of its discretion, the Upper Tribunal will apply the approach to costs taken under CPR." 2015‑10‑30 22:30:40 2015 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


Blavo and Co Solicitors (SRA decision: closure) [2015] MHLO 70The SRA closed down Blavo & Co Solicitors and suspended John Blavo's practising certificate, giving the following reasons: (a) there is reason to suspect dishonesty of the part of a manager or employee of Blavo & Co Solicitors Limited; (b) there is reason to suspect dishonesty on the part of John Blavo in connection with his practice; (c) to protect the interests of clients of Blavo & Co Solicitors Limited. 2015‑10‑16 22:39:01 2015 cases, Brief summary, Cases, SRA decisions, Transcript


North Yorkshire County Council v MAG [2015] EWCOP 64, [2015] MHLO 69The Council sought a declaration that it was in MAG's best interests (a) to be deprived of his liberty and reside in his current placement, and (b) for the Corporate Director of Health and Adult services to enter into a tenancy agreement on MAG's behalf in relation to the current placement. (1) The reference in Re MN (An Adult) [2015] EWCA Civ 411, [2015] MHLO 41 to the ability of the Court of Protection to explore the care plan put forward by a public authority and the inability of the Court to compel a public authority to agree to a care plan which it is not willing to implement does not apply when the issue is the right to liberty under Article 5. (2) The placement at which MAG had been deprived of his liberty for 9 years did not meet his needs (for instance, there was insufficient room to manoeuvre a wheelchair indoors, so he had to mobilise on his hands and knees causing physical problems including bursitis and a recurring fungal infection in his thigh) and the council had not taken the steps necessary to ensure that there was no breach of its obligations. The court therefore refused to continue an interim deprivation of liberty authorisation. [Caution: see subsequent Court of Appeal decision.] 2015‑10‑07 22:50:30 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript


PJ v A Local Health Board [2015] UKUT 480 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 63The MHRT for Wales had rejected PJ's argument that his CTO should be discharged because its conditions unlawfully deprived him of his liberty. He appealed to the Upper Tribunal. (1) In deciding that PJ was not deprived of his liberty, the MHRT had erred in law in its application of the Cheshire West decision. (2) The MHRT also erred in law in concluding that the CTO framework must take precedence over any human rights issues. The tribunal must take into account whether the implementation of the conditions of a CTO will or may create a breach of Article 5 or any Convention right. If an issue remains to be decided on whether a breach exists or could be avoided (by authorisation or consent, or changing conditions), then generally the tribunal should adjourn to give an opportunity to make lawful the implementation of conditions. But if the treatment could not be provided without breach of Convention rights then the tribunal (whether by the statutory criteria or under its discretion) should discharge the CTO. (3) Guidance to tribunals was given under the following (paraphrased) headings: (a) whether implementation of the conditions will objectively amount to a deprivation of liberty; (b) whether the patient has capacity to consent; (c) if the patient has capacity, whether consent avoids a breach of Article 5; (d) if the patient lacks capacity, whether the objective deprivation of liberty can be authorised under the MCA; (e) if the patient lacks capacity, whether s64D can be relied upon to avoid an Article 5 breach; (f) how the conclusions on the above should help decide whether to adjourn, or discharge or uphold the CTO. (Caution: see Court of Appeal decision.) 2015‑09‑10 00:18:19 2015 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


SL v Ludlow Street Healthcare [2015] UKUT 398 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 60The patient was living outside hospital on s17 leave but was required to attend hospital for fortnightly psychology sessions and a monthly ward round. He challenged the tribunal's decision that it remained appropriate for him to be liable to be detained in hospital under s3 for medical treatment. This was unsuccessful as the tribunal had applied the correct legal test and had applied it properly. The UT judge added that medical treatment includes rehabilitation under medical supervision, which meant that the s17 leave and the rehabilitation provided outside hospital, both of which operated under medical supervision, were themselves part of the treatment plan. 2015‑08‑07 22:27:01 2015 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


Case HM/0339/2015 [2015] MHLO 57 (UT)After the case had been adjourned part-heard, the patient's withdrawal was agreed by a tribunal clerk. The panel judge spoke with a salaried tribunal judge, who then set aside the decision to consent to withdrawal, and the tribunal reconvened without discharging the patient. The salaried tribunal judge's decision was unlawful and the tribunal therefore had no jurisdiction to continue with the hearing. (Under the subsequent Practice Statement: Delegation of Functions to Staff and to Registrars on or after 27 April 2015 [2015] MHLO 36 the original decision would not have been made by a clerk.) 2015‑07‑26 23:29:14 2015 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


SSJ v KC [2015] UKUT 376 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 49(1) A conditional discharge may include conditions which will, on an objective assessment, give rise to a deprivation of liberty, if that deprivation of liberty is authorised under the MCA. (2) (Obiter) The same conditions would be lawful for a patient with capacity who gives real consent since this would mean there is no Article 5 deprivation of liberty. 2015‑07‑15 22:54:29 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


Re MOD (Deprivation of Liberty) [2015] EWCOP 47, [2015] MHLO 48Nine cases which had been issued under the Re X streamlined procedure were listed for directions before DJ Marin. (1) One case (ML) would require a best interests hearing so never really belonged in the Re X procedure, but orders under the Re X procedure would or would potentially have been made in the other cases. (2) The Court of Appeal in Re X had (obiter, and without referring to new rule 3A) decided that P should be a party in every deprivation of liberty case. (3) Party status would entail the need for a litigation friend but, except for an IMCA in one case (MOD), no-one suitable had been identified: (a) in most of these cases, the family may be said to have an adverse interest to the person concerned; (b) there must be a question in every case as to whether family members have the required expertise; (c) the Official Solicitor refused to act as his COP Health & Welfare team was already "fire-fighting" at an unsustainable level owing to budgetary constraints; (d) IMCAs in one borough refused to act without indemnity insurance, which it was hoped would be in place by the end of 2016. (4) The result was that none of these cases could proceed, and neither could hundreds and potentially thousands of others: the judge said he "cannot think of a more serious situation to have faced a court in recent legal history". (5) These cases were transferred to the Vice President of the COP (Charles J) to decide on the following issues: (a) whether P must be joined as a party in a case involving deprivation of liberty; (b) whether the appointment of a rule 3A representative is sufficient in a case involving deprivation of liberty; (c) if P must be joined as a party, in the absence of any suitable person to act as litigation friend, what should be done in circumstances where the Official Solicitor cannot accept an invitation to act; (d) whether a family member can act as litigation friend in circumstances where that family member has an interest in the outcome of the proceedings; (e) whether other deprivation of liberty cases not before the court on this occasion but which raise similar issues to this case should be stayed pending a determination of the issues recorded at paragraphs (a) to (d). (6) The Official Solicitor was ordered to file and serve a statement which would: (a) provide a full and evidence-based explanation of why he cannot cope with the number of deprivation of liberty applications in which he is invited to act as litigation friend; (b) explain in full detail providing evidence where appropriate as to which areas or processes cause him difficulty and why; (c) inform the court when he expects to be able to cope with deprivation of liberty cases and the likely time scale in which he can start work on a case; (d) provide any other information to the court what will assist the court to make decisions in this case regarding the position of the Official Solicitor. (7) The court refused to approve deprivations of liberty on an interim basis ..→ 2015‑07‑12 21:32:07 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript


R (MT) v Oxford City Council [2015] EWHC 795 (Admin), [2015] MHLO 47The claimant's application via his deputy to the defendant as homeless was rejected on the basis that his lack of capacity to make such an application meant that there was no duty under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. (1) The claimant's argument that Article 14 (with Article 8) meant the otherwise-binding House of Lords decision in Garlick should not be followed was unsuccessful. (2) In any event, it is not discriminatory to provide two different systems for provision of accommodation (the system potentially available to MT was at that time s21 National Assistance Act 1948). 2015‑06‑26 22:53:16 2015 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Other capacity cases, Transcript


LB Redbridge v G (No 6) [2015] EWCA Civ 446, [2015] MHLO 40The Official Solicitor unsuccessfully appealed against an order that Associated Newspapers Limited should pay (only) 30% of his costs. (1) The primary ground of appeal - that the COP Rules did not apply - was described by the Court of Appeal as "simply a device to suggest that the costs presumption should be reversed". (2) The alternative ground was that if the COP Rules did apply then the judge had erred in the exercise of his discretion in the proportionate costs order that he made. In relation to this the Court of Appeal held that (a) given that inaccurate letters from the OS (stating that that ANL were prevented from visiting G) had triggered ANL's application, and that the OS had not understood the public importance of the media's general role, a proportionate costs order was unsurprising; and (b) multiple representation where there is no significant difference between the arguments of parties on an application is to be discouraged by a limitation in costs. 2015‑05‑23 22:30:03 2015 cases, 39 Essex Chambers summary, Brief summary, COP costs cases, Transcript


ABC v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB), [2015] MHLO 39The claimant's father had killed his wife, was detained under s37/41, and refused to allow the Trust to inform his pregnant daughter of his Huntingdon's disease diagnosis. She claimed that the failure to inform her: (a) was negligent and breached Article 8; and (b) had caused psychiatric damage, and (if her daughter also has the disease) additional expense which she would have avoided by an abortion. Her claim was struck out. 2015‑05‑23 21:52:22 2015 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


DD v Dudley and Walsall NHS Trust [2014] MHLO 145 (PI)The Claimant's partner committed suicide while being detained under s2 Mental Health Act. The Claimant and the deceased were not married but had been cohabiting for a number of years. The deceased was also the Claimant's full time carer as a result of the spinal fusion surgery the Claimant had undergone some years previously. The deceased had a history of mental illness which was depressive in nature. At the time of his death his mental health had deteriorated significantly. While detained under the Mental Health Act, the deceased was initially assessed as not having capacity nor insight into his illness; he was also becoming aggressive and a risk to himself and others. However, an assessment by the duty doctor the following night did not indicate that the deceased was a self-harm risk, nor were there any known acts/plans since admission. Later that evening the deceased killed himself. The Trust carried out a Serious Untoward Incident investigation which highlighted a number of failings in the care of the deceased. The Defendant made some admissions of liability in its Letter of Response. However, the Defendant put the Claimant to proof as to the nature of his relationship with the deceased and the level of care he required. The Claimant made a claim for dependency as the deceased had been his full time carer. A claim was also made under the Human Rights Act 1998 for a breach of Article 2, the Right to Life. It was acknowledged by the Claimant that there would be no monetary award under this Act (only an acknowledgement of the breach) as compensation was sought under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. A Round Table Meeting was held in June 2014 and the Claimant accepted a settlement of £185,000. (Summary provided by claimant's solicitor.) 2015‑04‑13 14:21:41 2014 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, No transcript


NM v Kent County Council [2015] UKUT 125 (AAC), [2015] MHLO 34NM was subject to both guardianship and a DOLS authorisation. His residence at a particular home was enforced and he was escorted while on leave. The First-tier tribunal decided that he "had the capacity to decide where to live but not the capacity to decide on the supervision that was required to keep him and any child he came into contact with safe", and that he would not remain in the home without being subject to the guardianship; it refused to discharge him. (1) An ideal set of reasons would identify the relevant legal differences between guardianship and DOLS and include findings of fact sufficient to show their significance to the legal criteria set out in s72(4). (2) Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs accepted the council's position that the differences include: DOLS assumes that the person lacks capacity to make the relevant decisions in their best interests; DOLS cannot impose a requirement that the person reside at a particular address, whereas a guardian can; and DOLS cannot authorise anyone to give, or consent to, treatment for someone with a mental disorder. He also said that a limitation inherent in the DOLS regime was that, while it could prevent NM from leaving, it could not deal with the possibility that he may abscond. (3) In some (other) cases guardianship may not be necessary for the purposes of s72(4)(b) as DOLS may provide sufficiently for the person’s welfare and the protection of others. (4) The First-tier Tribunal's reasons on the statutory criteria (the key being that NM would not remain at the home without guardianship) and the relationship with DOLS (concerning return following absconsion) were in substance adequate to explain and justify its decision. 2015‑04‑10 20:09:05 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


Rochdale MBC v KW [2015] EWCOP 13, [2015] MHLO 24(1) The Court of Appeal's decision to allow an appeal against the judge's earlier decision (that KW was not being deprived of her liberty at home) by consent, and without an oral hearing or judgment, was procedurally impermissible. (2) Although the Court of Appeal had set aside the decision, it had not actually declared that KW was deprived of her liberty: therefore, her status will be in limbo until the judge decides the matter at an oral 12-month review hearing. (3) The provisions for a review on the care plan becoming more restrictive would only be triggered if the changes amount to bodily restraint comparable to that which obtained in Cheshire West, as any restrictions short of that would amount to no more than arrangements for her care in her own home and would not amount to state detention. (4) The judge concluded that: "In this difficult and sensitive area, where people are being looked after in their own homes at the state's expense, the law is now in a state of serious confusion." 2015‑03‑24 20:09:36 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript


MASM v MMAM [2015] EWCOP 3, [2015] MHLO 10 — (1) The issue: "The point the case raises is a short but important one: namely the legal status of declaratory orders in the Court of Protection and the consequences, if any, for deliberate defiance of them. ... Mr MASM and his son have plainly colluded to defeat the declaration made by this court. ... Two questions have fallen for consideration here in the light of this background: (i) What is the legal status of a declaration of best interests in the Court of Protection? (ii) Can a party who deliberately acts in defiance of a declaration be held to be in contempt of court?" (2) Decision: "Ultimately, a declaration of best interests connotes the superlative or extreme quality of welfare options. It by no means follows automatically that an alternative course of action to that determined in the Declaration, is contrary to an individual's welfare. There may, in simple terms, be a 'second best' option. For this reason, such a declaration cannot be of the same complexion as a Court Order. It lacks both the necessary clarity and fails to carry any element of mandatory imperative. I am ultimately not prepared to go as far as Mr McKendrick urges me to and elevate the remit of the Court of Protection, in its welfare decision making, to such a level that anything hampering the court in the exercise of its duty, or perpetrated in wanton defiance of its objectives is capable, without more, of being an interference with the administration of justice and therefore criminal contempt. Such an approach would it seems to me be entirely out of step with the development of our understanding of the importance of proper and fair process where the liberty of the individual is concerned. I would add that this has long been foreshadowed by the recognition that the necessary standard of proof in a application to commit is the criminal standard. Moreover, though my order of 20th February 2015 was expressed to have been made pursuant to section 16, it was drafted in declaratory terms. As such, for the reasons I have set out above, it cannot, in my judgement, trigger contempt proceedings. There cannot be 'defiance' of a 'declaration' nor can there be an 'enforcement' of one. A declaration is ultimately no more than a formal, explicit statement or announcement. That said I emphasise that Mr MASM, in fact acted, through the agency of his son, in a way which was cynically contrary to his mother's best interests. The course he took was not a 'second best' option but one entirely inimical to his mother's welfare, physically, mentally and emotionally. He has frustrated the objectives of the litigation but he is not, as I ultimately find, acting in defiance of an order and therefore is not exposed to contempt proceedings." (3) Guidance: "Such guidance as I can give can only be limited: (i) Many orders pursuant to Section 16 seem to me to be perfectly capable of being drafted in clear unequivocal and even, where appropriate, prescriptive language. This Section ..→ 2015‑01‑31 20:37:41 2015 cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Cambridgeshire County Council 13 016 935 [2015] MHLO 9 (LGO) — LGO's summary: "Complaint from a woman that the council moved her husband into a residential home against both his and her wishes. She says she was forced to accept this course of action and the council failed to properly consider her preference of care home. The Ombudsman upheld the complaint and found fault causing injustice. Recommendations: To remedy the injustice caused, we recommend the council (within three months of the date of our report): (1) apologise to the woman for the failures outlined in our report. This apology should accept responsibility for the faults, and acknowledge the impact these had on her. It should also include an assurance that the same faults will not happen again, and explain what steps have been taken to ensure this; (2) set a timetable for refresher training for social care staff on mental capacity assessments, best interests decisions, deprivation of liberty and the role of the Court of Protection and how to advise the public on their rights. This may involve the council reviewing the current status of residents who may be deprived of their liberty without proper authorisation; and (3) pay the woman £750 to recognise the distress caused by the failings identified and the time and trouble she has expended in making the complaint." 2015‑01‑31 20:25:19 2015 cases, Brief summary, LGO decisions, Transcript


Jimoh Adun of Nieko Solicitors (SRA decision: closure) [2015] MHLO 4 (SRA)The SRA decided to intervene because Jimoh Adun had abandoned his practice at Nieko Solicitors, and it was necessary to protect the interests of clients (former or potential) and any beneficiaries of any trust of which he is or was a trustee. The SRA was unable to gain access on 8/12/14 but gained access three days later with a court order. 2015‑01‑29 15:58:06 2015 cases, Brief summary, No transcript, SRA decisions


LB Hillingdon v PS [2015] MHLO 3 (COP)Faced with an impasse about contact between PS and M, Hillingdon asked the court to determine what was in PS's best interests. Permission was required under MCA 2005 s50 and CS objected to the grant of permission. The factors in s50 required for permission were satisfied. Also, the court could give effect to the rules in accordance with the overriding objective (dealing with the case justly, including having regard to proportionality). The judge gave the following directions: (a) M to be served with a copy of the application and joined as a party; (b) CS to be joined as party; (c) permission to the attorneys to intervene; (d) final hearing listed and provision made for statements to be filed; (e) Court of Protection Visitor to visit PS to ascertain his wishes and feelings and to gather information relevant to the issue of contact in the same way Cafcass would report in a children's case; (f) costs reserved. 2015‑01‑29 15:33:43 2015 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


Essex County Council v RF [2015] EWCOP 1, [2015] MHLO 2(1) A final declaration was made that P lacked capacity to make decisions in relation to his residence and care arrangements, but retained capacity to make decisions in relation to contact with others. (2) In considering quantum for unlawful detention there is a difference between procedural breaches (which would have made no difference to P's living or care arrangements) and substantive breaches (where P would not have been detained if the authority had acted lawfully). (3) The judge approved the following compromise agreement: (a) a declaration that ECC unlawfully deprived P of his liberty for approximately 13 months; (b) £60,000 damages; (c) care home fees to be waived (around £23-25,000); (d) damages to be excluded from means testing for community care costs; (e) costs to be paid (may exceed £64,000). (4) The judge described the situation as follows: "It is hard to imagine a more depressing and inexcusable state of affairs. A defenceless 91 year old gentleman in the final years of his life was removed from his home of 50 years and detained in a locked dementia unit against his wishes. Had it not been for the alarm raised by his friend RF he may have been condemned to remain there for the remainder of his days. There can be no doubt that ECC's practice was substandard. They failed to recognise the weakness of their own case and the strength of the case against them. They appeared unprepared to countenance any view contrary to their own. They maintained their resolute opposition to P returning to his home until the last possible moment. In my judgment the conduct of ECC has been reprehensible. The very sad and disturbing consequences for P cannot be ignored." 2015‑01‑21 21:48:32 2015 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript


Lucia Benyu (strike off) and Ronnie Benyu (section 43 order) [2014] MHLO 138 (SDT)(1) In relation to Lucia Shingirai Benyu, née Ndoro, who at the material time practised as a sole practitioner under the style of Peters & Co Solicitors, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal concluded that: "The First Respondent had admitted a lack of integrity and had had several allegations of dishonesty proved against her. The Tribunal had heard a litany of the most ruthless exploitation of an obviously vulnerable individual and had disbelieved much of what the First Respondent had to say whilst giving evidence on oath. In cases where dishonest misappropriation of client’s funds had been found then it was well-established that that would invariably lead to strike off. There were no circumstances put before the Tribunal that might lead it to mitigate that penalty. The First Respondent would be struck off the Roll of Solicitors. Indeed, the seriousness of her misconduct was such that this would have been the appropriate sanction even if she had not been found to be dishonest." (2) In relation to Ronnie Benyu, her husband who held the position of Practice Manager and Bookkeeper, the SDT concluded that: "It was clear that, even by his own admission, the Second Respondent was a totally unfit person to work in a solicitor’s office. The Tribunal would have no hesitation in making the section 43 Order requested by the Applicant." 2014‑12‑31 20:11:15 2014 cases, Brief summary, SRA decisions, Transcript


AG's reference (no 91 of 2014) sub nom R v Joseph Williams [2014] MHLO 137 (CA)The trial judge had imposed a sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, together with with a s45A hospital order and limitation direction, on an offender (W) who had pleaded guilty to attempted murder. Following an AG's reference the Court of Appeal held that: (1) The appropriate range was 17-25 years, the starting point was 20 years after a trial, and the judge was not at fault for reducing the sentence by six years given the unusual facts of the case that related to W's mental health. (2) It was not certain that the offence was motivated by antipathy to V's sexual orientation; it could equally have been the case that W did not want to share his flat with anyone. (3) As the judge considered that W's dangerousness was not confined to his mental illness, he should have passed an extended sentence to protect the public in the event that the criteria for the hospital order and restrictions were no longer satisfied, but the offender remained a risk to the public. (4) An extended period of five years was added to the 14-year sentence. The hospital direction with restrictions remained unchanged. (Summary based on Lawtel summary of ex tempore judgment.) 2014‑12‑31 17:38:26 2014 cases, Brief summary, Hybrid order cases, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


Hysaj v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, [2014] MHLO 135In each of these three cases, which were heard together, the applicant failed to file a notice of appeal within the time prescribed by CPR 52.4(2), which made it necessary for him to seek an extension of time. The mental health case involved a nearest relative who had been awarded costs after displacement proceedings and who (nearly six years out of time) wished to appeal against the sum ordered by the judge. The Court of Appeal, having held that the guidance in the Mitchell and Denton cases applied to applications for extensions of time for filing a notice of appeal, dealt with some questions of general importance (public law cases, shortage of funds, litigants in person, the merits). In the mental health case, the extension of time was refused. 2014‑12‑31 16:04:25 2014 cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


R (Guntrip) v Parole Board [2014] EWHC 4180 (Admin), [2014] MHLO 132(1) When the prisoner was transferred to psychiatric hospital an unlawful and unfair decision was taken to cancel (rather than adjourn) a Parole Board hearing. (2) The delay of 12 months breached Article 5(4) and damages of £2,500 were awarded. 2014‑12‑31 11:53:56 2014 cases, Brief summary, Prison law, Transcript


A Local Authority v M [2014] EWCOP 33, [2014] MHLO 119 — (1) Legal Aid: "One lesson of this case is that, if parties such as E and A are to be unrepresented in hearings of this kind, be it in the Court of Protection or in the Family Court, the hearings will often take very considerably longer than if they were represented. Denying legal aid in such cases is, thus, a false economy." (2) Disclosure: "In total, the court papers filled some 33 lever arch files (court documents and file records) plus two further lever arch files of documents produced by E and A during the hearing. No doubt if the parents had been represented, it might have been possible to reduce this material into a core bundle, as I did myself at the conclusion of the hearing. Even those 35 files may not represent the totality of the disclosable documents that might have been produced. ... This illustrates another consequence of parties appearing without representation in these cases, namely that the courts may have to devise new rules as to disclosure." (3) Fact finding: "The principal focus of this hearing has been to make findings on disputed issues of fact as the basis for future decisions about M's life. In my judgment, the legal principles to be applied at a fact finding hearing in the Court of Protection should be broadly the same as in children's proceedings where a court is investigating allegations that a child has been ill-treated or neglected. I have summarised those principles in a number of children's cases, including Re JS [2012] EWHC 1370 (Fam). Of those principles, the following seem to me to be of particular importance in this case. ..." (4) Orders: Various interim orders, including on contact and residence, were made and a decision on deputyship was adjourned. 2014‑12‑30 22:02:00 2014 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


R (Worcestershire CC) v Essex CC [2014] EWHC 3557 (Admin), [2014] MHLO 104In this case Essex argued that VC lacked capacity to have consented to her place of residence, and therefore had not been resident in Essex for the purposes of s117. The result would be either that VC had no place of residence, or remained resident at the last place she lived in before she lost capacity to decide for herself. They were unsuccessful. Extract from judgment: "I do not however read these passages as deciding that a person cannot acquire residence in a place unless he does so voluntarily. Still less do they decide that residence may only be acquired as a result of a decision made by a person with capacity, or lawfully on his behalf by someone else. ... The context and purpose of s117 point in my judgment to an interpretation that is as straightforward as possible, the residence of a person being prima facie the place in which he was in fact living eating and sleeping immediately prior to his detention. There may be reasons to conclude that he has not lost an established residence elsewhere, for example because of imprisonment or because he is only temporarily away from that residence on holiday, but if he has no such other place, and in the absence of some other special factor, his actual place of abode is his residence. This would be so whether he is there voluntarily or involuntarily, and whether any lack of voluntariness is caused by his will being overborne (eg on imprisonment) or because a decision he has in fact made is vitiated by lack of capacity, or if the decision has in reality been taken on his behalf by someone else, with or without lawful authority to do so." Some of these comments are obiter, and this is a first instance decision which did not refer to the earlier Court of Appeal decision in R (Wiltshire Council) v Hertfordshire CC [2014] EWCA Civ 712, [2014] MHLO 103. 2014‑11‑03 00:30:54 2014 cases, After-care, Brief summary, Transcript


R (Wiltshire Council) v Hertfordshire CC [2014] EWCA Civ 712, [2014] MHLO 103The patient had been placed under a hospital order when he was resident in Wiltshire. He was conditionally discharged with a condition to reside in Hertfordshire. He had no wish to return to Wiltshire, but the Court of Appeal decided that the residence condition meant his place of residence was not voluntary, and decided that he was still 'resident' in Wiltshire. 2014‑11‑03 00:18:45 2014 cases, After-care, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Transcript


Lucia Benyu (SRA decision: control of practice) [2014] MHLO 99 (SRA)(1) The SRA decided that as Lucia Benyu, née Ndoro, was in an Individual Voluntary Arrangement, and her conduct was under investigation, the following conditions on her 2013/14 practising certificate were necessary: (a) she may act as a solicitor only as an employee; which role has first been approved in writing by the SRA; she is not a sole practitioner, or a manager or owner of any authorised body or authorised non-SRA firm except as a minority share owner in Peters Legal Limited (SRA ID 607645); (c) she does not hold, receive or have access to client money or have responsibility for any client money; (d) she is not a signatory to any client or office account and does not have the power to authorise electronic payments or transfers from any client or office account; (e) Mrs Benyu shall immediately inform any actual or prospective employer of these conditions and the reasons for their imposition. (2) She was subsequently struck off the roll of solicitors by an order of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal dated 3/10/14. 2014‑10‑27 15:47:00 2014 cases, Brief summary, No transcript, SRA decisions


An NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X [2014] EWCOP 35, [2014] MHLO 96An NHS Foundation Trust sought declarations that: (a) it is not in Ms X's best interests to be subject to further compulsory detention and treatment of her anorexia nervosa, whether under the Mental Health Act 1983 or otherwise, notwithstanding that such treatment may prolong her life; (b) it is in her best interests, and shall be lawful, for her treating clinicians not to provide Ms X with nutrition and hydration with which she does not comply. The judge decided that X should not be compelled to have treatment for her anorexia, and made the declarations, but expressed the hope that she would realise the benefit of treatment. 2014‑10‑09 10:03:45 2014 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


MAP v RAP [2013] EWHC 4784 (Fam), [2013] MHLO 151A 'consent order' was challenged under the Family Procedure Rules. (1) Under the FPR, where the ground of attack against an order is that there was no true consent, either because it had been withdrawn (which was said to be the case here) or because one of the parties purportedly giving consent was incapacitated, instead of an appeal (which had been made here) an application for revocation should be made to the court which made the order. (2) A consent order made by a party who is in fact incapacitated (even if this is unknown to everybody including the court) is not valid and should be set aside. (3) The principal claims (that the appellant withdrew consent, and that she lacked capacity) were arguable but should properly be tried at first instance. 2014‑08‑24 20:24:59 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Re MM [2013] MHLO 150 (UT)(1) The tribunal did not misdirect itself by applying the s2 criteria to a s3 case. (2) However, the tribunal's reasoning was inadequate. The tribunal stated that all the evidence was to the effect that MM's mental disorder 'warrants his treatment in hospital' (this is language from the s2 criteria), but it was only (part of) the medical evidence in which there was any confusion as to the criteria. The findings of fact (that the condition was chronic and relapsing etc) did not show that the mental disorder warranted detention (or made it appropriate). The only finding that could support the tribunal's decision was the medical evidence, which was affected by reference to the wrong legal test. In those circumstances the tribunal should have (a) shown that they had applied the correct criteria and not made the same mistake as the doctor, and (b) shown by precise findings of fact that the s3 criteria were satisfied. A blanket reference to a possibly-contaminated report did not suffice, and the tribunal made things worse by expressing its legal conclusions in the same confused terms as the medical report. 2014‑08‑17 19:00:23 2013 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


McCann v State Hospitals Board for Scotland [2014] CSIH 71, [2014] MHLO 93The smoking ban at Carstairs Hospital, which at first instance had been declared to be unlawful, was decided on appeal to be lawful. 2014‑08‑15 22:14:46 2014 cases, Brief summary, Scottish cases, Transcript


Re X (anonymity) [2014] EWCA Civ 1009, [2014] MHLO 90The press has reported this case as follows: a restricted transferred prisoner patient in medium security judicially reviewed the Secretary of State's refusal to grant permission for unescorted community leave; Cranston J refused to make an anonymity order, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeal (Lord Dyson MR; Maurice Kay LJ, VP; Floyd LJ). It is understood that an appeal will be made to the Supreme Court. 2014‑08‑11 20:01:46 2014 cases, Brief summary, No transcript, Re X (anonymity) (2014) EWCA Civ 1009, (2014) MHLO 90


Re X (amputation) [2014] MHLO 89 (CA)The Court of Protection had decided that X lacked capacity to consent to a below-knee amputation to treat her foot infection, and that this treatment was in her best interests. The Court of Appeal refused her son permission to appeal. (1) The judge's decision on capacity was correct. (2) The judge was also correct on best interests: there was no need for further tests to determine best interests; the medical experts had no difficulty reaching their conclusions and there was no disagreement; the alternatives were unsuitable (for example, antibiotics would cease to be effective); the son was worried about death in theatre, but in fact surgery gave X the best chance of survival; her condition was deteriorating and the infection would spread without amputation. (Summary based on Lawtel report of ex tempore judgment - transcript not available at time of writing.) 2014‑08‑11 19:55:46 2014 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, No transcript


Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust v CD [2014] EWCOP 23, [2014] MHLO 83(1) Capacity and best interests in relation to life-sustaining treatment. (2) Guidance regarding out-of-hours applications involving medical treatment. 2014‑08‑05 22:47:04 2014 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


AG's ref (no 34 of 2014) sub nom R v Jenkin [2014] EWCA Crim 1394, [2014] MHLO 56Criminal sentencing case with mental health background (a s45 hybrid order had been given in conjunction with life sentences). The Court of Appeal clarified that if a sentencing court "chooses to work with the currency of minimum terms, as it generally will do in homicide cases involving mandatory or discretionary life sentences, it does not need to have regard to the early release provisions". In this case, the judge should not have halved the 12-year minimum term to 6 years. A minimum term of 13 years 4 months was substituted. 2014‑07‑28 19:32:29 2014 cases, Brief summary, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


R (M) v Kingston Crown Court [2014] EWHC 2702 (Admin), [2014] MHLO 50M had admitted to GBH but the Crown wanted to pursue GBH with intent, and the judge made an order under s35 (remand for report) to gather evidence about intent. (1) The purpose of an order under s35 was to inform the court of a defendant’s fitness to plead and his diagnosis, not to advance one party’s claim. (2) The judge’s misinterpretation of s35 was a jurisdictional error so the High Court was entitled (despite the limitation in s29(3) Senior Courts Act 1981) to quash the order made under it. 2014‑07‑22 22:34:02 2014 cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Other criminal law cases, Transcript


R (L) v West London MH NHS Trust [2014] EWCA Civ 47, [2014] MHLO 49(1) There was no challenge to the first instance judge's finding that the common law duty of procedural fairness applies to decisions to transfer from medium to high security. (2) However, the judge had gone beyond what fairness requires, by requiring an overly-adversarial procedure. (3) Relief should not have been given on the facts of L's case, including because he had been able to put across his side of a disputed incident and had ceased objecting to transfer. (4) The ability of the decision-making process to achieve fairness has an undesirable element of fortuity. The decision-making process should therefore be "amended so that, absent urgency, a clinical reason precluding such notification, or some other reason such as the exposure of other patients or staff to the risk of harm, the 'gists' of the letter of reference to the high security hospital by the hospital that wishes to transfer the patient and the assessment by the clinician from the high security hospital are provided to the patient and/or his representative, and that the patient be afforded an opportunity to make written submissions to the panel." 2014‑07‑22 20:57:13 2014 cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


MH v MHRT for NI [2014] NIQB 87, [2014] MHLO 48The patient challenged the MHRT's decision on the grounds that "(i) the approach of the MHRT was unlawful and that the MHRT had not adopted the narrow focused based approach required under Article 77(1) and Article 2(4) of the Order and, (ii) the MHRT had misunderstood the meaning of "discharge" and had failed to take into account the applicant's stated intention which was to remain in hospital as a voluntary patient if discharged from detention". These challenges were rejected. The tribunal's decision was the only reasonable one on the evidence. 2014‑07‑22 20:07:53 2014 cases, Brief summary, Northern Irish cases, Transcript


Re Jared Britton [2013] MHLO 146 (FTT)Extract from decision: "In a decision given on 26 September 2011, the application by Mr Jared Britton that his application dated 4th September 2009 should be held in public was granted. The fact of this decision should be published. The reasons for the decision must not to be made public. An open hearing is now listed at Liverpool Crown Court on Wednesday 3rd April 2013 for an all day hearing starting at 10.30am." 2014‑07‑17 22:11:11 2013 cases, Brief summary, First-tier Tribunal decisions, Publicity, Transcript


Bostridge v Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust [2014] MHLO 42 (CC)A tribunal’s deferred discharge from s3 took place just before a CTO was purportedly imposed. Recall from that (non-existent) CTO, and subsequent detention, had been unlawful; however, because no loss had been shown, following Lumba (a Supreme Court decision on immigration detention), only nominal damages were awarded in this county court case. (The Court of Appeal gave permission to appeal.) 2014‑06‑17 21:48:34 2014 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Unlawful detention cases


TW v Enfield Borough Council [2014] EWCA Civ 362, [2014] MHLO 26The duty to consult under s11(4), the R (E) v Bristol case, and the Code of Practice, were all considered in light of Article 5 and Article 8. Overturning the High Court's decision, the Court of Appeal stated: "In summary, it seems to me that, as a matter of construction of section 11(4), when an [AMHP] is considering whether it is 'reasonably practicable' to consult the 'nearest relative' before making an application to admit a mental patient pursuant to section 3(1) and 13(1) of the MHA 1983 (in its form as at 29 June 2007), the section imposes on the [AMHP] an obligation to strike a balance between the patient's Article 5 right not to be detained unless that is done by a procedure that is in accordance with the law and the patient's Article 8(1) right to her private life." 2014‑05‑10 14:13:56 2014 cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Nearest relative, Transcript


RB v Brighton and Hove CC [2014] EWCA Civ 561, [2014] MHLO 25This is the executive summary and conclusion from the Court of Appeal decision: "In June 2007 RB sustained a serious brain injury in an accident. He was treated for eight months in hospital and then transferred to a care home, S House. In 2011 RB ceased participating in rehabilitation programmes and proposed to leave S House. The staff at S House considered that RB was not capable of independent living. Because of his physical and mental disabilities he was likely to (a) resume his former chaotic lifestyle and (b) to suffer serious or fatal injuries in consequence. The Council granted a standard authorisation pursuant to schedule A1 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 ('MCA'), which enabled staff to detain RB at S House. RB brought proceedings in the Court of Protection to terminate the standard authorisation. The Court of Protection dismissed the application and RB appealed to the Court of Appeal. He contends that two preconditions for deprivation of liberty are not satisfied, namely the mental capacity requirement (set out in paragraph 15 of schedule A1) and the best interests requirement (set out in paragraph 16 of schedule A1). In my view RB's appeal should be dismissed. Because of his brain injury RB is unable to use and weigh relevant information. He does not appreciate the dangers of resuming his former chaotic lifestyle in his present condition. Therefore the mental capacity requirement is satisfied. If RB is discharged into the community, he is likely to revert to alcoholism and a chaotic lifestyle. Given his current disabilities, this is likely to lead to serious injury. Therefore confinement in S House, at least for the time being, is in RB's best interests. I reject the submission that IM v LM [2014] EWCA Civ 37 somehow governs the outcome in this case. The court must apply the provisions of the MCA, not judicial glosses on the statute." [Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused, and permission to appeal to Strasbourg is being sought.] 2014‑05‑10 13:59:17 2014 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript


Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust v RC [2014] EWHC 1317 (COP), [2014] MHLO 22A detained patient (RC) was self-harming by cutting and had made an advance decision refusing blood transfusions. (1) RC had capacity to refuse blood transfusions and sometimes had capacity to lacerate himself. (2) The advance decision was valid and applicable. (3) The self-harming was a symptom or manifestation of mental disorder so a blood transfusion would be treatment under s63 MHA 1983. (4) Where the consequences of a decision not to impose s63 treatment may be life-threatening the Trust should apply to the High Court for declaratory relief and (just as with a decision to impose treatment) the hearing will involve a 'full merits review'. (5) It would be lawful to withhold blood transfusions despite the s63 power (indeed, the judge stated that given RC's current capacity and advance decision it would be 'an abuse of power ... even to think about imposing a blood transfusion' and that it 'would be a denial of a most basic freedom'). 2014‑05‑02 00:58:58 2014 cases, Advance decision cases, Brief summary, Transcript


Re Davies [2012] MHLO 184 (LPA)The donor appointed four attorneys, A, B, C and D, to act jointly and severally, and imposed the following restriction: "The appointment of C and D shall not take effect unless I am mentally and/or physically incapable of managing my affairs and the appointment of C shall not take effect unless she has been in my employment within the period of one month preceding my loss of capacity to manage my affairs." This restriction was severed on the ground that the appointments of co-attorneys cannot be activated at different times. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2014‑04‑29 20:59:05 2012 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of restrictions incompatible with a joint and several appointment, No transcript


Re Buckley [2013] MHLO 144 (LPA)The donor made an LPA for property and financial affairs and included the following provision: "Assets should be used firstly to ensure the well being and comfort of [my wife] and secondly to meet any urgent need of the families of the Attorneys and thereafter managed until distributed in accordance with the terms of my will." On the application of the Public Guardian the provision was severed. Although the attorneys would have power to maintain the donor's wife (see Re Bloom above), this should not be the priority of the LPA because section 1(5) of the MCA provides that "An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests." The attorneys had no authority to meet the needs of their families, as the donor was not under any legal obligation to maintain them. Any maintenance of the families would be a gift which would potentially fall outside section 12 of the MCA 2005. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2014‑04‑29 20:56:34 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of invalid restrictions relating to gifts, No transcript


Re Rider [2013] MHLO 143 (LPA)The donor made an LPA for property and financial affairs which included the following provision: "No political donations to be made other than to the conservative party." On the application of the Public Guardian the provision was severed on the ground that it contravened section 12 of the MCA 2005. While section 12(2)(b) permits the making of gifts to charities (subject to certain conditions), donations to the conservative party, or any other political party, would not fall within that provision. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2014‑04‑29 20:53:33 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of invalid restrictions relating to gifts, No transcript


Re Barac [2013] MHLO 142 (LPA)The donor made an LPA for property and financial affairs which included the following provision: "After having taken full regard for my financial welfare and security I want my attorneys to take sensible steps to protect my estate from the effects of taxation [e.g. Inheritance Tax] and be able to create Trusts where beneficial." On the application of the Public Guardian the provision was severed on the ground that it contravened section 12 of the MCA 2005. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2014‑04‑29 20:49:55 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of invalid restrictions relating to gifts, No transcript


Re Bishop [2013] MHLO 141 (LPA)The donor appointed attorneys to act jointly and severally and included the following provision: "I direct that my attorneys shall endeavour to act jointly on decisions wherever possible. They must only act severally when all practicable steps to act jointly have been made without success. If an attorney must act severally then that attorney must consult the other before making the decision and keep the other informed of any decision made." On the application of the Public Guardian the provision was severed as being incompatible with a joint and several appointment. Although in the guidance section, it was expressed in mandatory terms and was in substance a restriction. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2014‑04‑29 20:47:13 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of restrictions incompatible with a joint and several appointment, No transcript


Julia Lomas v AK (gift application) [2014] EWHC B11 (COP), [2014] MHLO 21AK's financial deputy sought the court's approval of a £150,000 gift to AK's parents to allow them to build a suitably-adapted house for when AK stayed in Pakistan each year; she sought a gift as it would be unrealistic in Pakistan to obtain receipts for all expenditure and expensive to translate those received. The Official Solicitor supported the proposed gift only if it proved impossible for AK instead to purchase an interest in the land or part of it. The judge decided that it would be in AK's best interests for a 10-year interest-free £150,000 loan to be made to his parents, and authorised the deputy to make annual gifts of £15,000, from any surplus, to AK's parents to assist them in repaying this loan. This arrangement was preferable to a gift because AK would retain the capital as part of his estate, and it was more likely to ensure that his parents actually carried out the building work; coincidentally, it should avoid inheritance tax. 2014‑04‑27 21:24:13 2014 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust v RC [2014] EWHC 1136 (COP), [2014] MHLO 20A detained patient with a severe personality disorder was self-harming by cutting and had to be mechanically restrained to prevent this. (1) He had made an advance decision, apparently with capacity to do so, refusing blood transfusions because of his religious beliefs: the court ruled that this was valid and applicable, but only on an interim basis since the document did not state that it was signed by the maker and the witness in each other's presence. (2) The Responsible Clinician accepted that a blood transfusion would be medical treatment for mental disorder under s63 MHA 1983, and therefore the advance decision could be overridden; however, because the patient's wishes were religious, she did not want to impose treatment: the Trust therefore sought the protection of a court declaration that her decision was lawful. (3) The court was unwilling to make the declaration, without hearing both sides of the argument, because of the importance of the issues (including the right to life under Article 2, freedom of religion under Article 9, and respect for private life, which includes bodily integrity, under Article 8). (4) The Official Solicitor was invited to attend a hearing the following day, the Trust was asked to facilitate the patient being directly represented and to encourage the father to attend, and the judge concluded that if there is an argument for the use of s63 it was very important for the court to hear it. 2014‑04‑27 21:20:43 2014 cases, Advance decision cases, Brief summary, Transcript


Wandsworth CCG v IA [2014] EWHC 990 (COP), [2014] MHLO 19This case illustrates the difficulties in assessing capacity where: (a) the cognitive difficulties of the subject are multi-factorial; (b) there is evidence that the subject displayed strong and challenging pre-morbid personality traits; and (c) there is no doubt that he plainly has capacity in relation to decision-making in some domains of his life. Having heard oral evidence for the jointly-instructed expert neuro-psychiatrist, the court decided that IA had capacity in relation to (a) ongoing medical treatment; (b) future residence and care; and (c) management of his property and affairs. 2014‑04‑27 21:09:07 2014 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


R (Cornwall Council) v SSH [2014] EWCA Civ 12, [2014] MHLO 17(1) In deciding the ordinary residence of an adult lacking capacity the Secretary of State had erred in applying 'test 1' from the Vale case (that a person who is so severely handicapped as to be totally dependent upon a parent or guardian in the same position as a small child and his ordinary residence is that of his parents or guardian because that is his base). (2) Instead, the words 'ordinary residence' should, unless the context indicates otherwise, be given their ordinary and natural meaning. (3) There is much to be said for the court adopting in the context of severely incapacitated adults a test of ordinary residence similar to the test of habitual residence adopted for dependent children in Re A (namely where he is integrated into a social and family environment). (3) On the facts, the person was ordinarily resident in South Gloucestershire (where he lived) rather than Cornwall (where his parents lived). 2014‑03‑24 20:38:20 2014 cases, Brief summary, Community care, ICLR summary, Transcript


Lucia Benyu of Peters Legal Limited (SRA decision: prosecution) [2014] MHLO 15 (SRA) — On 28/1/14 the SRA published their 30/5/13 decision to prosecute, before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, Lucia Benyu (who until 18/4/2013 was the director of Peters Legal Limited, one of the largest mental health law firms). The Tribunal certified that there is a case to answer in respect of allegations which are or include that she: (1) failed to maintain properly written up and accurate accounting records; (2) authorised or permitted improper withdrawals of client money from client account; (3) failed promptly or at all to remedy the breaches; (4) failed to manage the financial affairs of the firm either effectively or properly; (5) submitted misleading correspondence and/or documents to third parties; (6) created correspondence and/or documents; (7) continued to act on behalf of clients when there existed a conflict between her own interests and those of her clients; and (8) failed to provide to a client adequate information regarding costs. 2014‑03‑16 14:05:28 2014 cases, Brief summary, No transcript, SRA decisions


Republic of South Africa v Dewani [2014] EWHC 153 (Admin), [2014] MHLO 3If the RSA government were to give a suitable undertaking, it would not be oppressive or unjust to return Dewani to the RSA for trial. The undertaking would need to be to the following effect: "In the event of the appellant being found unfit to be tried, he will be free to return to the UK, unless there is found to be a realistic prospect of his being tried within a year (or other stated reasonable period) of that finding and the trial takes place within the period. In any event the appellant must be free to return in the event a Court in South Africa, having found him unfit to be tried, embarked on the process of determining under the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 whether he did the act." 2014‑02‑05 14:10:41 2014 cases, Brief summary, Repatriation cases, Transcript


R v Yusuf (Nadia Ali) [2013] EWCA Crim 2077, [2013] MHLO 137The appellant sought a restricted hospital order in place of an IPP sentence, but was unsuccessful as her medical evidence addressed the current situation rather than the situation at the time of sentencing. 2013‑12‑30 22:38:44 2013 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


R (McKay) v SSJ [2013] EWHC 3728 (Admin), [2013] MHLO 136Permission to apply for judicial review of the decision to refer the claimant prisoner to a prison Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) unit for assessment was refused because it was 'a classic example of a situation in which two experts disagree' and it was not for the court to interfere and substitute its own view. 2013‑12‑30 22:23:14 2013 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


R v Kenyon (Lindsay) [2013] EWCA Crim 2123, [2013] MHLO 135Unsuccessful appeal against eight-month sentence for eight offences of neglect of a person who lacks capacity contrary to MCA 2005 s44. 2013‑12‑30 22:14:53 2013 cases, Brief summary, Criminal law capacity cases, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


R v Anderson (Darren Gabriel) [2013] EWCA Crim 2212, [2013] MHLO 134Appellant sought restricted hospital order, in place of IPP and s45A hybrid order, but was unsuccessful. 2013‑12‑30 21:55:03 2013 cases, Brief summary, Hybrid order cases, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


Re L (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1557, [2013] MHLO 133Mother unsuccessfully sought permission to appeal against Court of Protection order (a) that her son lacked capacity in relation to welfare matters, and (b) that it was in his best interests to remain at his current placement for at least a year and finish at the existing school (as opposed to living with the mother and attending a school near her, or moving to a residential home near the mother and have some education in her area). 2013‑12‑30 16:29:47 2013 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


R (MM) v SSWP [2013] EWCA Civ 1565, [2013] MHLO 132(1) The Court of Appeal upheld the Upper Tribunal's decision that the process for assessing eligibility for Employment Support Allowance (involving the claimant completing a questionnaire and attending a face to face interview) placed mental health patients at a 'substantial disadvantage' (under the Equality Act 2010) when compared with other claimants. (2) In relation to the proposal that obtaining further medical evidence in such cases would be a 'reasonable adjustment', the UT had adjourned for further evidence, directing the SSWP to investigate its reasonableness: the adjournment was lawful but the directions were quashed. 2013‑12‑30 15:15:33 2013 cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Transcript, Welfare benefits cases


R v Odiowei [2013] EWCA Crim 2253, [2013] MHLO 131The appellant sought a restricted hospital order in place of a life sentence, relying on two recent medical reports which were critical of previous reports. The matter was adjourned for six weeks to obtain responses from the previous reports' authors. 2013‑12‑30 14:46:12 2013 cases, Brief summary, Life sentence cases, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


Obrey v SSWP [2013] EWCA Civ 1584, [2013] MHLO 129(1) The Upper Tribunal had not erred in law in finding that the cessation of Housing Benefit after 52 weeks as a hospital patient (which indirectly discriminated against the mentally ill) was justified . (2) The Court of Appeal discussed the limitations on appeals against the specialist Upper Tribunal. 2013‑12‑30 14:27:45 2013 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Welfare benefits cases


RGB v Cwm Taf Health Board [2013] EWHC B23 (COP), [2013] MHLO 128 (COP)At a time when she had been assessed to have capacity, Mrs B left her husband and did not wish him to see her. On the basis of these wishes, when she was admitted to hospital with dementia Mr B was refused access. The husband unsuccessfully sought a declaration that the Health Board had acted unlawfully. 2013‑12‑30 12:04:18 2013 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


A Local Authority v C [2013] EWHC 4036 (Fam), [2013] MHLO 125C had long-standing mental health problems and her two children had previously been removed from her. (1) Under the inherent jurisdiction Parker J made an anticipatory declaration that it was lawful for C's third baby to be removed immediately upon delivery, in order to safeguards the child's interests, on the understanding that the local authority would apply for an emergency protection order or an interim care order at the first possible moment. (2) No evidence was heard from C, and a litigation friend was not appointed, in order to avoid C being informed, the judge (and local authority solicitor) thinking that that (a) Official Solicitor would become C's solicitor so the solicitor-client duty of disclosure would apply, and (b) the only exception to that duty is when the client consents. 2013‑12‑22 00:53:19 2013 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


Oluku v CQC (2012) UKFTT 275, [2012] MHLO 183A carer at Dormers Wells Lodge secretly recorded ill-treatment, which led to the conviction of two staff (Sonika Limbu, 25, of Hayes, and Pashi Sahota, 57, of Southall) under MCA 2005 s44. The manager appealed against the CQC's cancellation of her registration as a manager, but the tribunal found that she was not fit to be registered as a manager. In relation to one allegation (although technically there was no breach as at the relevant time she was not yet registered), the tribunal noted: "the necessary paperwork was not present in the form of a Deprivation of Liberty for a number of service users, and in that respect the appellant did not have suitable arrangements in place to protect service users against the risk of such control or restraint being unlawful or otherwise excessive as required under regulation 11(2) Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010/781, since proper assessment and recording was not being carried out." 2013‑12‑21 23:45:18 2012 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


R (Muhammad) v SSHD [2013] EWHC 3157 (Admin), [2013] MHLO 123Immigration case mentioning the inherent jurisdiction in relation to 'vulnerable adults'. Interim relief (immediate and unconditional release from immigration detention) refused. 2013‑12‑21 22:51:47 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Repatriation cases, Transcript


TA v AA [2013] EWCA Civ 1661, [2013] MHLO 120A Court of Protection circuit judge twice allowed the Official Solicitor to withdraw MCA 2005 s21A applications which the relevant person's representative (RPR) had made (the first time, the judge had also concluded that the qualifying requirements for DOLS were met). The RPR argued that by failing to determine the legality of AA's continued detention the judge had denied AA his Article 5(4) rights. A High Court judge refused permission to appeal (appeals against circuit judges are made to nominated higher judges: the President of the Family Division, the Vice-Chancellor, or a puisne judge of the High Court). The RPR appealed to the Court of Appeal, which held that it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against refusal of permission such as this. Obiter: a full s21A hearing is not necessarily a lengthy, time consuming or expensive hearing. 2013‑12‑20 20:49:08 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Re Whiting [2013] EWHC B27 (COP), [2013] MHLO 119Social services sought to have Leslie Whiting committed to prison for breach of a Court of Protection injunction. The alleged breaches were in August-December 2012 and the court application was made in January 2013 but, owing to procedural irregularities, the hearing did not take place until December 2013. The lack of an intellectually rigorous relationship between the lawyers and the social workers meant that three of the four allegations were inadequately drafted and based on insufficient evidence to meet the criminal standard of proof. Despite the fourth allegation being established, the judge declined to take any action because a year had passed and there had been no subsequent allegations. The injunction, however, was continued for a further 12 months. 2013‑12‑20 19:57:51 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


West London Mental Health NHS Trust v Chhabra [2013] UKSC 80, [2013] MHLO 118The facts can be found in the summary of the Court of Appeal's judgment. The Supreme Court allowed Dr Chhabra's appeal, granting an order restraining the Trust from (a) pursuing any of the confidentiality concerns contained in the Trust's letter of 12 August 2011 as matters of gross misconduct and (b) pursuing any confidentiality concerns without first re-starting and completing an investigation under its policy D4A. 2013‑12‑19 00:34:13 2013 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


G v Scottish Ministers sub nom G v MHTS [2013] UKSC 79, [2013] MHLO 117This appeal relates to the circumstances in which it may be appropriate for the Mental Health Tribunal for Scotland to make no order for arrangements to be made for transfer from the State Hospital to conditions of lesser security following a finding that the patient is being detained in conditions of excessive security. The tribunal's decision to make no order was lawful. The Supreme Court took the opportunity to clarify the nature of decision-making under section 264(2) Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, and the factors which are relevant to the proper application of that section and of other provisions of the Act. 2013‑12‑18 21:16:28 2013 cases, Brief summary, Scottish cases, Transcript


Re P (A Child) [2013] EWHC 4037 (Fam), [2013] MHLO 115 — Decision of Munby P on reporting restrictions in 'forced caesarian' case - initial brief judgment. [Summary required.] 2013‑12‑17 20:28:01 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


YLA v PM [2013] EWHC 4020 (COP), [2013] MHLO 114There was a very significant possibility that PM married YLA and had a child with her for reasons solely to do with his immigration status. Parker J made interim declarations including that YLA lacked capacity to consent to sexual relations or marriage, or to decide where she should live, and provided general guidance on such forced marriage cases. 2013‑12‑16 15:26:25 2013 cases, Brief summary, Capacity to consent to sexual relations, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


R v Fort [2013] EWCA Crim 2332, [2013] MHLO 111(1) The sentencing judge erred in concluding that the appellant would continue to pose a significant risk of serious harm to members of the public occasioned by the commission of serious offences, even if his mental disorder were to be cured or substantially alleviated, and therefore erred in imposing a sentence of custody for life as opposed to a s37/41 hospital order. (2) The judge's order under s45A was unlawful, because such an order could not be made on someone who was under 21 at the time of conviction (and was thus being considered for a sentence of custody for life, as opposed to a sentence of imprisonment, as would be the case on a person over 21 at the date of conviction). 2013‑12‑15 13:36:51 2013 cases, Brief summary, Hybrid order cases, Life sentence cases, Transcript


Cuthbertson v Rasouli (2013) SCC 53, [2013] MHLO 109Canadian Supreme Court's consideration of a patient in persistent vegetative state, where physicians wished to remove his support and to provide palliative care, but the statutory 'substitute decision maker' refused to consent. 2013‑12‑12 21:43:09 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


R v Farooqi [2013] EWCA Crim 1649, [2013] MHLO 108Unsuccessful criminal appeal based partly on the misconduct of a trial advocate, in which the Lord Chief Justice comments on the advocate's role. 2013‑12‑12 21:00:25 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other criminal law cases, Transcript


Re Devillebichot (deceased) [2013] EWHC 2867 (Ch), [2013] MHLO 107The testator had capacity to make his will and (although subject to persuasion) had not been under undue influence. 2013‑12‑12 20:30:22 2013 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Other capacity cases, Transcript


UF v A Local Authority [2013] EWHC 4289 (COP), [2013] MHLO 105Under Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 2013/480, Legal Aid for MCA 2005 s21A appeals is non-means-tested for as long as the relevant DOLS standard authorisation is in force. In this case the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Aid Agency confirmed that Legal Aid could continue if the court extends the standard authorisation for the duration of the case. 2013‑12‑09 09:58:13 2013 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Transcript


R v Edgington [2013] EWCA Crim 2185, [2013] MHLO 102The appellant had been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and attempted murder, with a minimum term of 37 years. (1) Appeal against conviction dismissed, as the judge was not wrong to prevent counsel from re-examining the defence expert on whether she would 'as a matter of practice ... ever be released' from a hospital order. (2) Appeal against sentence dismissed as it was not manifestly excessive. 2013‑12‑03 14:57:56 2013 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


Equilibrium Health Care v AK [2013] UKUT 543 (AAC), [2013] MHLO 101A tribunal medical member had referred the RC to the GMC in 2010 in relation to the RC's evidence at a tribunal. The RC argued, following the adjournment of a 2013 hearing, that this medical member should recuse himself because of bias. He was unsuccessful as there was no real possibility of bias, or actual bias, at either the 2010 hearing or the 2013 hearing. Obiter: decisions on recusal are best challenged after the proceedings are concluded. 2013‑11‑27 22:42:05 2013 cases, Bias, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


R (Z) v Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust [2013] EWCA Civ 1425, [2013] MHLO 100Unsuccessful challenge to (1) detention under s2 (a subsequent tribunal decision to discharge was consistent with a lawful initial detention) and (2) decision not to hold hospital managers' hearing (it was reasonable to wait a few days for the tribunal). 2013‑11‑19 23:10:58 2013 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


Re VT (minimally conscious state): An NHS Foundation Trust v VT [2013] EWHC B26 (Fam), [2013] MHLO 99 (COP)The Trust obtained a declaration covering a decision not to provide intensive care or resusistation in specified circumstances. 2013‑11‑19 22:56:44 2013 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


MH v UK 11577/06 [2013] ECHR 1008, [2013] MHLO 94(1) The ECtHR considered this case, which involved a patient lacking capacity to apply to the tribunal, in three separate stages: (a) The first 27 days of detention under s2. With some emergency detentions a habeas corpus application might be a sufficient remedy, but with this one it would have been wholly unreasonable to expect such an application. Additionally, it would not have been reasonable to expect her nearest relative via solicitors to request a tribunal reference from the Secretary of State. Therefore, neither the patient nor her nearest relative were able in practice to avail themselves of the normal remedy granted by the 1983 Act because the special safeguards required under Article 5(4) for incompetent mental patients in a position such as hers were lacking. There was a violation of Article 5(4). The necessary special safeguards 'may well include empowering or even requiring some other person or authority to act on the patient’s behalf' (i.e. referring the case to the tribunal). (b) The period between the extension of s2 by s29 displacement proceedings and the tribunal's decision not to discharge. The Secretary of State, in circumstances where refusal would prevent a speedy judicial decision, has no discretion but is under a duty to make a tribunal reference. In this case: (i) there was such a tribunal within a month, which was not an unreasonably long period; and (ii) the fact that there was a tribunal meant that the patient was not a victim of the alleged shortcoming in the mental health system. There was no Article 5 breach. The situation of a patient without a nearest relative willing and able, through solicitors, to seek a reference was raised by the court but not considered. (c) The period between the tribunal decision and the patient's move from hospital. During this period, the legal basis of detention was no longer s29 but was the tribunal's judicial decision not to discharge. A judicial decision does not endure eternally, so a patient detained for an indefinite or lengthy period is subsequently entitled to take proceedings at reasonable intervals, but the four-month period in this case was not sufficient to breach Article 5. (2) No claim for just satisfaction was made so no compensation was ordered. (3) Legal costs were reduced to €5250 from the €5825.06 sought. 2013‑10‑23 23:44:21 2013 cases, Brief summary, Displacement, ECHR, Transcript


DL-H v Partnerships in Care [2013] UKUT 500 (AAC), [2013] MHLO 93This is the latest in a series of cases considering personality disorder, refusal to engage in treatment, and the question of whether the 'appropriate medical treatment is available' test in s72 is met. (1) Refusal to engage is not decisive but is potentially a relevant factor that has to be taken into consideration - although a patient may well continue to satisfy the conditions for detention despite refusing to engage. (2) In this case, the tribunal did not seem to have asked itself whether the deterioration after recall might not have been a response to detention rather than a manifestation of his mental disorder: this was relevant to the questions of 'nature/degree' and of whether the available treatment was appropriate, so the decision was set aside. 2013‑10‑23 23:25:05 2013 cases, Brief summary, Reasons, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


R (Moosa) v LSC [2013] EWHC 2804 (Admin), [2013] MHLO 90In Court of Protection proceedings, the patient's mother was financially ineligible for Legal Aid (the equity in her home was about £65,000 over the £100,000 limit) so the patient's brother was added as a party purely because he would be financially eligible. The LSC refused him funding, for reasons including that the mother should fund the case. Permission to apply for judicial review of that decision was refused. 2013‑09‑17 20:54:48 2013 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


Re Ian Brady [2013] MHLO 89 (FTT)After a public hearing the tribunal issued a notice on 28/6/13 that: 'Mr Ian Stewart Brady continues to suffer from a mental disorder which is of a nature and degree which makes it appropriate for him to continue to receive medical treatment and that it is necessary for his health and safety and for the protection of other persons that he should receive such treatment in hospital and that appropriate medical treatment is available for him.' The full reasons, dated 11/12/13, were published on 24/1/14: (1) When deciding to hold a public hearing the tribunal had concluded that it was not satisfied that Ian Brady suffered from schizophrenia but, in reaching the opposite conclusion when considering the detention criteria, it did not consider itself bound by its previous finding of fact. (2) The tribunal set out at length the reasons for concluding that the detention criteria were met in this case. 2013‑09‑14 20:43:40 2013 cases, Brief summary, First-tier Tribunal decisions, No transcript, Publicity


Re Boff [2013] MHLO 88 (LPA)The donor of a Lasting Power of Attorney cannot appoint a replacement attorney to succeed another replacement attorney. 2013‑09‑13 19:55:34 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - replacement for replacement attorney, No transcript


Neary v LB Hillingdon [2013] MHLO 87 (SEC)Mark Neary's appeal against Hillingdon's decision to end Housing Benefit was unsuccessful: as he was estranged from his wife, who lived separately in a jointly-owned property, his share of the property counted towards the statutory limit for Housing Benefit purposes. 2013‑09‑08 21:21:43 2013 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


Re Goodwin [2013] MHLO 86 (LPA)The donor appointed three attorneys and two replacements. Regarding the replacements, she directed that if one ceased to act the other could act alone, and added: "She should also make every effort to find one or two replacement attorneys to take over her responsibilities in the event of her own death, or if she no longer has the mental capacity to carry on, so that there is a continuing 'Lasting Power of Attorney' in place during the donor's lifetime." On the application of the Public Guardian this provision was severed on the ground that section 10(8)(a) of the MCA invalidates any provision in an LPA giving an attorney power to appoint a substitute or successor. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2013‑09‑07 22:39:42 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - appointment of substitute by an attorney, No transcript


Re Griggs [2013] MHLO 85 (LPA)In Re Griggs the donor appointed two primary attorneys and three replacements, to act jointly for some decisions and jointly and severally for other decisions. The donor directed that "My Remaining attorney is to choose which replacement attorney is to act as my other attorney." Although the provision could be viewed as incompatible with the manner of appointment, the court severed the provision for the reason given in the Public Guardian's application, which was that the donor should not leave it to the attorneys or replacement attorneys to decide which replacement is to act. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2013‑09‑07 22:37:45 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of restrictions incompatible with a joint and several appointment, No transcript


Re K (cancer) [2013] MHLO 83 (COP)The press has reported this case as follows: (1) It was suspected that K had cancer of the womb, but she was took frightened to undergo an diagnostic examination. (2) Moylan J decided that (a) K lacked capacity to take decisions about medical treatment; (b) it was in her best interests to undergo a hysteroscopy, which is more detailed and invasive than the normal ultrasound, on the basis that her fear meant she would be under general anaesthetic anyway. 2013‑08‑30 22:36:36 2013 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


R (LV) v SSJ [2013] EWCA Civ 1086, [2013] MHLO 82The applicant had been given an IPP sentence then transferred to hospital under s47/49. On 12/12/11 the MHT decided she met the criteria for conditional discharge. The dossier reached the Parole Board on 29/3/12, and the hearing was arranged for 12/3/13. She claimed a breach of Article 5(4) during: (a) the period before the dossier was ready, when no judicial body was responsible for supervising her progress and the potentiality for release, and (b) the subsequent long period until the Parole Board met. The Court of Appeal gave permission to apply for judicial review (being simpler than giving permission to appeal the High Court's refusal of permission to apply for judicial review). 2013‑08‑30 21:58:45 2013 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


Re Baxter [2013] MHLO 75 (LPA)The donor of a Health and Welfare LPA included the following provision: "My attorneys shall have no power to act until they have reason to believe that I have become or that I am becoming mentally incapable of managing my own affairs or that I have become physically handicapped to such a degree that I cannot look after my affairs without significant inconvenience discomfort or difficulty." On the application of the Public Guardian the words "or that I am becoming" and "or that I have become" to "difficulty" were severed. Section 11(7)(a) of the MCA provides that decisions concerning the donor's health and welfare may not be made under an LPA "in circumstances other than those where [the donor] lacks, or the donee reasonably believes that [the donor] lacks, capacity." As previously held in Re Azancot (2009) COP 27/5/09, the donor may not provide for decisions to be made by the attorney when the donor lacks physical capacity but not mental capacity. The words "or that I am becoming" were also inconsistent with section 11(7)(a) because the donor must lack capacity (or be reasonably believed to lack capacity). It is not sufficient that the donor may be "becoming" mentally incapable. The wording of section 11(7)(a) may be contrasted with paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 4 of the MCA, which imposes a duty to apply for registration on an attorney under an EPA when the donor "is or is becoming" mentally incapable. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2013‑08‑12 22:04:28 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of restrictions incompatible with a Health and Welfare LPA, No transcript


Re Spaas [2013] MHLO 74 (LPA)The donor of a Health and Welfare LPA included the following provision: "If I become completely mentally or physically incapable for example being unable to recognise my daughter then I wish steps to be taken to end my life as quickly and painlessly as possible. It that was not possible, I would wish the minimum medical intervention possible. I would not want my life unnecessarily prolonged." On the application of the Public Guardian the words from "steps to be taken" to "I would wish" were severed. The donor may have been envisaging assisted suicide, which is unlawful (see Re Gardner (2011) COP 6/7/11) or even expressing a wish for her life to be terminated by others in circumstances which would involve a criminal offence. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2013‑08‑12 22:00:59 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of restrictions incompatible with a Health and Welfare LPA, No transcript


AM v West London MH NHS Trust [2013] EWCA Civ 1010, [2013] MHLO 73The tribunal twice refused to adjourn in circumstances where there was relatively little in the social circumstances report about aftercare on discharge, the author of the report did not attend the hearing, and the social worker who did attend could not provide any further relevant information. The Upper Tribunal decided that this 'did not affect the tribunal’s ability to give Mr M a fair hearing and to deal with his case fairly and justly' and that the patient 'had not yet progressed to the point where the issue of aftercare that was actually available would arise'. The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal. 2013‑08‑10 02:03:26 2013 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Powers, Transcript


R v Ahmed [2013] EWCA Crim 1393, [2013] MHLO 66Appellant unsuccessfully sought restricted hospital order in place of an IPP sentence. 2013‑08‑08 02:04:30 2013 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


TW v LB Enfield [2013] EWHC 1180 (QB), [2013] MHLO 59The applicant argued that her nearest relative ought to have been consulted (under s11) before her s3 detention: she required leave of the High Court under s139(2) to bring a claim against the local authority, and sought a declaration of incompatibility. (1) The threshold for leave under s139(2) 'has been set at a very unexacting level. … An applicant with an arguable case will be granted leave'; the requirements of s139(1) prevent any claim 'unless the act [of applying for the applicant's admission] was done in bad faith or without reasonable care ... or is otherwise unlawful, for example because of a contravention of s11(4)'. (2) Even if s139(2) did have any effect on the applicant's rights under Article 6 read together with Article 14 (which it was not necessary to decide) that effect is plainly justified (the justification being 'the protection of those responsible for the care of mental patients from being harassed by litigation'). (3) If the argument that s139(1) is incompatible with the ECHR had not been withdrawn, the judge would have similarly dismissed it. (4) On the facts, it was clear that it was 'not reasonably practicable' to have consulted the nearest relative (the patient had repeatedly sent dictated letters instructing Enfield's staff not to involve her family, and had gone so far as to refer to having obtained solicitors' advice about breaches of patient confidentiality): permission under s139 was therefore refused. [Caution: see Court of Appeal decision.] 2013‑08‑08 01:20:30 2013 cases, Brief summary, Nearest relative, Transcript


SSJ v SB [2013] UKUT 320 (AAC), [2013] MHLO 56Deferred conditional discharge recommendation for technical lifer was unlawful as conditions would amount to deprivation of liberty. 2013‑08‑01 21:29:11 2013 cases, Brief summary, Discharge conditions, MHLR summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


SRA decision: Nnadozie Okpokiri of Dozie and Co Solicitors [2013] MHLO 53 (SRA)The SRA closed down Dozie and Co on the grounds that (1) it had reason to suspect dishonesty on the part of Nnadozie Okpokiri (director) and (2) it was satisfied that he had failed to comply with the conduct and accounts rules. 2013‑07‑19 23:54:02 2013 cases, Brief summary, SRA decisions, Transcript


Re Clarke [2013] EWCA Civ 811, [2013] MHLO 52On 14/1/13 Mr Clarke had been committed to prison for 3 months by HHJ Pelling QC for breach of injunctions prohibiting him from publicising matters to do with this Court of Protection case; as a result he decided to remain in Spain and wished to appeal the committal. (1) There was no merit in his separate appeal against an earlier costs order, so permission to appeal was refused. (2) His request for the costs appeal to be adjourned and considered alongside the future appeal against committal (the delay on this being because it took until June to obtain a transcript) was rejected as this would merely complicate matters. 2013‑07‑15 19:47:06 2013 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Other capacity cases, Transcript


R (Afework) v LB Camden [2013] EWHC 1637 (Admin), [2013] MHLO 51The judge held that as a matter of law s117(2) is only engaged vis-à-vis accommodation if: '(i) The need for accommodation is a direct result of the reason that the ex-patient was detained in the first place ("the original condition"); (ii) The requirement is for enhanced specialised accommodation to meet needs directly arising from the original condition; and (iii) The ex-patient is being placed in the accommodation on an involuntary (in the sense of being incapacitated) basis arising as a result of the original condition.' No obvious reason is given for the third requirement, which is probably wrongly decided (or, as the COP Newsletter puts it, 'will fall to be considered again in due course'). 2013‑07‑04 21:53:24 2013 cases, After-care, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Transcript


Re SB (A Patient: Capacity To Consent To Termination) [2013] EWHC 1417 (COP), [2013] MHLO 48SB's desire for an abortion coincided with her stopping her medication for bipolar affective disorder, which led to the Trust seeking decisions on capacity and best interests. (1) Even if aspects of her decision-making were influenced by paranoid thoughts in relation to lack of support from her husband and her mother, SB also had a range of rational reasons, and had capacity to make the decision. (2) Interesting aspects to the case include: (a) the judge disagreed with the two psychiatrists who believed SB lacked capacity; (b) he appeared to consider the question of being 'unable' to make a decision separately in relation to its ordinary meaning (whether SB had in fact made a decision, para 38) and its legal meaning by reference to MCA 2005 s3(1) (whether she could understand the relevant information etc, para 39); (c) the Official Solicitor asked for his appointment as litigation friend to be ended, and this request was granted (para 30); (d) the judge granted this request having accepted psychiatric evidence that this was a case 'where P ceases to be a person who lacks capacity to conduct proceedings himself but continues to lack capacity in relation to the matter or matters to which the application relates' (para 28, rule 147); (e) in relation to the threshold for capacity, the judge held that SB's decision to have an abortion 'is of course a profound and grave decision, but it does not necessarily involve complex issues' (para 44). 2013‑06‑03 21:57:06 2013 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


EC v Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Trust [2013] EWCA Civ 701, [2013] MHLO 47The appellant restricted patients had sought extra-statutory recommendations, in relation to leave and transfer, but the First-tier Tribunal had refused, without hearing evidence, to make recommendations. (1) The parliamentary answer in relation to extra-statutory recommendations given by a Home Office minister on 28/10/87, and the fact that recommendations had been made and considered in the past, did not give rise to a legitimate expectation that the tribunal would entertain submissions that a recommendation should be made. (2) If the FTT had been faced with the contention that leave or transfer were necessary or available parts of the patient's treatment (in relation to the test in s72(1)(b)(iia)) it would have had to consider it, but in these cases it had not been. [Summary based on Lawtel and All ER (D) reports.] 2013‑05‑12 23:24:53 2013 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, No transcript, Powers


Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26, [2013] MHLO 46As receiver under the MHA 1983 (old equivalent to deputy under the MCA 2005) for her husband, Mrs Pitt set up a settlement trust which overlooked the impact of inheritance tax; Futter's case did not involve the mental capacity. (1) The court considered the Hastings-Bass rule, and dismissed Mrs Pitt's appeal on this point (she had not breached her fiduciary duty so the settlement would not be set aside on this basis). (2) The court considered the test for setting aside a voluntary disposition on the ground of mistake, and allowed Mrs Pitt's appeal on this point. 2013‑05‑11 15:47:42 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


PS v LP [2013] EWHC 1106 (COP), [2013] MHLO 43(1) It was in LP's best interests not to see her estranged family: before losing capacity due to a cerebral aneurism, she had taken the decision that her future was with her new partner and that she wished to break with the past. (2) Contact should only commence in future if LP becomes capable of expressing a view to that effect, and the family should be kept informed in relation to this approximately every six months. 2013‑05‑05 23:03:20 2013 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


R v Dixon [2013] EWCA Crim 465, [2013] MHLO 42(1) Despite the appellant's intellect and condition the judge was entitled to permit the jury to draw an adverse inference from his failure to give evidence. (2) The appellant argued that fresh medical evidence showed the judge's decision was wrong, but this evidence was not admitted. (3) The appellant had been able meaningfully to participate in his trial, which was fair, and the conviction was safe. (4) The minimum term of the appellant's detention at Her Majesty's pleasure was reduced from 14 to 13 years. 2013‑05‑05 21:58:49 2013 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Other criminal law cases, Transcript


R (T) v LSC [2013] EWHC 960 (Admin), [2013] MHLO 41The LSC's decision in care proceedings to agree prior authority for a multi-disciplinary assessment at a lower amount than that sought was unlawful because of the lack of reasons given, and was quashed. 2013‑05‑05 21:11:44 2013 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


R v Foye [2013] EWCA Crim 475, [2013] MHLO 40The rule in s2(2) Homicide Act 1957 that the burden of establishing diminished responsibility lies on the defendant, on the balance of probabilities, is not incompatible with the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6(2). 2013‑05‑05 13:48:05 2013 cases, Brief summary, Diminished responsibility cases, Transcript


Stoke City Council v Maddocks [2013] EWHC 1137 (COP), [2013] MHLO 38(1) As a result of his Alzheimer's Disease and vascular dementia, JM lacked capacity to litigate, or make decisions as to his residence, care plan, contact with his family, or dealing with his property and financial affairs. (2) It was in JM's best interests to remain at the AH care home; it was not in his best interests to be cared for by his daughter WM, either in the UK or Turkey, in particular because of her psychological profile and failure to provide a detailed proposed care plan. (3) In light of a recent development (JM had been taken out of the care home in breach of an injunction), contact by family members could be suspended, and resinstated at the discretion of the local authority. (4) A local authority deputy was appointed to sell the home and administer the finances, because if WM were deputy she would refuse to meet the local authority's fees. (5) JM's passport could not be returned to the family and would remain with the Official Solicitor until further review. (6) Any attempt to publicise the case would be a cruelty to JM. (7) The case would be reviewed on the first available date after 3 months, or earlier if a committal application is made by the local authority. 2013‑05‑04 14:07:58 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


R v AJR [2013] EWCA Crim 591, [2013] MHLO 37The appellant had been found not guilty by reason of insanity and sentenced to a supervision order for 2 years under s5 CPIA 1964 and made the subject of a restraining order under s5A Protection from Harassment Act 1997 for 5 years. He appealed against the restraining order. (1) An finding of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' is an acquittal for the purposes of the 1997 Act so a restraining order may be lawfully imposed. (2) On the facts, there was no evidence that the defendant was likely to 'pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment', so the restraining order was quashed. (3) In any event, the restraining order had been drafted very widely and for a long duration, and concerns as to the children's welfare would more properly be addressed by agreement between mother and local authority, or by the family courts under the Children Act 1989. 2013‑05‑04 12:42:08 2013 cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


Baker Tilley (A Firm) v Makar [2013] EWHC 759 (QB), [2013] MHLO 33During a detailed assessment costs hearing M became tearful and distressed and lay on the floor screaming. M refused to grant access to her medical files and at a further hearing, in the absence of medical evidence, the master decided that M was a protected person for the purposes of CPR Part 21, and stayed procedings pending the appointment of a litigation friend. Held: The master put more weight on the incident than necessary, and should have taken account of M's ability to take part in other litigation. In the absence of medical evidence the court should be cautious before concluding that a litigant is suffering from a disturbance of the mind. 2013‑04‑05 21:27:47 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


MD v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2013] UKUT 127 (AAC), [2013] MHLO 32The tribunal decision stated that 'there are cases (and this is one of them) where it is impossible to escape the impact of risk in relation to all aspects of the statutory criteria' and that 'both the high likelihood of harm occurring, and the grave consequences of such harm if it occurred, especially when considered together, can pervade across all aspects of the case'. The patient argued that, while risk is relevant to the 'nature/degree' and 'necessity' tests, it is irrelevant to the 'appropriate treatment' test. (1) The tribunal's findings (including that that the patient's disorder was potentially responsive to treatment and that he had sometimes engaged) were sufficient to satisfy the 'appropriate treatment' test, whether or not risk was relevant. (2) (Obiter) Risk is not necessarily relevant to the issue whether appropriate treatment is available for a patient, but it can be: the treatment that is appropriate for a particular patient is determined by the patient’s medical condition and the risk a patient presents is a consequence or feature of that condition; risk is as relevant to treatment as any other feature of the disorder. 2013‑04‑05 20:44:36 2013 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


DD v Durham County Council [2013] EWCA Civ 96, [2013] MHLO 31DD wished to bring proceedings against local authorities arguing that (a) the two assessing AMHPs owed a duty to him (a legal responsibility not only for assessing whether the patient should be detained, but also for the suitability of the hospital at which the patient was to be detained and the regime under which he would be held); (b) that by making the application for admission, each was in breach of duty; and (c) that the county council was responsible vicariously for that breach of duty. (1) The Court of Appeal (reversing the High Court decision in this respect) decided that the argument was sufficient for leave under s139 to bring proceedings to be granted. (2) DD should not have been made responsible for the costs of Middlesbrough City Council. 2013‑03‑28 21:14:23 2013 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


R v Ahmed [2012] EWCA Crim 99, [2012] MHLO 178(1) The appellant sought a s37/41 restricted hospital order in place of an IPP sentence. (2) The Responsible Clinician argued for a s45A hybrid order, for reasons summarised by the court as follows: 'The appellant is an illegal immigrant. In order to be discharged from hospital he would have to undergo a period of controlled supervision. This would be in appropriate accommodation. Dr Swinton tells us that this is not an option open to an illegal immigrant like the appellant. Thus he cannot be discharged into the community because he cannot undertake the necessary conditioning which would satisfy the hospital that he was safe to be left in the community on his own. As a consequence he has to remain in hospital and he will take up a bed, apparently permanently. This is damaging to the wider public interest. If a section 45A order were made, then although the appellant would receive precisely the same treatment under a section 47 transfer as he currently does, a discharge can be effected by sending the appellant back to prison where the relevant supervision can be provided.' (3) The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and, considering the appellant to be an ill man needing treatment rather than a criminal needing punishment, imposed a restricted hospital order. 2013‑03‑28 12:46:19 2012 cases, Brief summary, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


MA v SSH [2012] UKUT 474 (AAC), [2012] MHLO 171The inability of a nearest relative of a patient detained under s2 (in contrast to s3) to apply to the tribunal following the RC's barring of his order for the patient's discharge did not breach Article 5, 6, 8 or 12. 2013‑03‑27 23:19:58 2012 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


Bernard v SW London and St George's MH NHS Trust [2013] UKUT 58 (AAC), [2013] MHLO 26The medical member, questioning the RC, had stated 'I have no issues with the nature; it is chronic, relapsing, etcetera' but he had not formed a preconceived and concluded view (actual bias) or expressed himself in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension that he had (apparent bias). 2013‑03‑27 23:01:32 2013 cases, Brief summary, MHLR summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


MM v Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust [2013] UKUT 107 (AAC), [2013] MHLO 25The patient had been visited by an independent doctor but did not rely on a report from him. The hospital argued that the tribunal should infer that the doctor had been instructed to prepare a tribunal report, that this report was not favourable to the patient, and that it concurred with the clinical team's opinion. The patient appealed, arguing that (in light of the hospital's argument) the panel should have recused themselves for there to be a fair hearing. (1) In relation to the hospital's argument: (a) as a matter of practical reasoning, it could never succeed (invalid inferences); (b) as a matter of law, it may not be permissible (requiring inferences to be drawn from other inferences); and (c) it failed to take into account the context: 'The First-tier Tribunal always has medical evidence from the clinical team. The medical member of the panel will have interviewed the patient. And the patient may have produced medical evidence in support of the application. I cannot imagine any realistic circumstances in which a tribunal, having such evidence, could properly rely on the failure by a patient to produce a report as a basis for drawing inferences that would affect the outcome. The tribunal’s duty, and the only proper course, would be to decide on the evidence available rather than speculate on possible explanations of why the report was not produced.' (2) The arguments for recusal were rejected so the appeal was dismissed. 2013‑03‑27 22:56:07 2013 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


MS v North East London Foundation Trust [2013] UKUT 92 (AAC), [2013] MHLO 24In this case it was argued that the tribunal had addressed the s3 criteria for a patient who was detained under s2. (1) The Upper Tribunal decided that the First-tier Tribunal had not misdirected itself in this way. (2) However, the judge considered the criteria: he set out why he considered them different (primarily the different purpose of each section) but did not define how they were different. He concluded: 'This is not to say that the conditions for detention under section 2 are not demanding. Just that they are less demanding than for section 3. It would not be appropriate for me to try to define the differences between those sections. The language used is everyday language that merely has to be applied. But it has to be applied in a context that requires detention to be strictly justified.' (3) The tribunal decision was set aside because, faced with a medical report which had wrong language and a confused focus, the tribunal had failed to analyse the evidence to ensure that the doctor’s opinions could properly be related to the relevant criteria. (4) The tribunal had been asked to make a recommendation so its failure to explain its refusal was an error of law, albeit not of a kind to justify setting aside a decision (rather, a tribunal could amend its decision by adding the explanation). 2013‑03‑27 22:49:25 2013 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


Re Martin [2013] MHLO 21 (LPA)The donor appointed two primary attorneys, A and B, to act jointly and severally, and three replacement attorneys, C, D and E. He included a valid provision to the effect that the D should replace B if B was unable to act, and then directed as follows: "In the event of my first attorney being unable to continue, E should act as Assistant to C (1st Replacement Attorney), and in the event of C being unable to continue, he should assume the power of Attorney." On the application of the Public Guardian this provision was severed because (applying Re Baldwin, above) the MCA does not permit a replacement attorney to be replaced, nor is it possible to direct an attorney or replacement attorney to act as assistant to another attorney or replacement attorney. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2013‑03‑26 23:48:47 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - replacement for replacement attorney, No transcript


Re Black [2013] MHLO 20 (LPA)The donor, a solicitor, appointed A and B as attorneys, to act jointly and severally. She imposed the following restriction: "A has been appointed solely to manage ABC Solicitors to enable continuing management of the Practice. B has been appointed to deal with all other financial matters both personal and business related, which do not specifically require a Solicitor of the Supreme Court." On the application of the Public Guardian the restriction was severed because it was incompatible with a joint and several appointment. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2013‑03‑26 23:46:15 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of restrictions incompatible with a Property and Financial Affairs LPA, No transcript


Re Hart [2013] MHLO 19 (LPA)The donor made an LPA for property and financial affairs. He was also the sole attorney under an EPA made by his wife and registered. In his LPA he authorised his attorneys to have access to his will and medical records, and then continued as follows: "This also applies to acting as Attorneys for my wife, whose EPA has been registered." On the application of the Public Guardian this provision was severed because an LPA may not be used to add anything to someone else's EPA. (The donor appears to have wrongly assumed that his own attorneys could take over his role as attorney for his wife.) [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2013‑03‑26 23:43:24 2013 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severance of restrictions incompatible with an LPA, No transcript


R v Nightingale [2012] EWCA Crim 2734, [2012] MHLO 167The appellant, having pleaded guilty to possession of (a) a Glock 9mm pistol and (b) the following live ammunition: 122 x 9mm, 40 x 7.62mm, 50 x 9mm (frangible), 50 x .338 (armour piercing), 2 x .308, 74 x 5.56mm, had been sentenced to 18 months for the Glock and 6 months concurrently for the ammunition. On appeal against sentence, as 'these offences were committed in exceptional circumstances by an exemplary soldier', this was reduced to 12 months, suspended for 12 months. 2013‑03‑26 19:02:57 2012 cases, Brief summary, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


Pender v DPP [2013] MHLO 12 (QBD)An ASBO was imposed with a 'no begging' condition. A Crown Court appeal, based on uncontradicted medical evidence (that the appellant suffered learning difficulties, schizophrenia and severe nicotine addiction, and that begging was the manifestation of nicotine addiction), was unsuccessful. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by way of case stated, because the judge had failed to set out the factual basis for her factual conclusion (which was contrary to the medical evidence) that the appellant had been capable of complying with the ASBO. 2013‑03‑26 17:42:34 2013 cases, Brief summary, Criminal law capacity cases, No transcript


ZH v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWCA Civ 69, [2013] MHLO 9ZH, a severely autistic, epileptic 19-year-old man, became fixated with the water during a school visit to a swimming pool and would not move from the water's edge: the police were called; when an officer touched him on his back he jumped into the water, fully clothed; the police had him taken out of the pool and restrained him. The police unsuccessfully appealed against the judge's findings on liability (assault, battery and false imprisonment, DDA 1995, ECHR Articles 3, 5, and 8). [Detailed external summary available.] 2013‑03‑25 23:30:58 2013 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Re P (fair trial); Knowsley MBC v P [2013] MHLO 5 (COP)The press has reported this case as follows: (1) A patient was detained in a psychiatric hospital, then transferred to a psychiatric home; when the six-month section was due to expire, the council obtained a Court of Protection order to prolong detention, without consultation with the patient, her family or her advocate. (2) Peter Jackson J approved a consent order in which the council (a) admitted, in relation to the two months of further detention, violating the patient's Article 5 (liberty), Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 8 (family life) rights, and (b) agreed to pay £6,000 compensation. (3) The patient was allowed home following legal intervention and an occupational therapy assessment. (4) The patient was quoted as saying 'I was held prisoner, it's as simple as that. Even though it's been months since I was able to come home, I still can't sleep. I feel like I just can't trust anyone. I'm constantly worried that they're going to turn up and take me away again.' 2013‑02‑10 23:40:47 2013 cases, Brief summary, No transcript, Other capacity cases


An NHS Trust v Dr A [2013] EWHC 2442 (COP), [2013] MHLO 4Dr A was refusing food in protest at a UK Border Agency decision. (1) He was suffering from a delusional disorder which impaired the functioning of his brain by affecting his ability to use or weigh up information relevant to his decision whether or not to accept nourishment. (2) It was in his best interests for the court to make an order permitting the forcible administration of artificial nutrition and hydration. (3) (a) That treatment would involve deprivation of liberty, but Dr A was ineligible to be deprived of his liberty under the MCA because he was already detained under the MHA. (b) However, he could not be given the treatment under the MHA because it was not for a mental disorder, but a physical disorder; although the physical disorder was in part a consequence of the mental disorder, it was not obviously either a manifestation or a symptom of the mental disorder. (c) The solution to the problem was to authorise treatment under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction as being in Dr A’s best interests. 2013‑01‑30 23:19:00 2013 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


Re AW (Permanent Vegetative State); The NHS Trust v AW [2013] EWHC 78 (COP), [2013] MHLO 3AW was in a permanent vegetative state, having suffered a spontaneous, severe intra-cerebral haemorrhage in 2008. The NHS Trust responsible for AW's care sought a declaration that it would be lawful and in her best interests to withdraw active medical treatment, including specifically artificial nutrition and hydration, even though this would lead to AW's death. The application was supported by AW's family, by all the medical staff who looked after her, by the evidence of the expert witnesses provided reports, and by the Official Solicitor on behalf of AW herself. (1) The judge's findings were as follows: (a) AW is in a permanent vegetative state; (b) there will be no change or improvement in her condition; (c) there is no treatment available which could confer any benefit and that accordingly her treatment regime is futile; and (d) the suffering caused by withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration will be managed by appropriate use of pain relief in accordance with the plan that has been created for AW. (2) The following declarations were made: (a) AW lacks capacity to litigate in these proceedings or to make decisions about the medical treatment she should receive, including as to the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration and other life-sustaining treatment; (b) it is lawful and in AWs best interests for life-sustaining treatment in the form of artificial nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn; and (c) it is in AW's best interests to receive such treatment and nursing care as may be appropriate to ensure that she retains the greatest dignity until her life ends. (3) By agreement, the NHS Trust was ordered to pay half of the costs of the Official Solicitor, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. 2013‑01‑29 22:45:19 2013 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


West London MH NHS Trust v Dr Chhabra [2013] EWCA Civ 11, [2013] MHLO 2(1) Various complaints had been made against Dr Chhabra, including in relation to breaches of patient confidentiality, and the case investigator's report stated that Dr Chhabra admitted to reading CPA notes and dictating reports on public transport. (2) Upon reading the case investigator's report the case manager decided to convene a disciplinary panel to consider the following allegations and to consider them as potential gross misconduct which could lead to dismissal: (a) that Dr Chhabra breached patient confidentiality whilst reading notes and discussing patients whilst on public transport (the complaint being made by another passenger who happened to be Head of Secure Services Policy at the Department of Health); (b) that she undertook dictation on at least two occasions whilst completing Mental Health Tribunal reports whilst on public transport (the complaint being made by a member of secretarial staff); (c) that whilst travelling to work on public transport she would often call her secretary to discuss patient related matters breaching confidentiality (the complaint being made by her PA). (3) The High Court had made a declaration and injunction the effect of which were to prevent a disciplinary panel from investigating these complaints as matters of gross misconduct and under the terms of its disciplinary policy. (4) The Court of Appeal overturned that decision, stating the case manager's decision was justified on the basis of the disciplinary procedures and the evidence: patients' right to confidentiality is fundamental in the Health Service and must be respected by doctors and other staff; the case manager was entitled to regard breach of it in a public place by a consultant at Broadmoor as a potentially serious offence. 2013‑01‑27 21:32:37 2013 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


Re P (abortion) [2013] EWHC 50 (COP), [2013] MHLO 1(1) The solicitor who was one of P's deputies queried whether P had capacity in relation to whether to continue with her pregnancy or have an abortion. (2) Hedley J held that she manifestly lacked litigation capacity but did have capacity in relation to continuing the pregnancy. (3) Generally courts and health officials should not try to decide whether P would be able to bring up a child but should instead concentrate solely on whether the pregnancy itself is in her best interests (the reasoning being that once a child is born, if the mother does not have the ability to care for a child, society has perfectly adequate processes to deal with that). (4) The judge also stated that '[t]he purpose of [mental capacity legislation] is not to dress an incapacitated person in cotton wool but to allow them to make the same mistakes that all other human beings are able to make and not infrequently do'. [Summary based on press article; judgment now available.] 2013‑01‑25 11:36:58 2013 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


AC v Partnerships in Care Ltd [2012] UKUT 450 (AAC), [2012] MHLO 163AC appealed against the tribunal's rejection of his application for a notification under s74 that, if subject to a s37/41 hospital order rather than a s47/49 prison transfer direction, he would be entitled to a conditional discharge. (1) The tribunal failed to explain why it rejected Dr Kahtan's independent evidence which supported discharge: (a) although it stated that the RC had more experience of the patient, this is not of itself a reason for preferring evidence but rather is the background to almost every case, and it does not always follow that greater knowledge means greater insight; (b) the tribunal's criticisms of Dr Kahtan's evidence on the link between the index offences and AC's mental state did not necessarily undermine his views on discharge. (2) The tribunal was right not to consider the conditions which might be imposed by the Parole Board (and any consequent diminution of risk on release) and only to consider conditions possible with a conditional discharge: (a) the tribunal's statutory function is limited to considering discharge from the scope of the Act; (b) it is true that the tribunal should take into account the practical reality, as in a case where release into the community is impossible and prison is the only alternative (Abu-Rideh), but this reasoning does not apply to a case such as AC's because it is unknown whether the Parole Board will release or what conditions it might impose. 2013‑01‑23 23:41:23 2012 cases, Brief summary, Powers, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


R (Cornwall Council) v SSH [2012] EWHC 3739 (Admin), [2012] MHLO 162PH was a young man born with significant learning and physical disabilities. The Secretary of State decided that when he turned 18 he was ordinarily resident under the NAA 1948 in Cornwall, where his parents lived, despite his physical presence elsewhere. The court held that the Secretary of State had lawfully applied the test in Vale relevant to a person who is so severely handicapped as to be totally dependent upon a parent or guardian (termed 'test 1' in the guidance), which states that such a person is in the same position as a small child and his ordinary residence is that of his parents or guardian because that is his base. 2013‑01‑10 20:46:23 2012 cases, Brief summary, Community care, Transcript


R v Fletcher [2012] EWCA Crim 2777, [2012] MHLO 161IPP sentence quashed and a restricted hospital order substituted in its place: the judge had not properly been informed as to the appellant's mental state, because the original reports focussed on mental illness (which the appellant did not suffer from) rather than learning disability (which he did). 2013‑01‑07 16:47:26 2012 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


Re L; The NHS Trust v L [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP), [2012] MHLO 159The Trust sought a declaration that it was not in the best interests of L to be the subject of forcible feeding or medical treatment notwithstanding that in the absence of such nutrition and treatment she would inevitably die. The court declared (to paraphrase) that: (1) L lacked capacity to litigate and to make decisions in relation to the serious medical treatment at issue, specifically, (a) nutrition and hydration, and (b) dextrose for hypoglycaemic episodes. (2) L had capacity to make decisions as to anti-biotic treatment, analgesia and treatment of her pressure sores. (3) In L's best interests, the clinicians were permitted: (a) to provide nutrition and hydration and medical treatment where L complies; (b) to administer dextrose solution to L despite her objections where immediately necessary to save life; (c) not to provide L with nutrition and hydration with which she does not comply (all reasonable steps to gain L's co-operation having been taken); (d) to provide palliative care in the terminal stage of L's illness. 2012‑12‑23 00:30:19 2012 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


A Local Health Board v J [2012] MHLO 158 (COP)(1) The court made the following declaration and orders as sought by the Health Board: (a) J lacked capacity to make decisions regarding her medical treatment including decisions regarding the withdrawal of ANH and other life-sustaining treatment; (b) J was in a permanent vegetative state and had no prospect of recovery; (c) there were no further investigations/treatment which should be undertaken; (d) it was in J's best interests for ANH to be withheld; (e) ANH might be withdrawn lawfully by the applicant, or responsible attending medical practitioners or nursing staff; and (f) it was in her best interests to receive such treatment and nursing care as was appropriate to ensure that she retained the greatest dignity until her life came to an end. (2) In relation to the second declaration, the court considered evidence that J had said 'die' several times, and concluded that this had been (misinterpreted) 'vocalisation' (a moan or groan often repeated, and often seen in PVS) rather than 'verbalisation' (which would be consistent with a minimally-conscious state). [Summary based on All ER (D) report of ex tempore judgment.] 2012‑12‑21 01:53:08 2012 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, No transcript


R v Channer [2012] EWCA Crim 1667, [2012] MHLO 157IPP sentence with minimum term of 23 months quashed and restricted hospital order substituted in its place. 2012‑12‑21 01:00:13 2012 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


R v Searles [2012] EWCA Crim 2685, [2012] MHLO 156Custodial sentence of two years' detention in a young offender institution quashed and unrestricted hospital order substituted in its place. 2012‑12‑21 00:44:16 2012 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


R v Searles [2012] EWCA Crim 1839, [2012] MHLO 155Criminal appeal adjourned for second medical report in relation to the making of a hospital order. 2012‑12‑21 00:40:54 2012 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


RAR v GGC [2012] EWHC 2338 (QB), [2012] MHLO 154(1) In relation to limitation the court held as follows: 'I am satisfied that it would be fair and just to invoke the discretion afforded to the court by section 33 of the 1980 Act and permit this trial to proceed. I do so for the following reasons: (i) Having read the lengthy report of Dr Roychowdhury, it is clear that as a result of the abuse perpetrated upon her, the mental health of the claimant has been adversely affected. It has fluctuated over the years, at its worst, it has entailed compulsory hospitalisation. I find that the mental health of the claimant played a real part in the delay which has occurred in the bringing of the civil claim. I accept that the nature of the matters to be explored in this case are of themselves a deterrent for a person in the position of the claimant in bringing such a claim. (ii) In 1977/1978 the defendant had cause to consider allegations of sexual assault upon the claimant by reason of the criminal proceedings. That he did so, and that his memory remains to this day, is evidenced by the detailed witness statement which the defendant has filed in these proceedings. (iii) This case depends upon the evidence of two people, the claimant and the defendant. Although the claimant will find it distressing to give evidence, the detail contained in her witness statement demonstrates that she is able to remember and articulate her memories, however unpleasant. There is nothing in the witness statement of the defendant which demonstrates any difficulty on his part remembering the detail of relevant periods. The evidence of both parties remains sufficiently cogent to enable a fair trial to take place. (2) The other issues considered were: (ii) What was the nature and extent of the alleged assaults perpetrated by the defendant upon the claimant? (iii) What is the nature and extent of any resultant personal injury and loss? (iv) What is the appropriate level of damages? 2012‑12‑21 00:28:59 2012 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


R (D) v SSHD [2012] EWHC 2501 (Admin), [2012] MHLO 153Immigration case with mental health background. (1) D was entitled to damages for unlawful detention for breach of paragraph 55.10 of the Enforcement Instructions and s149 Equality Act 2010, or alternatively for breach of the Hardial Singh principles. (2) Nominal damages for the period during which, had regard been paid to the relevant matters, he would still have been detained. (3) Breaches of Article 3 and 8. 2012‑12‑21 00:15:59 2012 cases, Brief summary, Repatriation cases, Transcript


Southend-on-Sea BC v Armour [2012] EWHC 3361 (QB), [2012] MHLO 152The recorder's decision to refuse to grant a possession order (on the basis that by the time of the delayed hearing possession was no longer appropriate because there had been full compliance with the terms of the tenancy for the 12 months prior to the hearing) was upheld on appeal. 2012‑12‑20 23:49:50 2012 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


Southend-on-Sea BC v AR (2012) EW Misc 25 (CC), [2012] MHLO 151The claimant local authority sought possession of an introductory tenancy on the basis of the defendant's antisocial behaviour. (1) The procedure was followed properly so there was no defence to the claim under the Housing Act 1996. (2) The original decision to seek possession was a necessary and proportionate interference with the defendant's Article 8 rights: in particular, the diagnosis of Aspergers and depression (which led to lack of litigation capacity and appointment of a litigation friend) did not explain the defendant's conduct and was properly considered by the claimant. (3) However, there had been full compliance with the terms of the tenancy for the 12 months prior to the delayed final hearing, so possession was no longer proportionate. (4) No order for costs (despite the claimant seeking costs). 2012‑12‑20 23:42:45 2012 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


NHS Trust v K [2012] EWHC 2922 (COP), [2012] MHLO 150The Trust proposed to carry out surgery on K which could potentially cure her of cancer but which itself (given her co-morbidities including her 20-stone weight) raised a considerable risk of death. (1) K lacked capacity due to her chronic mental illness, and in particular her delusional belief that she did not have cancer, to make informed decisions about major medical treatment. (2) Orders were made that certain specified treatment would be lawful, subject to powers of veto given to specified people. 2012‑12‑20 23:33:31 2012 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


Re CP; WBC v CP [2012] EWHC 1944 (COP), [2012] MHLO 144LPM, the brother of CP (called C in the 'blue room' judgment) sought a costs order against the local authority. (1) The court should follow the general rule in welfare cases (that there be no order as to costs: rule 157) where it is appropriate, and it is only local authorities who have broken the law, or who are guilty of misconduct (that falls within rule 159) that have reason to fear a costs order (G v E). (2) The questions to be addressed are (a) is the departure from the general rule justified in all the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties, the outcome of the case and the role of the Applicant as a public body?; and (b) if so, what order should be made? (Neary). (3) The judge concluded that (a) the local authority's actions were tainted with illegality, (b) the local authority's decision making was impoverished and disorganised, (c) the local authority was responsible for the delay in referring CP's circumstances to the Court of Protection and/or the High Court in its children and inherent jurisdictions, and (d) the local authority could have arrived at the position concluded by the court many months earlier. (4) The local authority was ordered to pay LPM's costs to be assessed if not agreed. 2012‑12‑20 01:49:08 2012 cases, Brief summary, COP costs cases, Transcript


SH v Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust [2012] UKUT 290 (AAC), [2012] MHLO 143The appellant was subject to a CTO. When he attended for his depot injection, he said that he did not consent to it but nonetheless he submitted to receive it without resistance. He argued that his lack of consent meant that the 'appropriate medical treatment is available for him' test was not met, but the tribunal did not discharge. The UT held that the issue of consent is outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal: (a) the tribunal can only consider the statutory criteria (consent does not arise until the decision to treat has been made, whereas appropriateness and availability are issues that arise prior to that decision); (b) it is the courts which provide judicial oversight of treatment under the Act. 2012‑12‑20 01:24:24 2012 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


R v Jenkin [2012] EWCA Crim 2557, [2012] MHLO 141Having pleaded guilty to GBH with intent (for gouging his girlfriend's eyes out), the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a six-year minimum term, combined with a hospital direction and limitation direction under s45A MHA 1983. He appealed against sentence, arguing for a restricted hospital order or alternatively an IPP sentence. (1) A hospital order means that 'release is dependent on the responsible authority being satisfied that the defendant no longer presents any danger which arises from his medical condition': this would be inadequate as, irrespective of his delusional disorder, the appellant posed a significant risk of serious harm to the public. (2) A life sentence should be reserved for those cases where the culpability of the offender is particularly high or the offence itself particularly grave (R v Kehoe): both those limbs were met in this case. (3) The s45A hybrid order was appropriate as the criteria were met and the disorder was treatable, but when treatment is no longer necessary the risk to the public required that he be released from hospital to prison and for the Parole Board to make the release decision. 2012‑12‑20 00:00:12 2012 cases, Brief summary, Hybrid order cases, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


G v DPP [2012] EWHC 3174 (Admin), [2012] MHLO 140At the Youth Court it had been argued that the case should be stayed since it would be an abuse of the court's process to proceed to an adjudication when the appellant was unfit to plead, to participate in his trial and to instruct his defence. Having heard medical evidence from both sides, the District Judge declined to stay the proceedings, arranged for the appointment of an intermediary and accepted the intermediary's advice as to the way in which the appellant should be assisted during the course of the hearing; he found the charge proved. This was an appeal by way of case stated in relation to the appellant's conviction at the Youth Court. (1) The High Court set out the rules for appeals and commented that the way in which the appeal had been prepared is was lamentable. (2) The District Judge had correctly followed the guidance (from DPP v P) for proceedings in the Youth Court in which capacity is relevant. (3) The defence expert confused the propriety of a prosecution with the ability to understand the nature of proceedings and communicate instructions and the District Judge was entitled to disagree with her. 2012‑12‑19 23:22:42 2012 cases, Brief summary, Criminal law capacity cases, Missing from Bailii, Transcript


AM v West London MH NHS Trust [2012] UKUT 382 (AAC), [2012] MHLO 139The tribunal twice refused to adjourn in circumstances where there was relatively little in the social circumstances report about aftercare on discharge, the author of the report did not attend the hearing, and the social worker who did attend could not provide any further relevant information. The Upper Tribunal decided that this 'did not affect the tribunal’s ability to give Mr M a fair hearing and to deal with his case fairly and justly' and that the patient 'had not yet progressed to the point where the issue of aftercare that was actually available would arise'. 2012‑12‑19 21:29:38 2012 cases, Brief summary, Powers, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


JO (qualified person - hospital order - effect) Slovakia [2012] UKUT 237 (IAC), [2012] MHLO 132The respondent had been charged with attempted murder, found not guilty by reason of insanity, and made subject to a restricted hospital order. The Secretary of State made a deportation order under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006. Under those regulations, (a) a 'qualified person' (jobseeker or worker) is entitled to reside in the UK while he remains a qualified person, (b) after five years of such residence he is entitled to reside in the UK permanently, (c) a worker or self-employed person's periods of inactivity due to illness or accident are treated as if they were periods of activity. (1) The term 'illness' should not be given a narrow or restricted meaning, either in terms of the type of illness (to exclude mental illness) or the period of incapacity (to exclude long-term illnesses). (2) Although a prison sentence does not count towards the qualifying period for permanent residence, time spent subject to a hospital order does: 'The distinction is that a prison sentence follows the choice of an individual to act in a criminal manner, whereas a Hospital Order results from a finding that the individual suffers from a mental disorder and is not therefore criminally responsible for their otherwise culpable behaviour.' [This distinction is fallacious, as it is mental state at sentencing that is relevant and most hospital orders follow a criminal conviction.] (3) The Secretary of State's challenges in relation to the respondent's 'integration' and work history were rejected as (respectively) integration was not relevant because the respondent fell within the regulations, and the FTT were entitled to reach the view it did as to work history. 2012‑12‑19 00:07:58 2012 cases, Brief summary, Repatriation cases, Transcript


Calvert v Clydesdale Bank Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 962, [2012] MHLO 131There is no requirement for a mortgagor to give consent or to be capable of giving consent at the time when the security is enforced. Accordingly, the bank were entitled to enforce their mortgage (by the appointment of receivers who sold the property) despite the mortgagor's lack of capacity. 2012‑12‑18 23:30:21 2012 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Re Johnston [2012] MHLO 130 (EPA)The donor appointed two attorneys to act jointly and severally. The donor included the following restriction: "The property at [address] shall not be disposed of without the agreement of A, B and C, as children of [the donor] in addition to the attorneys." On the attorneys' application the restriction was severed as being ineffective as part of an EPA. [OPG summary - EPA case.] 2012‑12‑18 22:17:46 2012 cases, Brief summary, EPA cases - all, EPA cases - severance of restriction fettering authority of attorney, No transcript


Re Edmonds [2012] MHLO 129 (LPA)The donor appointed a sole attorney and then two replacements, the latter to act jointly for some decisions and jointly and severally for others. She then directed as follows: "I would like my replacement attorneys to act jointly as much as possible and always where any transaction is valued at more than £5,000." On the application of the Public Guardian the words "as much as possible and always" were severed on the ground that they were uncertain and incompatible with the appointment type. [OPG summary - LPA case.] 2012‑12‑18 20:38:28 2012 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - severence of restrictions incompatible with an appointment to act jointly in some matters and jointly and severally in others, No transcript


R v Tudor [2012] EWCA Crim 1507, [2012] MHLO 127Following receipt of a psychiatric report which did not recommend a hospital order, the trial judge was entitled to impose an IPP sentence without adjourning for a second psychiatrist's report. 2012‑12‑17 01:15:24 2012 cases, Brief summary, Missing from Bailii, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


Buck v Norfolk and Waveney MH NHS Foundation Trust [2012] MHLO 123 (CC)The defendant Trust granted unescorted leave to a detained patient who then ran in front of a bus. The claimant bus driver suffered PTSD and sued the Trust. The court held that a custody authority responsible for the negligent release of a patient did not owe a duty to a victim unless that victim had been identifiable: the Trust therefore owed no duty of care to the driver. 2012‑12‑17 00:47:55 2012 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


R v B [2012] EWCA Crim 1799, [2012] MHLO 119The trial judge found the appellant unfit to plead. The appellant had admitted the act charged during an interview under caution, and the judge refused to exclude that evidence. On the basis of that evidence, the jury found that the appellant had done the act charged. (1) Given that the appellant's mental state was the same during interview as when found unfit to plead, the Court of Appeal found it impossible to understand how the interview could have been admitted: the finding that he had done the act was therefore set aside. (2) The Court of Appeal would have ordered a retrial but has no power to do; the court noted that it was 'high time that Parliament remedied this most unfortunate error in the law'. 2012‑12‑17 00:16:25 2012 cases, Brief summary, Transcript, Unfitness and insanity cases


Court Martial in the case of Sergeant Nightingale [2012] MHLO 116(1) The accused pleaded guilty of possessing (a) a Glock 9mm pistol and (b) the following live ammunition: 122 x 9mm, 40 x 7.62mm, 50 x 9mm (frangible), 50 x .338 (armour piercing), 2 x .308, 74 x 5.56mm. (2) In mitigation he relied, inter alia, on evidence from a neuropsychologist and a clinicial psychologist to the effect that a brain injury had caused memory problems and confabulation. (3) He was sentenced to 18 months for the Glock and 6 months concurrently for the ammunition. 2012‑11‑19 02:16:59 2012 cases, Brief summary, Other criminal law cases, Transcript


R (L) v West London MH NHS Trust [2012] EWHC 3200 (Admin), [2012] MHLO 114The claimant began proceedings to challenge the decision to transfer him from a medium secure unit to Broadmoor high secure hospital. (1) The claimant no longer wished to challenge the transfer decision, but the claims were of general importance and merited review, and were not merely academic, so the judge proceeded to hear the case and set out his reasons at extraordinary length. (2) The potential adverse consequences of a transfer to high security are: (a) the potential for delaying the ultimate date of discharge from detention; and (b) the potential for more restrictive detention conditions. (3) The nature of the decision making process as to whether a patient should be transferred from medium to high security is such as to engage a common law duty of fairness. (4) Subject to the need to protect persons from the risk of harm or some other substantial reason, that duty of fairness requires: (a) the patient and his advisers to be informed of any intention to refer him to high security; (b) the gist of the reasons for referral and any relevant reports to be provided; (c) the gist to be sufficiently detailed to enable meaningful and focussed representations, and reasons to be given if reports are withheld; (d) requests for additional information to be considered; (e) all such information to be communicated in time for the patient to make representations before the earliest possible of (i) the admissions panel meeting, (ii) the high security hospital accepting, (iii) the medium secure hospital deciding to transfer, or (iv) the decision being implemented; (f) all such information to be communicated immediately upon transfer at the latest; (g) reasons for the various decisions to be communicated, and to be sufficiently detailed to enable the patient to decide whether a worthwhile challenge can be made (see para 557-8). (5) In this case, in various ways, the requirements of the common law duty of fairness were not complied with and a declaration to that effect was made. (6) In relation to the Article 6 claim: (a) the transfer decision is not a 'determination' of his 'civil rights', so Article 6 does not apply; (b) but, if it did apply, and if there were a good arguable Article 8 claim, then the judicial review court would be required to exercise a fact-finding function; (c) it was inappropriate in this case for the judge to decide whether (if Article 6 applies and judicial review is inadequate) an independent panel (at least in a case turning on a disputed issue of fact) should decide on transfer; (d) similarly, it was inappropriate to decide whether (if Article 6 applies, judicial review is inadequate, and no hospital is empowered to contract out its function to a panel) the lack of provision for an independent panel makes the MHA incompatible with Article 6. 2012‑11‑15 00:25:40 2012 cases, Brief summary, Miscellaneous, Transcript


Re AS; SH v LC [2012] MHLO 113 (COP)AS's niece objected to a panel solicitor's application to be appointed deputy with specific authority to sell a property. (1) Generally speaking the order of preference for the appointment of a deputy is: (a) P's spouse or partner; (b) any other relative who takes a personal interest in P’s affairs; (c) a close friend; (c) a professional adviser, such as the family's solicitor or accountant; (d) a local authority's Social Services Department; and finally (e) a panel deputy, as deputy of last resort. (2) The court prefers to appoint a family member or close friend because of: (a) familiarity with P’s affairs, wishes and communication methods; (b) likely greater ability to consult with P and encourage participation; (c) reasons of economy; (d) the concept of deputyship of last resort. (3) The appointment of a family member will generally be a less restrictive alternative, though the question remains as to whether this will achieve the desired objective as effectively as the appointment of a panel deputy. (4) The court would not appoint a family member in cases involving, for example: (a) financial or other abuse; (b) conflict of interests; (c) an unsatisfactory track record in managing financial affairs; and (d) ongoing friction between various family members. (5) On the facts, the niece was appointed as there was no need for a deputy of last resort. (6) The general rule as to costs (that AS pay) was followed. 2012‑11‑12 23:12:51 2012 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


A, B and C v X, Y and Z [2012] EWHC 2400 (COP), [2012] MHLO 112The court considered X's capacity to marry, make a will or power of attorney, manage affairs, and litigate. (1) X did not lack capacity to marry. The basis for this assessment was correctly stated in Sheffield as follows: (a) it is not enough that someone appreciates that he or she is taking part in a marriage ceremony or understands its words; (b) he or she must understand the nature of the marriage contract; (c) this means that he or she must be mentally capable of understanding the duties and responsibilities that normally attach to marriage; (d) that said, the contract of marriage is in essence a simple one, which does not require a high degree of intelligence to comprehend, and the contract of marriage can readily be understood by anyone of normal intelligence. (2) The judge did not make a general declaration that X lacked testamentary capacity, but qualified this by saying that (a) there would be increasingly many times when X lacked such capacity, and (b) any will now made, if unaccompanied by contemporary medical evidence asserting capacity, might be seriously open to challenge. (3) The same observations applied to X's capacity to revoke or create lasting or enduring powers of attorney. (4) X lacked capacity to manage his own affairs: although a snapshot of X's condition at certain times would reveal an ability to manage his affairs, the general concept of managing affairs is an ongoing act and relates to a continuous state of affairs whose demands may be unpredictable and may occasionally be urgent. (5) X also lacked capacity to litigate: this required separate consideration because the time frame involved is different to managing affairs on the one hand, or making a will or granting power of attorney on the other. The basis for this assessment was stated in Masterman-Lister: 'whether the party to the legal proceedings is capable of understanding, with the assistance of proper explanation from legal advisers and experts in other disciplines as the case may require, the issues on which his consent or decision is likely to be necessary in the course of those proceedings'. (6) No finding was sought in relation to capacity to decide on contact, and the judge thought 'the idea that this distinguished elderly gentleman’s life should be circumscribed by contact provisions as though he was a child in a separated family' to be deeply unattractive. (7) There should be (a) a greater emphasis on judicial continuity in the COP, and (b) a pre-hearing review in any case estimated to last three days or more. 2012‑11‑12 22:59:02 2012 cases, Brief summary, LPA cases - all, LPA cases - capacity to make an LPA, Missing from Bailii, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Stoke City Council v Maddocks [2012] EWHC B31 (COP), [2012] MHLO 111(1) One of JM's children, WM, had breached court orders by, amongst other things, (a) arranging for JM to be taken from the care home to hear judgment delivered, and separately to see a solicitor, (b) discussing the possibility of moving back home with him, (c) harassing her father and employees of the local authority and care home. (2) WM was sentenced to five months' imprisonment for contempt because (a) there had been a considerable number of breaches of court orders, and (b) she had no intention, unless restrained by a severe measure by the court, of obeying the orders herself. 2012‑11‑11 06:37:42 2012 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Re Clarke [2012] EWHC 2947 (COP), [2012] MHLO 109(1) Michael Clarke's application that the court postpone a decision on costs (and in the interim to make orders for disclosure and for the production of further accounts by the Deputy and the Office of the Public Guardian) was refused. (2) The costs of the other family members and the deputy would be charged from Ann Clarke's estate. (3) In the light of the one-sided publicity that Michael Clarke gives to the affairs of the family, the three judgments were placed into the public domain. 2012‑10‑29 23:21:55 2012 cases, Brief summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript

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