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Category

2016 cases

The new database structure introduced in 2019 is more useful than this Category page: see Special:Drilldown/Cases.

The pages below are initially ordered according to the dates on which they were added to the site (most recent first). The order can be changed by clicking on the symbol beside a column heading: click on the symbol beside "Page and summary" for alphabetical order; click beside "Categories" for the order in which the cases were reported. Click on the arrow symbol again to reverse the order. Click on a page name to view the relevant page. Asterisks mark those cases which have been added to the new database structure.

Case and summary Date added Categories
Re AB [2016] EWCOP 66 — "I am asked to, and I do approve, a treatment regime for AB, which involves the administration of medication to her on a basis of deception. Not merely passive deception, which, to use a legal phrase might be characterised as suppressio veri, but active deception, which lawyers might describe as suggestio falsi. It is debateable whether there is in fact much moral difference between the two types of deception, but what is being proposed here is a treatment regime, an administration of medication, on the basis of active deception of AB. I only have to state this for the unusual nature of the case to be revealed, but the circumstances in which these facts arise demonstrate that such a course is manifestly required in the best interests of AB, notwithstanding that her personal wishes and feelings would be entirely contrary to the course that is going to ensue. AB is infected with HIV. ... The order will provide, however, that if the truth emerges to AB and she moves to a position of active resistance then the matter will have to be reviewed, and the Court will have to consider, in that situation, whether to move to forced administration of these drugs, which would be a very difficult decision to make, because it would not be a one-off administration of treatment, but would be a quotidian administration of treatment, which is a very different state of affairs to that which is normally encountered in this Court." 2018‑03‑28 09:45:15 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Medical treatment cases, No summary, Transcript


Re NS (Inherent jurisdiction: patient: liberty: medical treatment) [2016] NIFam 9, [2016] MHLO 61 — "This case relates to an elderly lady, NS. She has been represented by the Official Solicitor (OS) throughout these proceedings. ... The case therefore first came to court when the Trust sought to place NS in a residential facility after the hospital admission in May 2016. This was at a time when a stay in hospital was no longer required. The issue in the case was really whether NS should be discharged to a residential facility or to the care of MS with a care package. ... This case therefore involves consideration of a number of questions which I summarise as follows: (i) Is the patient incapable of making a decision regarding the particular issue put before the court? (ii) If so is the plan/treatment proposed in the best interests of the patient? (iii) Is the intervention necessary and proportionate pursuant to Article 8 of the ECHR? (iv) If the plan involves a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR should that be authorised by the court and if so under what terms regarding duration and review?" 2017‑02‑23 21:29:50 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Northern Irish cases, Transcript


Devon County Council v Manuel Martins and Teresa Kirk [2016] EWCOP 45, [2016] MHLO 60A consent order signed on 9/2/17, which followed an application notice dated 23/1/17 and the death of Manual Martins on 1/2/17, led to the publication of this judgment of 10/6/16, together with the lifting of all reporting restrictions. Extract from judgment: "These proceedings in the Court of Protection concern an 81 year old man called Manuel Martins, now suffering from dementia. He is currently in Portugal, having been taken there by his sister, Teresa Kirk. Previous orders have been made by other judges of this court ordering his immediate return. To date, Mrs Kirk has failed to comply with those orders and it may be therefore that she is in contempt of court as a result. That is not however a matter for this hearing. Because of the passage of time, I considered it appropriate at an earlier hearing to direct a further assessment of where Mr Martins' best interests lay. The fact is that he has now been living in Portugal for some time and I considered that it would be right in the circumstances to direct a further assessment. That assessment having now been carried out, I have today conducted a hearing to determine whether it is in Mr Martins' best interests to return to this country, to reside at a unit hereafter referred to as "A House" in the town where he lived for many years before going to Portugal, or rather to remain in his current residential unit in Portugal. ... I conclude that the balance plainly comes down in favour of a return to this country and a placement at A House." 2017‑02‑14 22:42:29 2016 cases, Best interests, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


Re DB [2016] EWCOP 30, [2016] MHLO 59 — "DB and EC are two men born and raised in Scotland. Each has a profound learning disability and complex behavioural problems. They have both been receiving treatment in the same specialist hospital in England for several years. Proceedings in respect of each man have now been started in the Court of Protection. A preliminary issue has arisen as to whether each man has acquired habitual residence in England so as to vest jurisdiction in the Court." 2017‑02‑12 21:31:18 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Victoria Wadsworth (strike off) [2016] MHLO 58 (SDT)Since 2007 Victoria Wadsworth had been in charge of a law firm's mental health department, and had invented another firm called "Healthy Minds" to pretend to write medical reports for clients, at the Legal Services Commission's expense. In the Crown Court she had admitted to obtaining £25,000 between 2007 and 2012 (though the law firm stated it had repaid £181,887.72, and the Legal Aid Agency statement referred to a value exceeding £134,000 being repaid). At the time of the hearing, she was in prison having been sentenced to three years (reduced to two on appeal) for fraud, but the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal proceeded in her absence. The Tribunal agreed that the rule 5(2) allegations which had commenced its proceedings had been superseded by the conviction and should lie on file. The Tribunal found breaches of Principle 1 (which requires a solicitor to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice), Principle 2 (which requires a solicitor to act with integrity) and Principle 6 (which requires a solicitor to behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in him and in the provision of legal services). The mitigation related to Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 proceedings, financial hardship, and caring responsibilities for her severely disabled adult son. She was struck off the roll of solicitors and ordered to pay the agreed costs of £21,864.10. 2017‑02‑11 21:38:18 2016 cases, Brief summary, SRA decisions, Transcript


R v Holloway [2016] EWCA Crim 2175, [2016] MHLO 57 — "The applicant was charged with attempted murder and wounding with intent. Two consultant psychiatrists decided that he was fit to stand trial. He was initially represented by solicitors and counsel but decided to dispense with his legal representation and represent himself. ... Subsequently, the judge decided to appoint counsel, a Mr David Malone, to assist the court and the applicant with legal issues. ... Ms Tayo asserts that the judge should have refused to allow the applicant to represent himself. She conceded, as she must, that he had been deemed fit to plead and stand trial and in principle had a right to defend himself but she maintained that the judge was obliged to force legal representation on him because of the nature and extent of his mental illness. ... Our conclusion on ground 1 can be stated shortly. This applicant had been certified fit to plead. The judge had no power to force representation on him and there was no basis in fact or law for staying the proceedings. ... It is clear that a defendant who is fit to stand trial cannot dismiss his legal representatives, insist on representing himself and then come to this court claiming he should not have been allowed to represent himself. ... The circumstances in which an advocate is appointed are very restricted. A memorandum dated 19 December 2001 agreed between the then Attorney General and Lord Chief Justice states in clear terms that an amicus will not be appointed for the purposes of cross‑examination in criminal trials and they will not be appointed 'simply because a defendant in criminal proceedings refuses representation'. Her Majesty's Attorney may consider appointing a special advocate in the Crown Court but only to perform a very limited role in relation to disclosure of sensitive documents. Mr Little invited us to note that in such a situation, it is not the court who appoints the advocate but the Attorney and the advocate does not act on behalf of an accused in cross‑examining witnesses or presenting arguments before a jury. ... It is now accepted that a court has an inherent power (and possibly a power under the Criminal Procedure Rules) to appoint an intermediary to ensure the effective participation of a vulnerable defendant in a trial. In this case, however, an intermediary was not necessary. HHJ Lyons, with the best of intentions, purported to appoint an amicus 'to assist the court' who in truth was appointed to act as a defence advocate and adviser. We see considerable force in Mr Little's submissions that, save where statute provides, there is no power to appoint an advocate in these circumstances to perform such a role. Further, there is no need for any such power. The court now has ample powers to ensure a fair trial without resorting to appointing a defence advocate where legal representation has been refused. Accordingly, we can find no basis for the appointment of Mr Malone, as helpful as he undoubtedly was to the court and to the applicant. Through no ..→ 2017‑02‑08 21:06:39 2016 cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript, Unfitness and insanity cases


Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC 3275 (QB), [2016] MHLO 56 — "On 25th August 2010 Ms Henderson ('the Claimant') stabbed her mother to death. She was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time, and her condition had recently worsened. It is common ground between the parties that this tragic event would not have happened but for the Defendant's breaches of duty in failing to respond in an appropriate way to the Claimant's mental collapse. The Claimant has now brought proceedings in the tort of negligence claiming general damages under various heads, special damages and future losses, and liability has been admitted. The Defendant's position is that all of the claims should be defeated on illegality or public policy grounds, and that binding authority of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords compels that outcome. ... In my view, there are three main questions for me to consider within the agenda circumscribed by the preliminary issue: (1) the correct interpretation of the sentencing remarks of Foskett J [in the Claimant's case], and the extent to which it is permissible, if at all, to go behind them; (2) whether there is binding authority of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords precluding some or all of these claims; and (3) if not, whether the law as accurately enunciated (there remains a dispute between the parties as to what it is) permits, or obviates, the maintenance of some or all of these claims. I frame the questions in this manner because it is the Defendant's submission that I am bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Clunis v Camden and Islington HA [1998] QB 978! and that of the House of Lords in Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1339!. If I were to uphold the Defendant's submission on stare decisis, the parties are agreed that I need not express a view on question (3) above on the hypothetical basis that I might be overruled. If, on the other hand, question (3) does properly arise for decision, the parties are agreed that the case should be listed for further argument on this point. ...I ... refuse to issue a certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969. I also refuse permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal for the reason indicated under paragraphs 99 and 104 above." 2016‑12‑27 21:07:36 2016 cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Miscellaneous, Transcript


SSJ v Staffordshire County Council and SRK [2016] EWCA Civ 1317, [2016] MHLO 55 — "The issue in this case is whether, in order for the United Kingdom to avoid being in breach of Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is necessary for a welfare order to be made by the Court of Protection pursuant to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in a case where an individual, who lacks the capacity to make decisions about where to live and the regime of care, treatment and support that he should receive, is to be given such care, treatment and support entirely by private sector providers in private accommodation in circumstances which, objectively, are a deprivation of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Convention." 2016‑12‑27 20:47:27 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University LHB v RY [2016] EWCOP 57, [2016] MHLO 54 — "On 12th October this year the applicant Health Board applied to this court for declarations both as to 'capacity' and 'best interests' under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, concerning RY, to permit withdrawal of ventilation, withholding of life-sustaining treatment, and provision of palliative care only. RY's daughter has from the beginning asserted that, when ventilation is removed, life-sustaining treatment should be provided. I am asked to approve an order filed with the consent of all the parties which provides for some life-sustaining treatment, but not CPR or further intensive care. ... However, there have been a number of recent videos taken of RY ... which have led [Dr Badwan] to conclude that RY is not in a vegetative state, but is in a minimally conscious state with some signs of being in upper minimally conscious state. ... This morning the very experienced advocates in this case presented a plan, by agreement, in which it was proposed that RY underwent a tracheostomy under general anaesthetic and, transferred to a suitable unit for further treatment and/or assessment. ... As a Judge sitting in the Court of Protection, I have experience of litigants seeking very extensive assessments and re-assessments, in a way that occurred in the Family Division in Children Act 1989 proceedings, most particularly in public law care proceedings. The reasons for both strike me as similar, namely that the decisions the Court is asked to make are of such great importance and carry such profound consequences that there is, I think, a forensic instinct to leave no stone unturned. I am bound to say however, that I sometimes feel that I am being asked to authorise a petrological survey on the upturned stone. Just as the Family Justice reforms have re-emphasised the real dangers to vulnerable children caused by avoidable delay, so to, it seems to me, practitioners in this field must recognise that delay which is not, on a true analysis, either constructive or purposeful is almost certainly damaging and thus inimical to P's welfare. Though avoidance of delay is not a statutory imperative in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 the principle is now so deeply embedded in the law of England and Wales and across every jurisdiction of law that it should be read into Court of Protection proceedings as a facet of Article 6 and 8 ECHR. It requires to be restated that the Court of Protection Rules provide for the Court to restrict expert evidence and assessment, application must be made by completing form COP9. ... Given the scale of the hypoxic damage, the preponderant evidence suggests that any significant improvement may be rather a forlorn hope. I think RY's family should be under no delusion as to the prospects. That 'flicker of hope', says the Official Solicitor, is one that should be pursued on RY's behalf. Ultimately, I have acceded to that submission but I do so on a very particular basis and that is that the assessment process, which has been outlined in framework ..→ 2016‑12‑18 21:20:13 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Medical treatment cases, No summary, Transcript


R v Fuller [2016] EWCA Crim 1867, [2016] MHLO 53(1) IPP sentence quashed and replaced with a restricted hospital order. (2) Request for anonymisation refused. 2016‑12‑15 20:47:18 2016 cases, Anonymisation cases, Brief summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Sentence appeal cases, Transcript


OH v Craven [2016] EWHC 3146 (QB), [2016] MHLO 52 — "This brings me back to the focus of my concern. The firm of solicitors who have acted in the successful litigation will have established a relationship of trust and confidence with the claimant or the litigation friend. At the successful conclusion of the litigation the person in whom trust is reposed then suggests a further transaction out of which its associate will derive a personal benefit. The adviser suggests that a private trust is the preferable arrangement, and that its associated trust corporation should be appointed trustee and should charge for acting, although there are many other trust corporations who could fulfil the role. So the client is retained for the long term. The solicitors before me suggested that this arrangement was not about an integrated business model (whereby the litigation solicitors secure for their associate the future income stream of management fees, the size of which will be under its control, together with any transactional fees) but was an arrangement for the convenience of clients who wanted a "one stop shop" in personal injury litigation. But this is a shop that stocks only one product. The principled approach to this situation is in my judgment as follows. The law irrebuttably presumes that a solicitor has influence over his client: Etridge [2001] UKHL 44! at [18]. Vesting a large sum of money to which the settlor has recently become absolutely entitled in the settlor's solicitor upon a bare trust for the settlor (but subject to charging and other powers vested in the solicitor) cannot readily be accounted for by ordinary motives. It is a transaction that calls for an explanation (in a way that making a family solicitor the trustee of a family trust or making a partner in the will draftsman's firm the prospective executor simply do not). It gives rise to a rebuttable evidential presumption that the solicitor's influence has been undue. The burden lies on the solicitor to adduce evidence rebutting this presumption. Typically, that evidence will demonstrate that the settlor had independent advice such that the constitution of the bare trust was a spontaneous act undertaken in circumstances which enabled the settlor to weigh matters up and to exercise his or her own free will. How might that be done? In my judgment where the litigation firm proposes the establishment of a "personal injury trust" in relation to a settlement of £1 million or more where its in-house trust corporation is to be a trustee then (drawing on the established practice in applications under the Variation of Trust Act 1958 and in trust compromises) a separate partner in the firm should instruct Chancery Counsel of not less than 5 years' standing to advise the claimant or the litigation friend in writing as to the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed private trust (both as to its strategic advantages and as to its exact provisions, including the advantage of trusts other than bare trusts) and as to the trusteeship arrangements: ..→ 2016‑12‑09 21:19:13 2016 cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


Devon County Council v Teresa Kirk [2016] EWCA Civ 1221, [2016] MHLO 51 — "In the circumstances of the present case, where a party was facing the likelihood of a prison sentence for contempt, but where that party, whom the court accepts had genuine and sincere objections to the welfare determination that had been made, had issued an application for permission to appeal that welfare determination, it was simply premature for the judge to press on with the committal application. The absence of an application for a stay of the order, where it is almost certain that a stay would have been granted pending receipt of the transcript of Baker J's judgment [the welfare determination], should not have been taken as justification for proceeding with the committal application. ... I end with a reminder to contemnors and their representatives of the availability of public funding. ... Whatever the limitations of civil funding, public funding in contempt cases is available under the criminal scheme. ...The effect of [a Court of Appeal decision] is that this covers all proceedings for contempt of court, whether criminal or civil in nature and whether arising in the context of criminal, civil or family proceedings. Because this is criminal public funding, it can be ordered by the court. ... In the same way, criminal public funding is available in this court." 2016‑12‑06 21:17:17 2016 cases, Contempt of court cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


Re M: Devon County Council v Teresa Kirk [2016] EWCOP 42, [2016] MHLO 50 — "This is an application made by a Local Authority for committal for contempt of court... The backdrop to this application is a long-running case in the Court of Protection concerning MM. ... The court went on to make declarations. Firstly, that MM lacked capacity. Secondly, that it was in his best interests to live in England, in the area of the South West. Thirdly, that it was not in his best interests to continue to reside at the care home in Portugal; and further ordered at para.7 that, no later than 4pm on 27 June 2016, Mrs. Kirk shall provide to the Local Authority a signed copy of the written declaration of authority... The short point about that provision in the order is that it provided for Mrs. Kirk to sign the written declaration of authority so that MM could be released to the local authority. The order had a penal notice attached to it, the recitals are very clear. ... I apply the criminal standard to the only breach with which I am concerned, which is as set out in the order. I am entirely satisfied and sure - indeed, it is accepted in the face of the court - that Mrs. Kirk has not provided the written declaration of authority... I shall pass a sentence of six months' imprisonment. However, I shall suspend the warrant for a period of seven days only to give Mrs Kirk one last chance to comply..." 2016‑12‑06 20:51:23 2016 cases, Contempt of court cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


Re NS (Inherent jurisdiction: patient: liberty: medical treatment) [2016] NIFam 9, [2016] MHLO 49 — "The applications are brought to the court under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court [in Northern Ireland]. The Trust sought a declaratory order in June to move NS from a hospital to a care home. This was opposed by MS who said that he could care for NS. However, the Trust and the Official Solicitor acting on behalf of NS felt that she would only receive the appropriate care and treatment befitting her needs in the care home. The test in relation to this has been set out by Mr Potter in a skeleton argument. He articulates this as a two-fold test, namely: (a) whether or not NS has the capacity to provide a legally valid consent to the proposed care and treatment; and (b) that the proposed care and treatment is necessary and in her best interests. The consideration of this case falls within the common law jurisdiction." 2016‑11‑29 20:45:51 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Northern Irish cases, Transcript


Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC 3032 (QB), [2016] MHLO 48 — "On 25 August 2010 the claimant killed her mother. ... She pleaded not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. Those pleas were accepted. ... The claimant remains in detention pursuant to the Mental Health Act. Long before the manslaughter, the claimant had been diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. At the time, she was under the care of the Southbourne Community Mental Health Team, within the defendant NHS Trust. An inquiry later made findings critical of the defendant's conduct. The core criticism was of a failure to act in a timely manner when alerted by a health worker, Ms Loyne, to a significant deterioration in the claimant's condition. In this unusual personal injury claim the claimant seeks damages against the defendant for personal injury in the form of psychiatric harm, and for the consequences of killing her mother. Proceedings were issued on 22 August 2013. The defendant admitted liability for negligence. Judgment on liability in negligence, with damages to be assessed, was entered by consent as long ago as 12 May 2014. By an order of 17 February 2016 Master Cook directed the trial of preliminary issues which had been proposed by the defendant. That trial is listed to take place over 3 days in the week commencing 5 December 2016. The preliminary issues concern the extent to which the claimant's claims for damages are barred by the rule of law which prohibits a person from recovering damages for the consequences of their own illegality. ... It was on Monday 14 November 2016, seven working days before the start of the preliminary issue trial window, that the claimant's solicitors filed her application. It seeks permission to amend by adding (1) claims under the Human Rights Act 1998, alleging infringement of the claimant's rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and (2) a claim for an extension of time for bringing those claims, pursuant to s 7(5)(b) of the HRA." 2016‑11‑27 00:24:59 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Miscellaneous, No summary, Transcript


Re L: K v LBX [2016] EWHC 2607 (Fam), [2016] MHLO 47 — "In essence, K says that this court should intervene because his son lacks capacity to be able to decide contact. More recently he has made an application to remove Miss O'Connell as a litigation friend for L. ... By the order I made on 15 November 2013, I found that L had capacity to decide about residence and care and I made orders under the inherent jurisdiction regulating what contact there should be between L and his father, as I considered him to be a vulnerable adult, he needed orders being made to ensure he retained his capacity... There is no evidence that L's capacity has changed." 2016‑11‑19 20:35:03 2016 cases, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


* ECHR and tribunal criteria JD v West London Mental Health NHS Trust [2016] UKUT 496 (AAC)"The patient in this case is held in conditions of exclusion and restraint that are exceptional and perhaps unique. He occupies a ‘super seclusion suite’ consisting of a room with a partition that can divide it into two. No one is allowed to enter without the partition in place, except nursing staff wearing personal protective equipment in order to administer his depot injections. He is only allowed out of the suite in physical restraints that restrict his circulation and under escort by a number of members of staff. ... The Secretary of State referred the patient’s case to the First-tier Tribunal on 28 July 2015. The hearing took place on 19 and 20 November 2015; the tribunal’s reasons are dated 23 November 2015. ... What the tribunal did not do was to deal expressly with the human rights argument put by Ms Bretherton on the patient’s behalf. On 7 January 2016, the tribunal gave permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal identifying as the issue: 'to what extent should the circumstances of the patient’s detention, and any possible breach of the European Convention as a result thereof, have any bearing on the First-tier Tribunal’s exercise of considering sections 72 and 73? Following from that, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the circumstances of a patient’s detention are a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, how should that be reflected in the decisions that the First-tier Tribunal can lawfully make?'" 2016‑11‑12 00:09:27 2016 cases, Cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Powers, Upper Tribunal decisions


GW v Gloucestershire County Council [2016] UKUT 499 (AAC), [2016] MHLO 45 — "This appeal is brought with the permission of the First-tier Tribunal against the decision of that tribunal refusing to discharge the patient from guardianship. She was first received into guardianship on 8 January 2013 and the Court of Protection first made a Standard Authorisation on 14 February 2015. The essence of the case before both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal is that the former was no longer necessary in view of the latter." 2016‑11‑12 00:00:27 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


* After-care payments and double recovery Tinsley v Manchester City Council [2016] EWHC 2855 (Admin)"Thus there is a fundamental issue between the parties which they require the court to resolve, which is whether or not it is lawful for the defendant to refuse to provide after-care services to the claimant under s117 on the basis that he has no need of such provision because he is able to fund it himself from his personal injury damages. The claimant's position is that this is unlawful, and represents a thinly disguised attempt to charge through the back door in this particular category of cases when the House of Lords has confirmed in Stennett that it is impermissible to do so in any circumstances. The defendant's position is that to allow the claimant's deputy to claim the provision of after-care services on his behalf under s.117 would offend against the principle against double recovery which has been established in the decided cases in the personal injury field, most notably by the Court of Appeal in Crofton v NHSLA [2007] EWCA Civ 71!, [2007] 1 WLR 923! and Peters v East Midlands SHA [2009] EWCA Civ 145, [2010] QB 48!." 2016‑11‑11 23:52:42 2016 cases, After-care, Cases, Judgment available on Bailii


* After-care Richards v Worcestershire County Council [2016] EWHC 1954 (Ch)"The present proceedings were issued on 6 March 2015. They seek to recover sums totalling £644,645.87, which, it is said, were spent by Mr Richards' deputy on his behalf on providing him with care. The claim is based on section 117 of the 1983 Act. It is Mr Richards' case that section 117 applied when he was released from hospital in 2004 and that, accordingly, the defendants had a duty to provide him with after-care services. He contends that that duty extended to the provision of the various services which have thus far been paid for privately. ... There are essentially two issues to consider: (i) Is it in principle possible for Mr Richards to bring a restitutionary claim? (ii) If so, can the present claim be pursued otherwise than by way of judicial review?" 2016‑10‑12 22:36:23 2016 cases, After-care, Cases, Judgment available on Bailii


V v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWCOP 29, [2016] MHLO 42 — "As the Applicant indicated might be the case she makes an application that part of her costs be paid by the Respondents on an indemnity basis. The application has been made and resisted on written submissions." 2016‑10‑09 14:42:34 2016 cases, COP costs cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


V v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWCOP 21, [2016] MHLO 41 — "The application before me is for a reporting restrictions order that extends beyond the period of the reporting restrictions order granted at the first hearing for directions in the case and was not altered by Macdonald J. By its terms it ended on C's death." 2016‑10‑09 14:39:52 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Reporting restriction order cases, Transcript


UCL Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v G [2016] EWCOP 28, [2016] MHLO 40 — "This brief judgment concerns an application by the Applicant Health Trust for the variation of a reporting restriction order (RRO) made by Hogg J on 11 March 2016 in proceedings concerning the Respondent, Miss G. That order, which is expressed to last until one month after Miss G's death, prohibits her identification or the identification of members of her family, all of whom are adults, as being concerned in these proceedings. The Trust, supported by the family, now asks for the order to be extended indefinitely. That application is opposed by the Official Solicitor on behalf of Miss G and by the Press Association in submissions lodged on its behalf by Mr Dodd." 2016‑10‑09 14:11:26 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Reporting restriction order cases, Transcript


M v Press Association [2016] EWCOP 34, [2016] MHLO 39 — "The hearing had taken place over four days in early November. On 2 November 2015 I made a reporting restriction order, prohibiting the identification of the first respondent and Mrs N in any press reporting 'during her lifetime'. I also decided that, for a period of seven days after her death, the injunction should continue. On 17 December 2015 the applicant, M, applied to vary the RRO to extend its duration until '14 days after the final judgment in the matter of V v Associated Newspapers Ltd' [2016] EWCOP 21!. In that case, to which I will refer below, Charles J was considering the scope and ambit of such Reporting Restriction Orders following the death of P. On 13 January 2016 I varied the order in the terms applied for, no party sought to contest it. On 16 December 2015 Mrs N died. On 25 April 2016 Charles J delivered the judgment in V (supra) and on 4 May 2016 M applied to vary the RRO to extend the duration 'until further order of the court'." 2016‑10‑09 13:55:42 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Reporting restriction order cases, Transcript


R (Lee-Hirons) v SSJ [2016] UKSC 46, [2016] MHLO 38 — "A man is convicted of an offence. Satisfied that he is suffering from mental disorder, the court makes an order for his detention in hospital. Satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of the public, the court also makes a restriction order, which removes from the hospital the power to discharge him. In due course a tribunal directs his discharge from hospital on conditions. Afterwards, however, the Secretary of State for Justice (“the Minister”) exercises his power to recall the man to hospital, where he is subject to renewed detention. This appeal is about the explanation for the recall which the law requires the Minister to provide to the man both at the time of his recall and soon afterwards." 2016‑10‑07 21:15:28 2016 cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Ministry of Justice, Transcript


Re FD (Inherent Jurisdiction: Power of Arrest) [2016] EWHC 2358 (Fam), [2016] MHLO 37 — "FD is an 18 year old young woman. In July 2016 a local authority issued proceedings seeking an injunction under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to prevent AD (her father) and GH (a male friend) from having contact with FD and from going to her home. So far as concerns the application for an injunction against GH, the local authority also seeks a power of arrest. The issue before the court is whether a power of arrest may be attached to an injunction granted by the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction in the case of a vulnerable adult who has capacity. ... It is clear that under its inherent jurisdiction the High Court has a wide and largely unfettered discretion to grant injunctive relief to protect vulnerable adults. That discretionary power is at least as wide as its powers in wardship. In Re G the Court of Appeal was in no doubt that under its inherent jurisdiction in wardship the High Court has no power to attach a power of arrest to an injunction. I am in no doubt that the position is exactly the same so far as concerns the inherent jurisdiction to protect vulnerable adults. ... [I]t appears that FD will again be unrepresented at the next hearing, on 17th October, at which the court will determine whether she is a vulnerable person in respect of whom the court should exercise its inherent protective jurisdiction. FD does not accept that she is a vulnerable adult. Neither does she support the local authority's application for injunctions against AD and GH. If she is not, in fact, a vulnerable adult then the orders sought by the local authority would, if made, be in breach of FD's Article 8 right to respect for her private and family life. I make that point simply to highlight the importance and significance for FD of the decisions the court is being invited to make. At the hearing on 17th October FD will be a litigant in person defending an application by a local authority represented by leading counsel. There will be no equality of arms. However hard the court tries to ensure that there is a level playing field, the reality is that FD will be significantly disadvantaged. I can do no more than to invite the Legal Aid Agency to reconsider its decision as a matter of urgency." 2016‑10‑01 23:03:14 2016 cases, ICLR summary, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript


Staffordshire County Council v SRK [2016] EWCOP 27, [2016] MHLO 36 — "This case concerns an individual SRK who was severely injured in a road traffic accident. The effects of those injuries are that (a) he lacks capacity to make decisions on the regime of care, treatment and support that he should receive (SRK's care regime), and (b) applying the approach in Cheshire West (see Surrey County Council v P and others; Cheshire West and Chester Council v P and another [2014] UKSC 19!, [2014] AC 896!), SRK's care regime creates, on an objective assessment, a deprivation of liberty. SRK was awarded substantial damages that were paid to his property and affairs deputy (the third Respondent IMTC). He lives at a property that has been bought and adapted for him. His regime of care and support there is provided by private sector providers. The damages funded that purchase and adaptation and fund that regime of care. The issue is whether this situation on the ground is a deprivation of liberty that has to be authorised by the Court of Protection (the COP) by it making a welfare order. The test that the COP would apply in making such an order is whether SRK's care regime is the least restrictive available option to best promote his best interests. The same test applies to the decision makers on the ground. It is common ground that at present SRK's care regime satisfies that test." 2016‑09‑25 21:18:42 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript


Re W (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13, [2016] MHLO 35 — "In this case, Miss W, a young woman aged 28, has suffered from a severe and enduring eating disorder for 20 years, with physical, social and psychological consequences of the kind described above. In this judgment I will call her W. Since the age of 11, she has had six admissions for inpatient treatment, spread between five units around the country and amounting to about 10 years in total. Her current admission has lasted for 2½ years and yet, despite the most intensive support, she is barely eating and is losing weight at the rate of 500 g – 1 kg per week. She now weighs less than 30 kg and her BMI is 12.6. If she continues to lose weight at this rate, she will die. ... The outcome is that, accepting the unanimous professional view, I approve the plan of the Health Board. This is that W should now be discharged into the community with a closely thought-out package of support for her and her family. Given W's fragile condition, it is a plan that has only been arrived at after the most anxious consideration by her care team. It will at first seem counterintuitive that someone so ill should be discharged from hospital. The conventional assumption is that hospital treatment is likely to bring benefits, but the evidence has persuaded me that in this case that is not so. The outcome is to some extent in accordance with W's wishes, which I will describe below." 2016‑09‑25 20:53:00 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Medical treatment cases, No summary, Transcript


Re CS (Termination of Pregnancy) [2016] EWCOP 10, [2016] MHLO 34 — "This is an application by a Hospital Trust for orders in respect of a young woman, who I will refer to as CS, who is said to lack capacity and in respect of whom the Trust seeks an order that it would be in her best interests to undergo surgery terminating her current pregnancy. This hearing is being conducted in the Court of Protection in open court in accordance with the Rules but subject to a reporting restriction order which I made earlier this afternoon." 2016‑08‑31 21:30:24 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Medical treatment cases, No summary, Transcript


Re Clarke [2016] EWCOP 11, [2016] MHLO 33 — "In 2012, I gave three judgments in this matter. ... A written application has now been made by Mr Michael Clarke on 3 September 2015 to vary the order of 9 October 2012 so as to allow the sale of Mrs Clarke’s Blackpool property. There has also been a request by Ms Angela Wilde and Mr Kevin Clarke for access to the property in order to inspect and maintain it, but no application has been issued, despite time being allowed. The application and request are both opposed." 2016‑08‑31 21:17:47 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


The NHS Acute Trust v C [2016] EWCOP 17, [2016] MHLO 32 — "The applicant Trusts provide obstetric and psychiatric care and services to the respondent, C. They have made applications for an order (i) in the Court of Protection to permit the applicants to undertake various steps and measures in respect of C's forthcoming labour; and (ii) a reporting restrictions order." 2016‑08‑31 20:59:57 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Medical treatment cases, No summary, Transcript


Re JM [2016] EWCOP 15, [2016] MHLO 31 — "These five cases are examples of cases in which the procedure to be adopted by the Court of Protection (COP) was left open in my judgment in Re NRA [2015] EWCOP 59, [2015] MHLO 66. That judgment contains the references to the decision of the Supreme Court in Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19, [2014] MHLO 16 and of the President and the Court of Appeal in Re X (Court of Protection Practice) [2015] EWCA Civ 599, [2015] MHLO 44, which are the essential background to NRA. In short, the five cases were chosen as cases in which it was thought that there was no family member or friend who could be appointed as a Rule 3A representative. That is no longer the position in VE and my reference to the test cases in this judgment are to the remaining four." 2016‑08‑31 20:40:27 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


Re RP [2016] EWCOP 1, [2016] MHLO 30 — "This is a dispute about the appointment of a deputy for property and affairs ..." 2016‑08‑29 21:57:46 2016 cases, Deputyship cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


Re A: C v D [2016] EWCOP 3, [2016] MHLO 29 — "This is a contested application for the appointment of a new deputy for property and affairs and a new trustee." 2016‑08‑29 21:37:35 2016 cases, Deputyship cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


PJV v Assistant Director Adult Social Care Newcastle City Council [2016] EWCOP 7, [2016] MHLO 28 — "I am pleased record that the parties addressed these points [(i) the imposition of a term in a trust directed to the risk that a perpetrator would benefit from the award, (ii) the terms of the appointment of a deputy, (iii) the declaratory relief granted and the discharge of the Deputy, and (iv) the Peters undertaking and a restriction on the powers of the trustees]. I attach in Parts 1 and 2 of the Schedule hereto (i) the wording for the appointment of a deputy that was agreed, and (ii) the terms of the trust that were agreed (anonymised save for the identity of the original trustee). I also record that, as the appointment of the deputy was discharged, it was agreed that there was no need for a Peters undertaking. It seems to me that the agreed wording for the appointment of a deputy should be a useful precedent or starting point in other cases." (CICA case.) 2016‑08‑29 21:22:12 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


WBC v Z [2016] EWCOP 4, [2016] MHLO 27 — "The central issue which arises in this case is whether risks taken by a 20-year old young woman with autism represent 'unwise' decision-making, or evidence her lack of capacity." 2016‑08‑29 21:02:08 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Other capacity cases, Transcript


North Yorkshire County Council v MAG [2016] EWCOP 5, [2016] MHLO 26 — "I have had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the applications for permission should be granted and the appeals allowed. ... This appears to be a case in which DJ Glentworth uncharacteristically appears to have allowed her understandable concern about MAG's living circumstances, and her palpable frustration at what she saw as NYCC's tardiness in resolving his accommodation issues, to distract her from following a clear path to outcome. The result is one which I consider is unsupportable, and wrong. Picking six key themes from the arguments, I divide my discussion of the judgment into the following sub-headings: (i) Did the judge ask herself the correct question(s)? (ii) The effect of Re MN on these facts; (iii) Has there has been a breach of Article 5? (iv) Taking a decision which MAG could not take for himself; (v) No alternative option; impermissible pressure; (vi) The factual findings." 2016‑08‑29 19:29:12 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


Al-Jeffery v Al-Jeffery (Vulnerable adult, British citizen) [2016] EWHC 2151 (Fam), [2016] MHLO 25 — "There are two applications before the court. One asks the court to make a statutory forced marriage protection order. The other asks the court to make orders, including mandatory orders, in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to make orders protective of vulnerable adults. ... She now claims that she is being seriously ill-treated by her father and being kept under constraint by him in his flat; and that she is being prevented by him from leaving Saudi Arabia and travelling to Wales or England, which she wishes to do, and is, in the eyes of the law of Wales and England, fully entitled freely to do. ... The father, against whom I [am] asked to make an order, is not a British citizen and owes no allegiance to our Sovereign or this state. Neither of them are present here. Neither of them have lived here for several years. Both of them are citizens of Saudi Arabia and both of them currently live there. There have, indeed, already been recent legal proceedings between them there. Should I, nevertheless, attempt to help her by making the essential order which she seeks for her return here; or should I appreciate that that would be exorbitant and, in my judicial discretion, decline to do so? That is the essential issue and dilemma in this case." 2016‑08‑27 09:09:22 2016 cases, Capacity to consent to sexual relations, Inherent jurisdiction cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


Poole v Everall [2016] EWHC 2126 (Ch), [2016] MHLO 24 — "The claimants are David's brothers ... who had benefited under previous wills prepared with the assistance of the Deputy, including one made on 29 February 2012 of which they seek proof in solemn form, but receive nothing in the December will. They allege that that will was not duly executed, that David lacked testamentary capacity and/or did not know and approve of its contents, and/or that its execution was procured by undue influence on Mr. Everall's part." 2016‑08‑20 21:16:39 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Testamentary capacity cases, Transcript


Jimoh Adun of Nieko Solicitors (SRA decision: control of practice) [2016] MHLO 23(1) The SRA decided on 15/7/15 (decision published 24/7/15) that Mr Adun's practising certificate for 2014/2015 would be subject to the following conditions: "(a) Mr Adun is not to be a recognised sole practitioner, manager or owner of any authorised body or authorised non-SRA firm; (b) Mr Adun shall immediately inform any actual or prospective employer and relevant authorised body's authorised signatory and/or organisation contact of these conditions and the reasons for their imposition." (2) Reasons: "Jimoh Adun is subject to Regulation 3 of the SRA Practising Regulations 2011. He was the sole manager and owner of the firm Nieko Solicitors, which was subject to an intervention decision dated 5 December 2014. The grounds for intervention were abandonment of practice and that the intervention was necessary to protect the interests of clients (former or potential) of Mr Adun. The SRA had been advised that he was being investigated by the Legal Aid Agency. His conduct is currently being investigated by the SRA." 2016‑07‑30 22:46:06 2016 cases, Brief summary, No transcript, SRA decisions


Re A (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 759, [2016] MHLO 22 — "This is an appeal against the making of a declaration by Mrs Justice Parker on 20 June 2016 whereby she declared that: 'It is lawful and in A's best interest to remove his respiratory support by extubating him and, if he becomes unstable, not to reintroduce his respiratory support again but instead generally to furnish such treatment by way of pain relief or sedation and nursing as may be appropriate to ensure that A suffers the least distress and pain at the time and in the manner of his dying.'" 2016‑07‑13 22:02:15 2016 cases, Best interests, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


R v Orr [2016] EWCA Crim 889, [2016] MHLO 21 — "The appeal concerns the definition of 'fitness to plead' and the process engaged by the trial judge in the instant trial which proceeded after he found the defendant 'unfit to be cross examined'. ... Once the issue of fitness to plead has been raised it must be determined. In this case, the judge explicitly found that the appellant had been fit to participate in his trial up to the point of cross examination and thereby implicitly determined that the appellant was no longer able to fully participate in his trial within the 'Pritchard' refined criteria. In these circumstances, the procedure to be adopted was clearly set out by section Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, 4A. We agree with the submission that this is a statutory mandatory requirement which cannot be avoided by the court's general discretion to order proceedings otherwise, however beneficial to the defendant they may appear. It follows that, in this case, the jury should not have been allowed to return a verdict, other than a verdict of acquittal if they were not satisfied on the evidence already given in the trial that the appellant did the act charged against him. The appeal against conviction must be allowed." 2016‑07‑09 21:55:06 2016 cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript, Unfitness and insanity cases


McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28, [2016] MHLO 20 — "This appeal raises three questions. The first is whether a court, when entertaining a claim for possession by a private sector owner against a residential occupier, should be required to consider the proportionality of evicting the occupier, in the light of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The second question is whether, if the answer to the first question is yes, the relevant legislation, in particular section 21(4) of the Housing Act 1988, can be read so as to comply with that conclusion. The third question is whether, if the answer to the first and second questions is yes, the trial judge would have been entitled to dismiss the claim for possession in this case, as he said he would have done. ... The appellant, Fiona McDonald, is aged 45 and, sadly, she has had psychiatric and behavioural problems since she was five. ... In those circumstances, her parents, who are technically the respondents to this appeal, decided to buy a property for her to occupy. ... However, owing to financial difficulties which they unfortunately encountered in their business, they failed to meet all the [loan] interest as it fell due. ... the Receivers served a notice ... indicating that they would be seeking possession of the property." 2016‑06‑20 21:53:27 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Miscellaneous, No summary, Transcript


R v Ahmed [2016] EWCA Crim 670, [2016] MHLO 19 — "Saber Ahmed 31, was tried for murder in the Crown Court at Birmingham in 2006 before HHJ Matthews and a jury. On 3 August 2006 he was acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. On 20 October 2006 HHJ Matthews sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 3 years and 6 months, less 462 days spent on remand. The judge recommended deportation. ... We are satisfied that in all the circumstances of this case it is appropriate to impose a hospital order with a restriction order. This is no reflection on the sentencing judge who passed the only sentence available to him on the evidence at the time. We quash the life sentence and we impose orders under Sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983, the latter without limit of time. To that extent the appeal is allowed." 2016‑06‑11 20:34:39 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Life sentence cases, No summary, Transcript


Home Office (Central government) (2016) UKICO FS50618706, [2016] MHLO 18 — "The complainant has requested information about police powers under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act to detain mentally disordered persons found in public places. By the date of this notice the Home Office had not responded to the request. The Commissioner’s decision is that by failing to respond to the request, the Home Office breached sections 1(1) and 10(1) of the FOIA. The Commissioner requires the Home Office to take the following steps. to ensure compliance with the legislation: Issue a response to the request under the FOIA by either complying with section 1(1) or issuing a valid refusal notice. The Home Office must take these steps within 35 calendar days of the date of this decision notice. Failure to comply may result in the Commissioner making written certification of this fact to the High Court pursuant to section 54 of the Act and may be dealt with as a contempt of court." The request was: "What qualifies a constable to take decisions regarding the mental health of a member of the public, and how is this not a breach of human rights. This is a particularly important request in the context that police forces are unlawfully detaining innocent members of the public by use of this Act." 2016‑05‑26 13:02:00 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Miscellaneous, No summary, Transcript


South Staffordshire and Shropshire Healthcare NHSFT v Hospital Managers of St George's Hospital [2016] EWHC 1196 (Admin), [2016] MHLO 17 — "This is an application for judicial review of a decision by an independent panel on 12 April 2016 to discharge the Interested Party, AU, from detention under the Mental Health Act 1983. It is brought by South Staffordshire and Shropshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and Dr Whitworth (previously AU's responsible clinician). ... To put the case in general terms the claimants are concerned about the Panel's decision to discharge AU in the light of the views of the clinical team and also a decision of the First Tier Tribunal ... which decided on 10 March 2016 not to discharge him from detention. ... The judicial review raises an important point of principle as to the capacity of a body to seek judicial review of a decision which it could have made itself. In broad terms the Trust appointed the Panel and under the 1983 Act it exercised delegated powers. Because AU raised this point in his grounds, Warby J joined Dr Whitworth as a second claimant to the action on 4 May 2016 on the basis that, if the Trust could not seek judicial review, she could. If the Trust and Dr Whitworth can seek judicial review, the grounds they advance against the Panel's decision are, first, that it failed to treat the Tribunal's decision as a relevant consideration and, secondly, that the Panel's decision is irrational in light of the evidence available and the reasons it has given." 2016‑05‑22 22:45:03 2016 cases, Hospital managers hearings, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Re-sectioning after hearing, Transcript


Re Daniel X [2016] EWFC B31, [2016] MHLO 16 — "This is the final hearing of the care proceedings brought by Thurrock Borough Council in relation to Daniel X, a boy of 10. ... It is also the final hearing of the application by Thurrock Borough Council for me to authorise them to deprive Daniel of his liberty by accommodating him in Y Home. ... The outstanding issue is that of Daniel's liberty, and there is a great deal of consensus on this point too. However, it has been agreed at the bar that it would be helpful if I set out the position in law and how I consider the law applies to Daniel." 2016‑05‑13 21:33:48 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


RP v Dudley and Walsall Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust [2016] UKUT 204 (AAC), [2016] MHLO 15Unsuccessful Article 8 challenge to conditions of discharge. 2016‑05‑09 22:44:39 2016 cases, Brief summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


Pennine Care NHS Trust v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 222 (TC), [2016] MHLO 14 — "The Appellant appeals against a decision dated 29 July 2011 issued by the Commissioners of Revenue and Customs that the construction services and materials received by the Appellant in the course of the construction of a mental health residential unit are not subject to zero rating for the purposes of VAT. Both parties agreed that the issue in this appeal is whether Prospect Place Low Secure Mental Health Unit was intended for use as a hospital or similar institution. HMRC contend that it was and therefore the supplies were standard rated. The Appellant contends that the use of the Unit satisfies paragraphs (b) and/or (g) of Note (4) and the exception for use as a hospital or similar institution does not apply; accordingly the supplies were eligible for zero rating." 2016‑05‑04 22:49:59 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Miscellaneous, No summary, Transcript


Re P (Huntingdon's disease patient at Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University Hospitals NHS Trust) [2016] MHLO 13This case involved a man in his 30s in the advanced stages of Huntington’s disease who had repeatedly pulled out a feeding tube attached to his stomach. The Trust applied for a ruling on what treatment would be in his best interests. Having heard evidence from a consultant neurologist (who said that it would not be right, and would be futile, to re-insert the feeding tube), and other evidence, including from relatives, Hayden J concluded that the tube should not be reinserted, even though this would hasten the man’s death. (Summary based on Press Association article.) 2016‑05‑01 20:16:08 2016 cases, Best interests, Brief summary, Transcript


R (O) v SSHD [2016] UKSC 19, [2016] MHLO 12 — "The appellant, O, is a woman of Nigerian nationality, aged 38. In November 2003, with her son, then aged three, she illegally entered the UK. In July 2008 she pleaded guilty to offences of cruelty towards her son, who had returned to live in Nigeria, and the court sentenced her to 12 months' imprisonment and recommended that she be deported. On 8 August 2008 her sentence came to an end, whereupon the respondent, the Home Secretary, detained her - at first pending the making of a deportation order and then, following the making of such an order, pending her deportation pursuant to it. O's detention, which was at the Immigration Removal Centre at Yarl's Wood in Bedfordshire, continued until 6 July 2011 when, pursuant to a grant of bail on 1 July 2011, she was released. It follows that O was detained at Yarl's Wood for almost three years. The court knows nothing about her circumstances after 6 July 2011 but infers that she has not, or not yet, been deported. ... In the present proceedings, which - chronologically - encompass her fourth claim for judicial review, O challenges the lawfulness of the later period of her detention, namely from 22 July 2010, and in particular from say 4 March 2011, until 6 July 2011. The object of the present proceedings has never been to secure her release, which had already occurred at the time of their issue. The object has been to secure a declaration that the detention was unlawful and, perhaps in particular, an award of substantial damages for false imprisonment. ... O has the misfortune to have suffered for many years from serious mental ill-health. So the appeal requires this court to consider the Home Secretary's policy relating to the detention of the mentally ill pending deportation; and perhaps also to identify the criterion by which the court should determine a complaint that she has failed to implement some aspect of her policy relating to it. Furthermore the Home Secretary is obliged to conduct monthly reviews of whether a person's detention pending deportation should continue. There were, as the Court of Appeal held, defects in the Home Secretary's conduct of the monthly reviews of O's detention between March and July 2011. ... [W]ere O's claim for judicial review permitted to proceed, the result in all likelihood would be a declaration that her detention from 4 March 2011 to 6 July 2011 was unlawful and an award to her of damages in the sum of £1. ... I would dismiss the appeal." 2016‑04‑28 13:48:52 2016 cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Repatriation cases, Transcript


Re Z (Recognition of Foreign Order) [2016] EWHC 784 (Fam), [2016] MHLO 11 — "This judgment considers the exercise of the court's powers under the inherent jurisdiction to recognise and enforce orders concerning the medical treatment of children made by courts of another member state of the European Union. On 4 March 2016, I made an interim order in respect of a girl, Z, who lives in the Republic of Ireland, declaring that orders made by the High Court of Ireland on 2 March 2016 should stand as orders of this court, thereby permitting emergency admission for treatment in a hospital in this country. At a hearing on is notice on 23rd March, I made a further interim order to that effect. This judgment set out the reasons for those orders." 2016‑04‑08 20:38:22 2016 cases, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript


LB Southwark v KA (Capacity to Marry) [2016] EWCOP 20, [2016] MHLO 10 — "These proceedings under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 concern a 29 year old learning disabled man, KA, one of five children of a Bangladeshi family. I am asked to make declarations that KA lacks capacity to make decisions as to: (a) Litigation; (b) Personal care and welfare; (c) Sexual relations; (d) Marry. It is common ground that KA does not have capacity to litigate thus the Official Solicitor is his litigation friend." 2016‑04‑03 21:09:56 2016 cases, Capacity to consent to sexual relations, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


R v Marcantonio [2016] EWCA Crim 14, [2016] MHLO 9 — "This is the judgment in two cases, an appeal against conviction (R v. Marcantonio) and an application for permission to appeal against conviction (R v. Chitolie), which have in common the submission that the appellant/applicant in each case was unfit to plead, within section 4, Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, at the time of his trial, and that this court should therefore quash his conviction and consider the exercise of its powers under section 6, Criminal Appeals Act 1968. A third case (R v. T) was heard at the same time. A separate judgment is handed down in that case which, because of the orders made, is subject to reporting restrictions." 2016‑02‑25 01:02:13 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript, Unfitness and insanity cases


A Local Health Board v Y (A Child) [2016] EWHC 206 (Fam), [2016] MHLO 8 — "In all the circumstances, therefore, I conclude that the course proposed by the clinicians is in Y's best interests. In accordance with the parties' ultimate agreement, I therefore conclude that (1) It is lawful and will be in Y's best interests for him to be extubated at the point where the clinicians, following discussion with Y's family, consider that his condition is optimal for extubation, and that "optimal" for these purposes is likely to mean when (a) he remains on minimal ventilation: (b) he has a body temperature of less than 37.5 and (c) that he has not required CPR for the previous 12 hours; (2) Upon extubation, it is lawful and in his best interests not to re-intubate him if he is unable to support his own respiration. (3) Upon extubation, it is lawful and in his best interests not to receive CPR (save for stimulation, which may be provided) or ventilation or inotropes." 2016‑02‑17 22:02:45 2016 cases, Best interests, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


* Immigration detention R (VC) v SSHD [2016] EWHC 273 (Admin), [2016] MHLO 7Repatriation case with mental health background. "There are two strands to the contentions made by the Claimant in this claim, as argued before me: (1) a challenge to the lawfulness of his detention on the basis that it was in breach of (a) the Defendant's policy on detaining the mentally ill which, had it been applied lawfully, would have precluded the Claimant's detention; (b) Hardial Singh principle 3 because from 31 October 2014 there was no realistic prospect of the Claimant's removal within a reasonable timescale; and (c) Hardial Singh principle 2 because the Claimant was detained for an unreasonable length of time. (2) a challenge to the treatment of the Claimant in detention on the basis that it was: (a) in violation of Article 3 ECHR; (b) contrary to the Mental Capacity Act 2005; (c) discriminatory, contrary to the Equality Act 2010; and (d) procedurally unfair." 2016‑02‑17 21:59:28 2016 cases, Cases, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Repatriation cases


* Freezing order continued Lord Chancellor v John Blavo [2016] EWHC 126 (QB), [2016] MHLO 6There was a strongly arguable case that John Blavo was party to an arrangement whereby false claims were submitted to the LAA in many thousands of cases, there was evidence of a less than scrupulous approach to his duty of disclosure to the Court, and evidence of a recent attempt improperly to put property beyond the reach of the Lord Chancellor. Taking these matters together there was a real risk that any judgment would go unsatisfied because of disposal of assets. Given the sums of money involved and the admitted financial difficulties it was just and convenient in all the circumstances to continue the freezing order. (The precursor to the official investigation was an audit during which 49 files were passed to the LAA's counter-fraud team, whose conclusions included: "In respect of 42 of these 49 files HMCTS have confirmed that they have no record of there having been tribunal proceedings either in respect of the individual client or on the date when the file indicates...Following this, the LAA made inquiries of the NHS on a selection of files among the 42 that had no tribunal hearing and the NHS confirmed that they have no records relating to 16 of the clients... After completing this analysis the Applicant undertook a further comparison of all mental health tribunal claims against the HMCTS system. As a result of this analysis, it was found that the Company had submitted a total of 24,658 claims for attendance at tribunals of which 1485 (6%) tribunals were recorded by HMCTS as having taken place... After visiting the Company's Head Office and requesting documentation from the Company and the Respondent, the LAA team used an electronic sampling tool to randomly select 144 cases for further investigation, across the last three complete financial years. Only 3% could be evidenced from HMCTS records...") 2016‑02‑02 15:46:47 2016 cases, Cases, Judgment available on Bailii, Judgment available on MHLO, Miscellaneous, Transcript


Birmingham City Council v D [2016] EWCOP 8, [2016] MHLO 5(1) A parent cannot consent to the confinement (i.e. the objective element of Article 5 deprivation of liberty) of a child who has attained the age of 16. (2) The confinement was imputable to the state despite the accommodation being provided under s20 Children Act 1989, as the local authority had taken a central role; in any event, even if D's confinement were a purely private affair the state would have a positive obligation under Article 5(1) to protect him. (3) The judge did not resile from his previous judgment that D's parents could consent to his confinement in hospital when he was under 16. 2016‑01‑31 23:02:21 2016 cases, Brief summary, Deprivation of liberty, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript


R (Sisangia) v Director of Legal Aid Casework [2016] EWCA Civ 24, [2016] MHLO 4This was a claim for false imprisonment and assault arising out of arrest and detention by the police. Paragraph 21 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 relates to Legal Aid for civil legal services under the heading "Abuse of position or powers by public authority". Following an initial refusal of Legal Aid, this case concerned the interpretation of sub-paragraph (4): "For the purposes of this paragraph, an act or omission by a public authority does not constitute an abuse of its position or powers unless the act or omission (a) is deliberate or dishonest, and (b) results in harm to a person or property that was reasonably foreseeable." The High Court had held that (a) paragraph 21(4) was a comprehensive definition of what was entailed in a claim for abuse of position or power (rather than a statement of the minimum criteria for such a claim), and (b) for the purposes of the definition in this case it was only the arrest itself that had to be deliberate (it was not necessary to allege that the arresting officers knew that they had no power of arrest). The Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal, held that: (a) the judge, in interpreting the words so that that any deliberate act by a public authority that causes reasonably foreseeable harm to another would count as an abuse of power, had ignored what it was that was being defined ("abuse of position or power") and gave no weight at all to the meaning of that phrase: abuse of position or power is a recognised juridical concept which, like many other public law concepts, is both flexible and context-specific and should, therefore, be given meaning in paragraph 21(4); (b) something more than an intentional tort (requiring only a deliberate act, such as, here, false imprisonment) is necessary before the impugned act becomes an "abuse of power": in this case it was not merely the fact of arrest, but the arrest without lawful justification, which had to be deliberate or dishonest. The Court of Appeal noted that a general policy not to fund purely money claims is what explains the anomaly that a claimant able to bring judicial review proceedings under paragraph 19 may add a claim for damages without having to satisfy any equivalent of paragraph 21(4). (There is also no equivalent in paragraph 20, for habeas corpus, or in paragraph 22, for significant breach of Convention rights.) 2016‑01‑28 16:34:26 2016 cases, Detailed summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Miscellaneous, Transcript


MM v WL Clinic [2016] UKUT 37 (AAC), [2016] MHLO 3Charles J refused permission to appeal his earlier decision (the main point of which was that, for the purposes of Article 5, a restricted patient with the capacity to do so can give a valid and effective consent to conditions of a conditional discharge that when implemented will, on an objective assessment, create a deprivation of liberty). The Secretary of State can seek permission from the Court of Appeal [and subsequently did]. 2016‑01‑28 00:16:49 2016 cases, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript, Upper Tribunal decisions


R (C) v SSJ [2016] UKSC 2, [2016] MHLO 2(1) There is no presumption of anonymity in proceedings which are about the compulsory powers of detention, care and treatment under the 1983 Act: in each case the judge must decide whether or not anonymity is necessary in the interests of the patient. (2) On the facts, an anonymity order was necessary in the interests of this particular patient. Extracts from judgment: "The first issue before us is whether there should be a presumption of anonymity in civil proceedings, or certain kinds of civil proceedings, in the High Court relating to a patient detained in a psychiatric hospital, or otherwise subject to compulsory powers, under the Mental Health Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”). The second issue is whether there should be an anonymity order on the facts of this particular case. ... The question in all these cases is that set out in CPR 39.2(4): is anonymity necessary in the interests of the patient? It would be wrong to have a presumption that an order should be made in every case. There is a balance to be struck. The public has a right to know, not only what is going on in our courts, but also who the principal actors are. This is particularly so where notorious criminals are involved. They need to be reassured that sensible decisions are being made about them. On the other hand, the purpose of detention in hospital for treatment is to make the patient better, so that he is no longer a risk either to himself or to others. That whole therapeutic enterprise may be put in jeopardy if confidential information is disclosed in a way which enables the public to identify the patient. It may also be put in jeopardy unless patients have a reasonable expectation in advance that their identities will not be disclosed without their consent. In some cases, that disclosure may put the patient himself, and perhaps also the hospital, those treating him and the other patients there, at risk. The public’s right to know has to be balanced against the potential harm, not only to this patient, but to all the others whose treatment could be affected by the risk of exposure. ... I conclude that an anonymity order is necessary in the interests of this particular patient. His regime before he left hospital, involving escorted leave in the community, demonstrated the need for anonymity and the case is even stronger now (as foreseen in R (M) v Parole Board). Without it there is a very real risk that the progress he has made during his long years of treatment in hospital will be put in jeopardy and his re-integration in the community, which was an important purpose of his transfer to hospital, will not succeed. I would therefore allow this appeal and maintain the anonymity order in place." 2016‑01‑27 23:45:15 2016 cases, Anonymisation cases, Brief summary, ICLR summary, Judgment available on Bailii, Transcript


R (Speck) v HM Coroner for District of York [2016] EWHC 6 (Admin), [2016] MHLO 1 — "Drawing these strands together, my conclusions were as follows. First, that the duty of the coroner was limited to a duty to investigate those matters which caused, or at least arguably appeared to him to have caused or contributed to, the death. Secondly, that the claimant was unable to show even an arguable case that any body was at the material time under a duty, statutory or otherwise, to establish a health-based place of safety at a time, and in a location, such that Miss Speck could have been taken to such a facility in June 2011. Thirdly, that the claimant was therefore unable to show even an arguable case that Miss Speck's death was caused or contributed to by a breach of such a duty. Fourthly, that the coroner was therefore correct to decline to investigate issues as to the non-availability of a health-based place of safety: to have done so would have been to investigate matters which fell outside his statutory duty under section 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Lastly, that even if I had been persuaded that it was within the coroner's discretion to investigate such matters, I would have found there was no basis on which it could be said that his decision not to do so was a perverse or otherwise unlawful exercise of that discretion." 2016‑01‑17 19:50:20 2016 cases, Inquests, Judgment available on Bailii, No summary, Transcript


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